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Showing papers by "Don Harris published in 2011"


Book
20 Sep 2011
TL;DR: In this paper, a systems approach to human factors in aviation is presented, which is a route to increased operational efficiency by using human-computer interaction (HCI) on the flight deck.
Abstract: Contents: Preface A systems approach to human factors in aviation Part 1 The Science Base: Human information processing Workload Situation awareness Decision making Error Individual differences. Part 2 The (Hu)Man: Pilot selection Training and simulation Stress, fatigue and alcohol Environmental stressors. Part 3 The Machine: Display design Aircraft control Automation Human-computer interaction (HCI) on the flight deck. Part 4 The Management: Flight deck safety management: crew resource management and line operations safety audits Airline safety management Incident and accident investigation Concluding thoughts: human factors in aviation as a route to increased operational efficiency References Index.

55 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extend the approach of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) by using the categories of control flaws derived from Leveson's Systems-Theoretical Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) approach to describe the mechanisms by which categories within HFACS are associated with other categories lower in the organizational hierarchy.
Abstract: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), based upon Reason's model of human error in an organisational context, is currently the most widely used human factors accident analysis framework. However, it has been criticised for merely categorising accident data rather than analysing it. Previous research has established statistical associations between the levels and categories within HFACS but has not specified a mechanism by which one category influences subsequent behaviour. This paper extends the approach in two ways. Using the categories of control flaws derived from Leveson's Systems–Theoretical Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) approach, it describes the mechanisms by which categories within HFACS are associated with other categories lower in the organisational hierarchy. It also provides a mechanism by which active failures can promulgate across organisations. The revised methodology HFACS-STAMP is illustrated using the case study of the Uberlingen mid-air collision on 1 July ...

39 citations


Book ChapterDOI
28 Sep 2011

5 citations


Book ChapterDOI
09 Jul 2011
TL;DR: It is suggested that a Safety Case-based approach may be better used as an adjunct to existing regulations for Human Factors issues, which are becoming increasingly incompatible with human and organizational behavior in an airline.
Abstract: Human error has been identified as the primary risk to flight safety. Two of the more pervasive aspects of Human Factors encountered throughout the airworthiness regulations are error and workload. However, as a result of increasing organizational inter-dependence and integration of aircraft systems it is argued that the manner in which these issues are addressed in the aviation regulations is becoming increasingly incompatible with human and organizational behavior in an airline. Workload and error are both products of complex interactions between equipment design, procedures, training and the environment. These issues cannot be regulated on a localized basis. A more systemic, holistic approach to Human Factors regulation is required. It is suggested that a Safety Case-based approach may be better used as an adjunct to existing regulations for Human Factors issues.

4 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
06 Dec 2011
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that the manner in which human factors issues are addressed in the aviation regulations is becoming increasingly incompatible with human and organizational behavior in an airline, and a more systemic, holistic approach to the regulation of error and workload is required.
Abstract: As a result of increasing organizational interdependence and integration of systems in commercial airline operation, it is argued that the manner in which human factors issues are addressed in the aviation regulations is becoming increasingly incompatible with human and organizational behavior in an airline. Error and workload are two of the more pervasive aspects of human factors in the airworthiness regulations and are both products of complex interactions among equipment design, procedures, training, and the environment. However, these aspects of human factors cannot be regulated on a localized basis, and a more systemic, holistic approach to the regulation of error and workload is required. It is suggested that a safety case–based approach may be better used as an adjunct to existing regulations for human factors issues.

2 citations


Book
01 Jan 2011
TL;DR: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Engineering Psychology and Cognitive Ergonomics, EPCE 2011, held in Orlando, FL, USA, in July 2011, within the framework of the 14th International conference on Human-Computer Interaction, HCII 2011, together with 11 other thematically similar conferences.
Abstract: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Engineering Psychology and Cognitive Ergonomics, EPCE 2011, held in Orlando, FL, USA, in July 2011, within the framework of the 14th International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction, HCII 2011, together with 11 other thematically similar conferences. The 67 full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. The papers are organized in topical parts on cognitive and psychological aspects of interaction; cognitive aspects of driving; cognition and the Web; cognition and automation; security and safety; and, aerospace and military applications.

1 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The results suggest that instructors do not appreciate the high accident likelihood of early solo pilots or the main dangers they face, which has implications for the decisions made when sending pilots solo.
Abstract: INTRODUCTION: U.K. glider pilots with less than 10 h of solo flying time have been shown to have the highest accident rate and be most vulnerable to accidents during the 'final approach' phase. METHOD: There were 58 gliding instructors who were asked to indicate what experience level they thought was associated with the highest accident rate and provide the reason behind their estimate. They were also asked to rank six flight phases by the relative probability of accidents to inexperienced pilots. RESULTS: The mean estimate for the accident peak was 296.3 h as pilot-in-command (SD = 337.9) with no instructor giving a figure of less than 10 h. Common reasons for these estimates were 'over-confidence', 'risk-taking', or 'complacency'. Instructors also ranked six flight phases by the likelihood of an accident being caused by inexperienced pilots during that phase. Despite the approach phase having the highest objective accident probability, it was only ranked fifth by instructors, indicating an underestimate of the danger it presents to newly trained pilots. DISCUSSION: The results suggest that instructors do not appreciate the high accident likelihood of early solo pilots or the main dangers they face. This has implications for the decisions made when sending pilots solo. Language: en

1 citations