Deposits of clastic carbonate-dominated (calciclastic) sedimentary slope systems in the rock record have been identified mostly as linearly-consistent carbonate apron deposits, even though most ancient clastic carbonate slope deposits fit the submarine fan systems better. Calciclastic submarine fans are consequently rarely described and are poorly understood. Subsequently, very little is known especially in mud-dominated calciclastic submarine fan systems. Presented in this study are a sedimentological core and petrographic characterisation of samples from eleven boreholes from the Lower Carboniferous of Bowland Basin (Northwest England) that reveals a >250 m thick calciturbidite complex deposited in a calciclastic submarine fan setting. Seven facies are recognised from core and thin section characterisation and are grouped into three carbonate turbidite sequences. They include: 1) Calciturbidites, comprising mostly of highto low-density, wavy-laminated bioclast-rich facies; 2) low-density densite mudstones which are characterised by planar laminated and unlaminated muddominated facies; and 3) Calcidebrites which are muddy or hyper-concentrated debrisflow deposits occurring as poorly-sorted, chaotic, mud-supported floatstones. These

Phd by thesis

We continue a line of research initiated in [10,11]on privacy-preserving statistical databases. Consider a trusted server that holds a database of sensitive information. Given a query function f mapping databases to reals, the so-called true answer is the result of applying f to the database. To protect privacy, the true answer is perturbed by the addition of random noise generated according to a carefully chosen distribution, and this response, the true answer plus noise, is returned to the user.

Previous work focused on the case of noisy sums, in which f = ∑ig(xi), where xi denotes the ith row of the database and g maps database rows to [0,1]. We extend the study to general functions f, proving that privacy can be preserved by calibrating the standard deviation of the noise according to the sensitivity of the function f. Roughly speaking, this is the amount that any single argument to f can change its output. The new analysis shows that for several particular applications substantially less noise is needed than was previously understood to be the case.

The first step is a very clean characterization of privacy in terms of indistinguishability of transcripts. Additionally, we obtain separation results showing the increased value of interactive sanitization mechanisms over non-interactive.

/pdf/calibrating-noise-to-sensitivity-in-private-data-analysis-4vnm2uv9ap.pdf

Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis

/pdf/convex-analysisnoer-san-nojin-zhan-nituite-5dl2rbmoyr.pdf

Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

We continue a line of research initiated in [10, 11] on privacy-preserving statistical databases. Consider a trusted server that holds a database of sensitive information. Given a query function f mapping databases to reals, the so-called true answer is the result of applying f to the database. To protect privacy, the true answer is perturbed by the addition of random noise generated according to a carefully chosen distribution, and this response, the true answer plus noise, is returned to the user. Previous work focused on the case of noisy sums, in which f = Σ i g(x i ), where x i denotes the ith row of the database and g maps database rows to [0,1]. We extend the study to general functions f, proving that privacy can be preserved by calibrating the standard deviation of the noise according to the sensitivity of the function f. Roughly speaking, this is the amount that any single argument to f can change its output. The new analysis shows that for several particular applications substantially less noise is needed than was previously understood to be the case. The first step is a very clean characterization of privacy in terms of indistinguishability of transcripts. Additionally, we obtain separation results showing the increased value of interactive sanitization mechanisms over non-interactive.

Boolean satisfiability is probably the most studied of the combinatorial optimization/search problems. Significant effort has been devoted to trying to provide practical solutions to this problem for problem instances encountered in a range of applications in electronic design automation (EDA), as well as in artificial intelligence (AI). This study has culminated in the development of several SAT packages, both proprietary and in the public domain (e.g. GRASP, SATO) which find significant use in both research and industry. Most existing complete solvers are variants of the Davis-Putnam (DP) search algorithm. In this paper we describe the development of a new complete solver, Chaff which achieves significant performance gains through careful engineering of all aspects of the search-especially a particularly efficient implementation of Boolean constraint propagation (BCP) and a novel low overhead decision strategy. Chaff has been able to obtain one to two orders of magnitude performance improvement on difficult SAT benchmarks in comparison with other solvers (DP or otherwise), including GRASP and SATO.

/pdf/chaff-engineering-an-efficient-sat-solver-2ima1ekzuu.pdf

Chaff: engineering an efficient SAT solver

The widthof a Resolution proof is defined to be the maximal number of literals in any clause of the proof. In this paper, we relate proof width to proof length (=size), in both general Resolution, and its tree-like variant. The following consequences of these relations reveal width as a crucial “resource” of Resolution proofs.In one direction, the relations allow us to give simple, unified proofs for almost all known exponential lower bounds on size of resolution proofs, as well as several interesting new ones. They all follow from width lower bounds, and we show how these follow from natural expansion property of clauses of the input tautology.In the other direction, the width-size relations naturally suggest a simple dynamic programming procedure for automated theorem proving—one which simply searches for small width proofs. This relation guarantees that the runnuing time (and thus the size of the produced proof) is at most quasi-polynomial in the smallest tree-like proof. This algorithm is never much worse than any of the recursive automated provers (such as DLL) used in practice. In contrast, we present a family of tautologies on which it is exponentially faster.

Short proofs are narrow—resolution made simple

An argument system for NP is a proof system that allows efficient verification of NP statements, given proofs produced by an untrusted yet computationally-bounded prover. Such a system is non-interactive and publicly-verifiable if, after a trusted party publishes a proving key and a verification key, anyone can use the proving key to generate non-interactive proofs for adaptively-chosen NP statements, and proofs can be verified by anyone by using the verification key.

/pdf/snarks-for-c-verifying-program-executions-succinctly-and-in-5gpviqjs3v.pdf

SNARKs for C : verifying program executions succinctly and in zero knowledge

We build a system that provides succinct noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs (zk-SNARKs) for program executions on a von Neumann RISC architecture The system has two components: a cryptographic proof system for verifying satisfiability of arithmetic circuits, and a circuit generator to translate program executions to such circuits Our design of both components improves in functionality and efficiency over prior work, as follows

Our circuit generator is the first to be universal: it does not need to know the program, but only a bound on its running time Moreover, the size of the output circuit depends additively (rather than multiplicatively) on program size, allowing verification of larger programs

The cryptographic proof system improves proving and verification times, by leveraging new algorithms and a pairing library tailored to the protocol

We evaluated our system for programs with up to 10,000 instructions, running for up to 32,000 machine steps, each of which can arbitrarily access random-access memory; and also demonstrated it executing programs that use just-in-time compilation Our proofs are 230 bytes long at 80 bits of security, or 288 bytes long at 128 bits of security Typical verification time is 5 ms, regardless of the original program's running time

/pdf/succinct-non-interactive-zero-knowledge-for-a-von-neumann-1ci7jum5sk.pdf

Succinct non-interactive zero knowledge for a von Neumann architecture

Human dignity demands that personal information, like medical and forensic data, be hidden from the public. But veils of secrecy designed to preserve privacy may also be abused to cover up lies and deceit by parties entrusted with Data, unjustly harming citizens and eroding trust in central institutions. Zero knowledge (ZK) proof systems are an ingenious cryptographic solution to the tension between the ideals of personal privacy and institutional integrity, enforcing the latter in a way that does not compromise the former. Public trust demands transparency from ZK systems, meaning they be set up with no reliance on any trusted party, and have no trapdoors that could be exploited by powerful parties to bear false witness. For ZK systems to be used with Big Data, it is imperative that the public verification process scale sublinearly in data size. Transparent ZK proofs that can be verified exponentially faster than data size were first described in the 1990s but early constructions were impractical, and no ZK system realized thus far in code (including that used by crypto-currencies like ZcashTM) has achieved both transparency and exponential verification speedup, simultaneously, for general computations. Here we report the first realization of a transparent ZK system (ZK-STARK) in which verification scales exponentially faster than database size, and moreover, this exponential speedup in verification is observed concretely for meaningful and sequential computations, described next. Our system uses several recent advances on interactive oracle proofs (IOP), such as a “fast” (linear time) IOP system for error correcting codes. Our proof-of-concept system allows the Police to prove to the public that the DNA profile of a Presidential Candidate does not appear in the forensic DNA profile database maintained by the Police. The proof, which is generated by the Police, relies on no external trusted party, and reveals no further information about the contents of the database, nor about the candidate’s profile; in particular, no DNA information is disclosed to any party outside the Police. The proof is shorter than the size of the DNA database, and verified faster than the time needed to examine that database naı̈vely. *Technion — Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel; supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant # 1501/14), the US–Israel Binational Science Foundation, and the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research And Innovation Programme under grant agreement no. 693423. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA.

/pdf/scalable-transparent-and-post-quantum-secure-computational-27yfvgsmwo.pdf

Scalable, transparent, and post-quantum secure computational integrity.

Bit coin is the first digital currency to see widespread adoption. While payments are conducted between pseudonyms, Bit coin cannot offer strong privacy guarantees: payment transactions are recorded in a public decentralized ledger, from which much information can be deduced. Zero coin (Miers et al., IEEE S&P 2013) tackles some of these privacy issues by unlinking transactions from the payment's origin. Yet, it still reveals payments' destinations and amounts, and is limited in functionality. In this paper, we construct a full-fledged ledger-based digital currency with strong privacy guarantees. Our results leverage recent advances in zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs). First, we formulate and construct decentralized anonymous payment schemes (DAP schemes). A DAP scheme enables users to directly pay each other privately: the corresponding transaction hides the payment's origin, destination, and transferred amount. We provide formal definitions and proofs of the construction's security. Second, we build Zero cash, a practical instantiation of our DAP scheme construction. In Zero cash, transactions are less than 1 kB and take under 6 ms to verify - orders of magnitude more efficient than the less-anonymous Zero coin and competitive with plain Bit coin.

Eli Ben-Sasson

Papers

Short proofs are narrow—resolution made simple

SNARKs for C : verifying program executions succinctly and in zero knowledge

Succinct non-interactive zero knowledge for a von Neumann architecture

Scalable, transparent, and post-quantum secure computational integrity.

Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin.