In this revised second edition, Deirdre McCloskey demonstrates how economic discourse employs metaphor, authority, symmetry and other rhetorical means of persuasion. ""The Rhetoric of Economics"" shows economists to be human persuaders and poets of the marketplace, even in their most technical and mathematical moods. It is further enhanced by three new chapters and two new bibliographies.

The Rhetoric of Economics

The book Inequality by Christopher Jencks is in one sense an arid waste of somewhat confusing and misleading statistics between chapter one and chapter nine, and, in another sense, a destructive, unscientific critique of American education and families. Jencks' interpretation comes down hard on his basic feeling that "The crucial problem today is that relatively few people view income inequality as a serious problem; indeed the Nixon administration apparently convinced itself that income was too equally distributed in 1968 and that the rich needed additional incentives to get even richer . The Kennedy and Johnson administrations were only marginally better. Neither made any explicit effort to equalize incomes; the subject was hardly discussed. Instead reformers focused on equalizing opportunity." This view is probably correct but it is no excuse for an unscholarly, unscientific polemic against far from "peripheral institutions," which is Jencks' evaluation of the American schools. This book states

Inequality, A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America.

This essay attempts to describe political consciousness in collectivities. Symbolist thought, focused on the idea of “myth,” seems linked with material thought, focused on the concept of “ideology.” It is suggested that a description of political consciousness can be constructed from the structures of meaning exhibited by a society's vocabulary of “ideographs.”

The “ideograph”: A link between rhetoric and ideology

Tied sales have a long history of scrutiny under the antitrust laws of the United States The primary basis for the condemnation of this practice has been the court's belief in what has come to be known as the "leverage theory" of tying: that is, that tying provides a mechanism whereby a firm with monopoly power in one market can use the leverage provided by this power to foreclose sales in, and thereby monopolize, a second market In recent years, however, the leverage theory has come under heavy attack In this paper, I reconsider the leverage hypothesis I argue that, in an important sense, the models used by the critics of the leverage theory which all assume that the tied good market has a competitive, constant returns-to-scale structure- are incapable of addressing the central concern of the leverage theory, that tying can be profitably used to change the market structure of the tied good market I then demonstrate that when the tied good market has an oligopolistic structure, tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power through the foreclosure of tied market rivals sales The mechanism through which this foreclosure occurs, its profitability for the monopolist, and its welfare implications are discussed in detail

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Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion

In this paper we look at the case for bundling in an oligopolistic environment. We show that bundling is a particularly effective entry-deterrent strategy. A company that has market power in two goods, A and B, can, by bundling them together, make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market. Bundling allows an incumbent to credibly defend both products without having to price low in each. The traditional explanation for bundling that economists have given is that it serves as an effective tool of price discrimination by a monopolist. Although price discrimination provides a reason to bundle, the gains are small compared with the gains from the entry-deterrent effect. I. INTRODUCTION In this paper we look at the case for bundling in an oligopolistic environment. We show that bundling is a particularly effective entry-deterrent strategy. A company that has market power in two goods, A and B, can, by bundling them together, make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market. Bundling allows an incumbent to defend both products without having to price low in each. While it is still possible to compete by offering a rival bundle, a monopolist can significantly lower the potential profits of a one-product entrant without having to engage in limit pricing prior to entry. We also show that bundling continues to be an effective pricing tool even if entry deterrence fails (or if there is already an existing one-product rival). A company with a monopoly in product A and a duopoly in product B makes higher profits by selling an A‐B bundle than by selling A and B independently. Leveraging market power from A into B and accepting some one-product competition against the bundle is better than using the monopoly power in good A all by itself. Since bundling mitigates the impact of competition on the incumbent, an entrant can expect the bundling strategy to persist, even without any commitment. The traditional explanation for bundling that economists have given is that it serves as an effective tool of price discrimination by a monopolist (see Stigler [1968], Adams and Yellen

Bundling as an Entry Barrier

This volume will be of interest and value to students of logic, ethics, and political philosophy, as well as to members of the legal profession and to everyone concerned with problems of government and jurisprudence. By citing a large number of cases, the author makes his presentation of the proceses of judicial interpretation particularly lucid.

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An Introduction to Legal Reasoning

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Law and the Future: Trade Regulation

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Some Aspects of Separation of Powers

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Edward Hirsch Levi

Papers

An Introduction to Legal Reasoning

Law and the Future: Trade Regulation

An Introduction to Legal Reasoning

Some Aspects of Separation of Powers

The Nature of Judicial Reasoning