David W. Sommer

TL;DR: Cummins et al. as mentioned in this paper investigated the impact of CEO turnover on performance using data for U.S. property-liability insurers and found strong support for the hypothesis that firms with a CEO turnover, especially those with a non-routine turnover, experience more favorable performance changes than firms without aCEO turnover.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the impact of ownership structure on the relation between firm performance and chief executive officer turnover in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry and found that CEO turnover is less responsive to firm underwriting performance in mutual insurers compared to stock insurers.

TL;DR: The empirical results indicate that insurers that exhibit the following characteristics are more difficult to assess in terms of financial strength: smaller insurers, stock insurers, insurer with a history of reserving errors, insurers that use less reinsurance, insurers with greater levels of investment in stocks and low-grade bonds, and insurers that are more geographically diversified.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors empirically test the alternative hypotheses regarding the implications of separation of ownership from management for firms' risk taking behavior, and find that each ownership structure is significantly different from every other ownership structure in terms of risk.

TL;DR: Cummins and Sommer as discussed by the authors examined the relation between a broad array of firm-specific characteristics and the probability of being licensed in New York and found that the expected relationship between specific firm characteristics (e.g., firm characteristics and regulatory requirements applicable to similar domestic insurers in every state in which the insurer does business) and the likelihood of becoming a licensed insurer in the state of New York.