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Decio Coviello

Researcher at HEC Montréal

Publications -  47
Citations -  1342

Decio Coviello is an academic researcher from HEC Montréal. The author has contributed to research in topics: Procurement & Common value auction. The author has an hindex of 17, co-authored 44 publications receiving 1080 citations. Previous affiliations of Decio Coviello include European University Institute.

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Weak Instruments and Weak Identification in Estimating the Effects of Education on Democracy

TL;DR: This article found that education systematically predicts democracy, and that education can be seen as a weakly exogenous force in the relation between education and democracy, but their results were robust across model specification, instrumentation strategies, and samples.
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Time Allocation and Task Juggling

TL;DR: In this paper, a single worker allocates her time among different projects which are progressively assigned, and when the worker works on too many projects at the same time, the output rate decreases and completion time increases according to a law which is derived.
Posted Content

Tenure in Office and Public Procurement

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study the impact of politicians' tenure in office on the outcomes of public procurement and find that an increase in the mayor's tenure is associated with worse outcomes: fewer bidders per auction, higher cost of procurement, a higher probability that the winner is local and that the same firm is awarded repeated auctions.
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The inefficiency of worker time use

TL;DR: It is shown that although all these judges receive the same workload, those who juggle more trials at once instead of working sequentially on few of them at each unit of time, take longer to complete their portfolios of cases.
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Publicity requirements in public procurement: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design ☆

TL;DR: In this paper, a regression discontinuity design analysis on a large database of Italian procurement auctions is presented, showing that the increased publicity requirement induces more entry and higher winning rebates, which reduces the costs of procurement and rationalizes public spending.