We develop a new index of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) based on newspaper coverage frequency Several types of evidence – including human readings of 12,000 newspaper articles – indicate that our index proxies for movements in policy-related economic uncertainty Our US index spikes near tight presidential elections, Gulf Wars I and II, the 9/11 attacks, the failure of Lehman Brothers, the 2011 debt-ceiling dispute and other major battles over fiscal policy Using firm-level data, we find that policy uncertainty raises stock price volatility and reduces investment and employment in policy-sensitive sectors like defense, healthcare, and infrastructure construction At the macro level, policy uncertainty innovations foreshadow declines in investment, output, and employment in the United States and, in a panel VAR setting, for 12 major economies Extending our US index back to 1900, EPU rose dramatically in the 1930s (from late 1931) and has drifted upwards since the 1960s

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Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty

The financial market turmoil in 2007 and 2008 has led to the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression and threatens to have large repercussions on the real economy The bursting of the housing bubble forced banks to write down several hundred billion dollars in bad loans caused by mortgage delinquencies At the same time, the stock market capitalization of the major banks declined by more than twice as much While the overall mortgage losses are large on an absolute scale, they are still relatively modest compared to the $8 trillion of US stock market wealth lost between October 2007, when the stock market reached an all-time high, and October 2008 This paper attempts to explain the economic mechanisms that caused losses in the mortgage market to amplify into such large dislocations and turmoil in the financial markets, and describes common economic threads that explain the plethora of market declines, liquidity dry-ups, defaults, and bailouts that occurred after the crisis broke in summer 2007 To understand these threads, it is useful to recall some key factors leading up to the housing bubble The US economy was experiencing a low interest rate environment, both because of large capital inflows from abroad, especially from Asian countries, and because the Federal Reserve had adopted a lax interest rate policy Asian countries bought US securities both to peg the exchange rates at an export-friendly level and to hedge against a depreciation of their own currencies against the dollar, a lesson learned from the Southeast Asian crisis of the late 1990s The Federal Reserve Bank feared a deflationary period after the bursting of the Internet bubble and thus did not counteract the buildup of the housing bubble At the same time, the banking system underwent an important transformation The

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Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008

The other side of value: The gross profitability premium.

Motivated from investment-based asset pricing, we propose a new factor model that consists of the market factor, a size factor, an investment factor, and a return-on-equity factor The new model [i] outperforms the Carhart (1997) four-factor model in pricing portfolios formed on earnings surprise, idiosyncratic volatility, financial distress, equity issues, as well as on investment and return-on-equity; [ii] performs similarly as the Carhart model in pricing portfolios on momentum as well as on size and book-to-market; but [iii] underperforms in pricing the total accrual deciles Our model's performance, combined with its clear economic intuition, suggests that it can serve as a new workhorse model for academic research and investment management practice

Digesting Anomalies: An Investment Approach

Using the policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013), we document a strong negative relationship between firm-level capital investment and the aggregate level of uncertainty associated with future policy and regulatory outcomes. More importantly, we find evidence that the relation between policy uncertainty and capital investment is not uniform in the cross section, being significantly stronger for firms with a higher degree of investment irreversibility and for firms which are more dependent on government spending. Our results lend empirical support to the notion that policy uncertainty can depress corporate investment by inducing precautionary delays due to investment irreversibility.

Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Investment

We propose a new measure of the economic importance of each innovation. Our measure uses newly collected data on patents issued to U.S. firms in the 1926 to 2010 period, combined with the stock market response to news about patents. Our patent-level estimates of private economic value are positively related to the scientific value of these patents, as measured by the number of citations the patent receives in the future. Our new measure is associated with substantial growth, reallocation, and creative destruction, consistent with the predictions of Schumpeterian growth models. Aggregating our measure suggests that technological innovation accounts for significant medium-run fluctuations in aggregate economic growth and TFP. Our measure contains additional information relative to citation-weighted patent counts; the relation between our measure and firm growth is considerably stronger. Importantly, the degree of creative destruction that is associated with our measure is higher than previous estimates, confirming that it is a useful proxy for the private valuation of patents.

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Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth

Organization capital is a production factor that is embodied in the firm's key talent and has an efficiency that is firm specific. Hence, both shareholders and key talent have a claim to its cash flows. We develop a model in which the outside option of the key talent determines the share of firm cash flows that accrue to shareholders. This outside option varies systematically and renders firms with high organization capital riskier from shareholders' perspective. We find that firms with more organization capital have average returns that are 4.6% higher than firms with less organization capital.

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Organization Capital and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns

We find a significant negative effect of idiosyncratic stock-return volatility on investment. We address the endogeneity problem of stock return volatility by instrumenting for volatility with a measure of a firm's customer base concentration. We propose that
the negative effect of idiosyncratic risk on investment is partly due to managerial risk aversion, and find that the negative relationship between idiosyncratic uncertainty and
investment is stronger for firms with high levels of insider ownership. Several mecha nisms can mitigate this effect namely the use of option-based compensation and shareholder monitoring. We find that the investment-idiosyncratic relationship is weaker for firms that make use of option-based compensation, and insider ownership does not matter for firms primarily held by institutional investors.

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Investment, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Ownership

I explore the implications for asset prices and macroeconomic dynamics of shocks that improve real investment opportunities and thus affect the representative household’s marginal utility. These investment shocks generate differences in risk premia due to their heterogeneous impact on firms: they benefit firms producing investment relative to firms producing consumption goods and increase the value of growth opportunities relative to the value of existing assets. Using data on asset returns, I find that a positive investment shock leads to high marginal utility states. A general equilibrium model with investment shocks matches key features of macroeconomic quantities and asset prices.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1086/662221.pdf

Investment Shocks and Asset Prices

We explore the impact of investment-specific technology (IST) shocks on the cross section of stock returns. Using a structural model, we show that IST shocks have a differential effect on the value of assets in place and the value of growth opportunities. This differential sensitivity to IST shocks has two main implications. First, firm risk premia depend on the contribution of growth opportunities to firm value. Second, firms with similar levels of growth opportunities comove with each other, giving rise to the value factor in stock returns and the failure of the conditional CAPM. Our empirical tests confirm the model's predictions.

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Dimitris Papanikolaou

Papers

Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth

Organization Capital and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns

Investment, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Ownership

Investment Shocks and Asset Prices

Growth Opportunities, Technology Shocks, and Asset Prices