THIS paper is concerned with those actions of business firms which have harmful effects on others. The standard example is that of a factory the smoke from which has harmful effects on those occupying neighbouring properties. The economic analysis of such a situation has usually proceeded in terms of a divergence between the private and social product of the far' ory, in which economists have largely followed the treatment of Pigou in The Economics of Welfare. The conclusions to which this kind of analyris seems to have led most economists is that it would be desirable to make the owner of the factory liable for the damage caused to those injured by the smoke, or alternatively, to place a tax on the factory owner varying with the amount of smoke produced and equivalent in money terms to the damage it would cause, or finally, to exclude the factory from residential districts (and presumably from other

闡釋《社會成本問題》[The Problem of Social Cost]

This paper presents evidence that firms choose conservative financial policies partly to mitigate workers' exposure to unemployment risk. We exploit changes in state unemployment insurance laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells. We find that higher unemployment benefits lead to increased corporate leverage, particularly for labor-intensive and financially constrained firms. We estimate the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress due to unemployment risk to be about 60 basis points of firm value for a typical BBB-rated firm. The findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions.

Labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions

We argue and demonstrate empirically that a firm's institutional and legal context has first‐order effects in tests that use state antitakeover laws for identification. A priori, the size and direction of a law's effect on a firm's takeover protection depends on (i) other state antitakeover laws, (ii) preexisting firm‐level takeover defenses, and (iii) the legal regime as reflected by important court decisions. In addition, (iv) state antitakeover laws are not exogenous for many easily identifiable firms. We show that the inferences from nine prior studies related to nine different outcome variables change substantially when we include controls for these considerations.

Institutional and Legal Context in Natural Experiments: The Case of State Antitakeover Laws

We study a model in which future financing constraints lead firms to have a preference for investments with shorter payback periods, investments with less risk, and investments that utilize more pledgeable assets. The model also shows how investment distortions towards more liquid, safer assets vary with the marginal cost of external financing and with firm internal cash flows. Our theory helps reconcile and interpret a number of patterns reported in the empirical literature, in areas such as risk-taking behavior, capital structure choices, hedging strategies, and cash management policies. For example, contrary to Jensen and Meckling (1976), we show that firms may reduce rather than increase risk when leverage increases exogenously. Furthermore, firms in economies with less developed financial markets will not only take different quantities of investment, but will also take different kinds of investment (safer, short-term projects that are potentially less profitable). We also point out to several predictions that have not been empirically examined. For example, our model predicts that investment safety and liquidity are complementary: constrained firms are specially likely to decrease the risk of their most liquid investments.

Corporate Financial and Investment Policies When Future Financing Is Not Frictionless

U.S. industrial firms invest heavily in noncash, risky financial assets such as corporate debt, equity, and mortgage-backed securities. Risky assets represent 40% of firms’ financial portfolios, or 6% of total book assets. We present a formal model to assess the optimality of this behavior. Consistent with the model, risky assets are concentrated in financially unconstrained firms holding large financial portfolios, are held by poorly governed firms, and are discounted by 13% to 22% compared to safe assets. We conclude that this activity represents an unregulated asset management industry of more than $1.5 trillion, questioning the traditional boundaries of nonfinancial firms.

/pdf/precautionary-savings-with-risky-assets-when-cash-is-not-4616dp1odn.pdf

Precautionary Savings with Risky Assets: When Cash is Not Cash

We exploit the adoption of U.S. state-level labor protection laws to study the effect of employment protection on corporate investment rates and sales growth. We find that, following the adoption of these laws, capital expenditures as a percentage of book assets decrease, resulting in slower sales growth. Our findings are consistent with theories predicting that greater employment protection discourages investment by making projects more irreversible. Supporting this channel, following negative cash flow shocks, firms are less likely to downsize operations in states that have adopted these laws but more likely to downsize in states that have not adopted these laws.Authors have furnished code, data, and an Internet Appendix, which are available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Employment Protection, Investment, and Firm Growth

We exploit the adoption of U.S. state-level labor protection laws to study the effect of employment protection on corporate investment and growth. We find that, following the adoption of these laws, capital expenditures decrease, resulting in firms growing sales at a slower rate. Our findings are consistent with theories predicting that greater employment protection discourages investment by making projects more irreversible. Supporting this theoretical channel, we also show that firms affected by these laws are less likely to divest assets following negative cash flow shocks, and conditional on investing, they invest in projects with higher expected rates of return.

Growing evidence suggests that managers select financial policies partially by mimicking policies of peer firms. We find that these peer effects in capital structure choice are unique to firms operating under weak external corporate governance. Cross‐sectional tests suggest that this finding is best explained by a quiet life hypothesis in which managers may be able to avoid the effort required to optimize financial policies and the scrutiny of market participants. Leverage ratios of mimicking firms display less sensitivity to a profitability shock. Finally, mimicking correlates to higher financing costs and lower future profitability, especially if it results in high leverage.

Corporate Governance and Financial Peer Effects

Although financial managers spend significant time and effort deciding in which financial assets corporate cash reserves should be invested, we know surprisingly little about the determinants of the variation in the composition of the financial assets that constitute these reserves. We find that firms invest more of their cash reserves in longer-maturity, less liquid securities that earn a higher yield if they can better forecast their short-term liquidity needs. Also, financially constrained firms, which typically hold large cash reserves to meet longer-term financing needs, invest more of their cash reserves into such securities. During years when significant amounts of their cash reserves are needed to fund operations or new investment, financially constrained firms shift funds to shorter-maturity, more liquid securities that earn a lower yield. We use several different identification strategies to establish causality of our results. Our findings provide insights on an important component of corporate liquidity management practices.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2691182_code97721.pdf?abstractid=2391467&mirid=5

What Determines the Composition of a Firm's Cash Reserves?

We examine whether labor market frictions affect firms’ tax aggressiveness. Exploiting the adoption of U.S. state-level Wrongful Discharge Laws as a quasi-exogenous shock to a firm’s firing costs, we document a decline in tax aggressiveness for firms located in states that increase employment protection. We further show that greater employment protection increases distress risk. The decline in tax aggressiveness is more pronounced for firms that are more vulnerable to financial distress and constrained from external financial markets. Our results imply that firms avoid risky tax positions in order to mitigate increased distress risk due to more rigid labor costs.

Douglas J. Fairhurst

Papers

Employment Protection, Investment, and Firm Growth

Employment Protection, Investment, and Firm Growth

Corporate Governance and Financial Peer Effects

What Determines the Composition of a Firm's Cash Reserves?

Employment Protection and Tax Aggressiveness: Evidence from Wrongful Discharge Laws