Este articulo es, a dia de hoy, una de las piezas clasicas y fundamentales para la posibilidad de estudiar las relaciones globales de poder a partir de las herramientas conceptuales desarrolladas por Gramsci a lo largo de su obra. Cox, contribuye de esta forma a las corrientes criticas de las Relaciones Internacionales al discutir varios conceptos gramscianos y cuales serian las implicaciones para estudiar las relaciones internacionales en distintos periodos de hegemonia y contrahegemonia. De igual forma, el autor planteo la cuestion –en su momento novedosa– de la relevancia de tomar en cuenta los procesos internos de construccion de bloques historicos contrahegemonicos como aquellos que podrian tener un efecto revolucionario en las estructuras y organizaciones internacionales, asi como ruptura con la hegemonia plasmada como una clase perteneciente a un orden economico universal transnacional.  This article is a classic and fundamental for approaching global power relations with the conceptual tools developed by Gramsci. Cox contributes to critical thought in International Relations by discussing various gramscian concepts and what their implications are for the study of different historical forms of hegemony and counter-hegemony. Also, the author draws our attention –novel at the time of its publicaction– to the relevance of taking into account the construction of domestic counter-hegemonic historic blocs. He suggests that these could have a revolutionary effect on international structures and organizations, as well as rupture with the hegemony performed by the transnational economic order.

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Gramsci, hegemonía y relaciones internacionales: Un ensayo sobre el método | Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method

Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy

Preface. Part I: Law as Fundamental Policy: Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective. 1. Criteria for a Theory about Law. 2. Trends in Theories about Law: Establishing and Maintaining Observational Standpoint. 3. Trends in Theories about Law: Delimitation of the Focus of Inquiry. 4. Trends in Theories about Law: The Relation of Law to its Larger Community Context. 5. Trends in Theories about Law: The Conception of Relevant Intellectual Tasks. 6. The Need for a Special Theory for Inquiry about Law: How to Make Decisions in the Common Interest. Part II: The Social Process Context. 1. The Social Process as a Whole. 2. Particular Value-Institution Processes. A. Power. B. Enlightenment. C. Wealth. D. Well-Being. E. Skill. F. Affection. G. Respect. H. Rectitude. 3. Personality: The Dynamics of Personality. 4. Political Personality. 5. Political Culture. Part III: Policy Thinking. 1. The Clarification of Values. 2. The Description of Trend. 3. The Scientific Examination of Conditions. 4. The Projection of Future Developments. 5. The Consideration of Policy Alternatives. Part IV: The Structure of Decision in a Free Society. 1. The Overriding Principles of the Constitutive Process. 2. The Prescribing Function. 3. The Intelligence Function. 4. The Promoting (Recommending) Function. 5. The Invoking Function. 6. The Applying Function. 7. The Terminating Function. 8. The Appraising Function. Appendices. Index.

Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy

This article analyses H.L.A. Hart's concept of international law from the perspective of analytical jurisprudence and in light of the state of contemporary international law. The article challenges Hart's view that international law is ‘law’ but not a ‘legal system’. Hart arrives at this conclusion on the basis of a comparison of the international legal order with the municipal legal system. This comparison is distorted by Hart's general focus on private law and criminal law and becomes less convincing when constitutional law is added to the equation. As a consequence, Hart's methodological approach is inconsistent and should be modified. Rather than asking whether international law resembles municipal law in form, it should be asked whether international law encompasses legislative, executive, and judicative structures which are able to perform the same functions as the legal order of a nation state, and which thereby overcome the defects of a primitive social order. Against the background of this modified analytical framework, Hart's analysis is revisited in light of recent developments and changes in the structure of international law at the beginning of the 21st century.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2026192_code1714217.pdf?abstractid=1927819&mirid=1

The Concept of International Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart

1. In the Beginning was the Deed 2. The Practice of Interpretation: Theoretical Perspectives 3. UNHCR and the Making of Refugee Law 4. Adjudication in the GATT/WTO: Making General Exceptions 5. Lawmaking in the Practice of Interpretation: Normative Twists 6. Epilogue: In the End there is Eternity

How interpretation makes international law : on semantic changeand normative twists

This article is concerned with the debate about interdisciplinary methods in international law, in particular the turn to International Relations. It finds the historical critique of Martti Koskenniemi grounded in a more methodological issue: the turn toward a redefinition of norm properties impedes on the critical discursive quality of law. Shaping this historical critique into a research question that allows for meaningful engagement, the article discusses Koskenniemi’s charges drawing on recent constructivist scholarship. Giving an account of what it means to be ‘obliged’ to obey the law, this article defends the coherence of Koskenniemi’s position and suggests that we should take the critique of the interdisciplinary project between law and International Relations seriously. While it agrees that a significant part of the discourse fails to appreciate the particularities of the law, it suggests that understanding legal obligations requires taking the institutional autonomy of the law into account. Respecting this autonomy, in turn, points to a multi- instead of an interdisciplinary project. The reflexive formalist conception of the law that this article advocates captures the obligating nature of the law, independent of the normative content of particular rules.

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The blinkered discipline?: Martti Koskenniemi and interdisciplinary approaches to international law

While the Kadi affair has attracted a lot of attention, this Article approaches it from a rarely used contextual theoretical perspective of resolving institutional conflicts through reflexive sincere cooperation. The argument is short and simple: The institutional relationship between the EU judiciary and the UN Security Council should have been conducted not in strategic-pragmatic terms motivated by institutional power-plays, but rather by genuine pluralist institutional cooperation. The argument is preceded by an in-depth analysis of the theoretical and concrete practical shortcomings stemming from the lack of institutional cooperation between the UN and the EU in the Kadi affair. These shortcomings were not inevitable, as the EU and the UN legal and political systems are already connected with a whole set of bridging mechanisms. These should be, however, strengthened and their use should be made more common. In order to achieve that, the Article suggests an amendment to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EU and further improvement of the safeguards in the UN Security Council sanctioning mechanisms procedures. There is no dilemma: Enhanced institutional cooperation between the institutions of the two systems will work to their mutual advantage as well as, most importantly, maintain the rights and liberties of individuals like Kadi.

The UN, the EU, and the Kadi Case: A New Appeal for Genuine Institutional Cooperation

Recently, human rights law has been restricted increasingly by measures taken in the interest of public security. This raises the question whether there are limits in human rights protection that cannot be touched without questioning the very essence of individual rights protection itself. This article submits that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in cases dealing with the compatibility of measures taken in the public interest with the ECHR has defined such limits predominantly in terms of procedure. Accordingly, individuals must not be deprived of the right to independent review in the light of their fundamental rights. Thus, the Court has been developing what may be called a right to invoke rights, a procedural component underlying all guarantees of the Convention. This principle has been established and upheld in three different constellations: general measures for public security, states of emergencies and the implementation of UN sanctions regimes.

https://brill.com/downloadpdf/journals/nord/86/3/article-p275_275.pdf

The Right to Invoke Rights as a Limit to Sovereignty – Security Interests, State of Emergency and Review of UN Sanctions by Domestic Courts under the European Convention of Human Rights

This essay introduces the theme of the volume: The Grammar(s) of Global Law. Legal grammar is understood as the conceptual and linguistic foundation on which legal decisions rest – law’s meta-structure, its argumentative techniques and its systematicity. The essay distinguishes between two ways of thinking about this grammar. The first way of thinking appeals to a grammar as a stabilizing factor, maintaining the coherence of the law. The second way of thinking highlights the asymmetries of power within this structure and perceives legal grammar as the medium carrying the ideological commitments of the law. As the essay ultimately argues, both perspectives react differently to the challenges of globalization that the law is confronted with. While the debate on the grammar(s) of global law is one place where future political order is negotiated, the outcome of the debate is largely open.

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The Grammar(s) of Global Law

This chapter provides a geometrical map of global legal thought from the discussions of Habermasian, Luhmannian, and Dworkinian approaches. In this inquiry, it suggests that the three patterns have different normative preferences on ordering the same social space. With the coordinate system of global legal method, this chapter shows that these normative preferences are mutually irreconcilable and that the search for a single right answer of global legal method is a tilting at windmills. This futility of a single, unified theoretical approach is what I call the Plurality Trilemma.

David Roth-Isigkeit

Papers

The blinkered discipline?: Martti Koskenniemi and interdisciplinary approaches to international law

The UN, the EU, and the Kadi Case: A New Appeal for Genuine Institutional Cooperation

The Right to Invoke Rights as a Limit to Sovereignty – Security Interests, State of Emergency and Review of UN Sanctions by Domestic Courts under the European Convention of Human Rights

The Grammar(s) of Global Law

The Plurality Trilemma: The Contingent Geometry of Global Legal Thought