D
Decio Coviello
Researcher at HEC Montréal
Publications - 47
Citations - 1342
Decio Coviello is an academic researcher from HEC Montréal. The author has contributed to research in topics: Procurement & Common value auction. The author has an hindex of 17, co-authored 44 publications receiving 1080 citations. Previous affiliations of Decio Coviello include European University Institute.
Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
Weak Instruments and Weak Identification in Estimating the Effects of Education on Democracy
Matteo Bobba,Decio Coviello +1 more
TL;DR: This article found that education systematically predicts democracy, and that education can be seen as a weakly exogenous force in the relation between education and democracy, but their results were robust across model specification, instrumentation strategies, and samples.
Journal ArticleDOI
Time Allocation and Task Juggling
TL;DR: In this paper, a single worker allocates her time among different projects which are progressively assigned, and when the worker works on too many projects at the same time, the output rate decreases and completion time increases according to a law which is derived.
Posted Content
Tenure in Office and Public Procurement
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study the impact of politicians' tenure in office on the outcomes of public procurement and find that an increase in the mayor's tenure is associated with worse outcomes: fewer bidders per auction, higher cost of procurement, a higher probability that the winner is local and that the same firm is awarded repeated auctions.
Journal ArticleDOI
The inefficiency of worker time use
TL;DR: It is shown that although all these judges receive the same workload, those who juggle more trials at once instead of working sequentially on few of them at each unit of time, take longer to complete their portfolios of cases.
Journal ArticleDOI
Publicity requirements in public procurement: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design ☆
Decio Coviello,Mario Mariniello +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a regression discontinuity design analysis on a large database of Italian procurement auctions is presented, showing that the increased publicity requirement induces more entry and higher winning rebates, which reduces the costs of procurement and rationalizes public spending.