There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cogni- tive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mecha- nism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors (e.g., alarm, social facilitation, vicar- iousness of emotions, mother-infant responsiveness, and the modeling of competitors and predators) that are crucial for the reproduc- tive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model (PAM), together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature (similarity, familiarity, past experience, explicit teach- ing, and salience). It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empa- thy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of de- velopment, and situations.

/pdf/empathy-its-ultimate-and-proximate-bases-3gnr9okjki.pdf

Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases.

Do people behave differently when they are lying compared with when they are telling the truth? The combined results of 1,338 estimates of 158 cues to deception are reported. Results show that in some ways, liars are less forthcoming than truth tellers, and they tell less compelling tales. They also make a more negative impression and are more tense. Their stories include fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual contents. However, many behaviors showed no discernible links, or only weak links, to deceit. Cues to deception were more pronounced when people were motivated to succeed, especially when the motivations were identity relevant rather than monetary or material. Cues to deception were also stronger when lies were about transgressions.

Cues to deception

What's wrong with the philosophy of mind the recent history of materialism - the same mistake over and over, appendix - is there a problem about folk psychology? breaking the hold - silicon brains, conscious robots, and other minds consciousness and its place in nature reductionism and the irreducibility of consciousness the structure of consciousness - an introduction the unconscious and its relation to consciousness consciousness, intentionality and the background the critique of cognitive reason the proper study.

The Rediscovery of the Mind

I present a complex theoretical explanation that draws on multiple bodies of literature to present an academically rigorous version of a simple argument: good deeds earn chits. I advance/defend three core assertions: (1) corporate philanthropy can generate positive moral capital among communities and stakeholders, (2) moral capital can provide shareholders with insurance-like protection for a firm's relationship-based intangible assets, and (3) this protection contributes to shareholder wealth. I highlight several managerial implications of these core assertions.

/pdf/the-relationship-between-corporate-philanthropy-and-2ninz9mssn.pdf

The Relationship Between Corporate Philanthropy And Shareholder Wealth: A Risk Management Perspective

Introduction to Phenomenology is an outstanding and comprehensive guide to phenomenology. Dermot Moran lucidly examines the contributions of phenomenology's nine seminal thinkers: Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Arendt, Levinas, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida.Written in a clear and engaging style, Introduction to Phenomenology charts the course of the phenomenological movement from its origins in Husserl to its transformation by Derrida. It describes the thought of Heidegger and Sartre, phenomonology's most famous thinkers, and introduces and assesses the distinctive use of phenomonology by some of its lesser known exponents, such as Levinas, Arendt and Gadamer. Throughout the book, the enormous influence of phenomenology on the course of twentieth-century philosophy is thoroughly explored.This is an indispensible introduction for all unfamiliar with this much talked about but little understood school of thought. Technical terms are explained throughout and jargon is avoided. Introduction to Phenomenology will be of interest to all students seeking a reliable introduction to a key movement in European thought.

Introduction to Phenomenology

A phenomenology of action is outlined, analyzing the structure of volition, kinesthesis, and perception in the experience of action, and, finally, the experience of embodiment in action. The intentionality of action is contrasted with that of thought and perception in regard to the role of the body, and the relations between an action, the experience of acting, and the context of the action are specified.

Consciousness in action

Husserl and Intentionality

I first encountered phenomenology as an undergradute at Northwestern in the Sixties. Only, I was a student of engineering, majoring in mathematics. In the midst of my junior year I looked at the text my roommate was reading for a course on perception (I still have this text). On the back of the book was an ad for Bertrand Russell’s Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. I popped around the corner to the nearest bookstore and of course found a copy (that being Great Expectations Bookstore). I read it on the train home for spring break, and by the time I got home I was going into philosophy. It was a conversion experience, only I felt as if I were simply coming home.

(On) Self-Presentation

Introduction Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith 1. The development of Husserl's thought J. N. Mohanty 2. The phenomenological dimension Jaakko Hintikka 3. Meaning and language Peter Simons 4. Knowledge Dallas Willard 5. Perception Kevin Mulligan 6. Transcendental idealism Herman Philipse 7. Mind and body David Woodruff Smith 8. Common sense Barry Smith 9. Mathematics Richard Tieszen 10. Part-whole Kit Fine.

The Cambridge Companion to Husserl

I. THE PLACE OF PHENOMENOLOGY IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND II: SELF-AWARENESS AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE III. INTENTIONALITY IV. UNITIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS V. PERCEPTION, SENSATION, AND ACTION

David Woodruff Smith

Papers

Consciousness in action

Husserl and Intentionality

(On) Self-Presentation

The Cambridge Companion to Husserl

Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind