There is, I think, something ethereal about i —the square root of minus one. I remember first hearing about it at school. It seemed an odd beast at that time—an intruder hovering on the edge of reality.

Usually familiarity dulls this sense of the bizarre, but in the case of i it was the reverse: over the years the sense of its surreal nature intensified. It seemed that it was impossible to write mathematics that described the real world in …

I and i

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

The Visual Display of Quantitative Information

Preface 1. Introduction: the problem of collective action 2. The prisoners' dilemma, chicken and other games in the provision of public goods 3. The two-person prisoners' dilemma supergame 4. The N-person prisoners' dilemma supergame 5. Altruism and superiority 6. The state 7. Epilogue: cooperation, the state and anarchy Annex Notes Bibliography Index.

The possibility of cooperation

Compact Lie groups are ‘perfect’ entities in modern mathematics because: 

(a)

They are differentiable (and even analytical) manifolds of finite dimension and therefore can be analysed with the help of the most powerful tool of mathematics: ordinary and partial differential operators (equations);




(b)

Denoting by £(G) or L(G) = T e (G) the tangent space to G in unity e, we find that L(G) can be identified with the set of left-invariant vector fields on G (or with the set of appropriate differential operators of order one). Thus L(G) naturally becomes a Lie algebra: on L(G) there exists a structure [·, ·] which satisfies the axioms of Lie algebra (see below);




(c)

This rich algebraic structure, in turn, makes it possible to apply the powerful algebraic tools (theory of Lie algebras);




(d)

An abstract (finite dimensional) Lie algebra g defines (up to an isomorphism) a simply connected Lie group G such that £(G) = g. Therefore investigations of the Lie group G can be to large extent replaced by investigations of its Lie algebra g;




(e)

Compactness of a Lie group G makes it possible to use the theory of representations of compact groups developed by Weyl and Peter. This theory is extraordinarily beautiful and simple: it reduces to large extend to the spectral theory of compact operators;




(f)

And finally every complex, compact (connected) commutative Lie group is a torus. Moreover, as it was shown by E. Cartan, every compact Lie group contains a maximal torus T (any other such a torus is conjugated T 1 = gTg −1 ); and any point g 0 of the group G belongs to some maximal torus: G = U g gTg −1. This fundamental Cartan theorem makes it possible to apply to T (and thus to the whole of G) the theory of representations of abelian groups: every representation of the torus T decomposes into the finite (and orthogonal) sum of unit representations (over ℂ), the so called weights. Thus the knowledge of these weights is the fundamental element of the theory of representations of compact Lie groups.

Representations of Compact Lie Groups

/pdf/a-polytopal-generalization-of-sperner-s-lemma-2dsr4z6ruh.pdf

A polytopal generalization of Sperner's lemma

(2002). Four-Person Envy-Free Chore Division. Mathematics Magazine: Vol. 75, No. 2, pp. 117-122.

/pdf/four-person-envy-free-chore-division-2ozrq3x3y4.pdf

Four-Person Envy-Free Chore Division

This article describes how the author used a wiki-based website in a real analysis course, and assesses its effectiveness. The wiki was used to post course materials, maintain a forum, enable students to write collaborative projects, and enable students to develop a glossary of important terms. The wiki proved to be very successful; it facilitated student collaboration, exposed students to LaTeX, and even helped them to study for examinations.

Using a Wiki to Enhance Cooperative Learning in a Real Analysis Course.

: The Army's myriad social networks connect not only humans and soldiers, but also machines, computers, and robots. And most of the social/biological/physical/informational connections in these networks are in the form of cooperation - entities working together to achieve a common goal. So how does this complex web of relationships, collaborations, and communities of diverse entities work? This paper introduces a new framework in which measures of cooperation can be precisely defined. We demonstrate how the framework can be applied to social networks, and examine the dynamic networks arising in the case of pursuit and evasion games. Finally, we relate the concepts of competitive and altruistic cooperation to trust and the nature of communication within a team.

/pdf/cooperation-in-social-networks-communication-trust-and-14gxkyl860.pdf

Cooperation in Social Networks: Communication, Trust, and Selflessness

In contrast to the classical cake-cutting problem (how to fairly divide a desirable object), "chore division" is the problem of how to divide an undesirable object. We develop the first explicit algorithm for envy-free chore division among N people, a counterpart to the N-person envy-free cake-division solution of Brams-Taylor (1995). This is accomplished by exploiting a notion of "irrevocable advantage" for chores. We discuss the differences between cake-cutting and chore division and additional problems encountered in chore division.

Elisha Peterson

Papers

A polytopal generalization of Sperner's lemma

Four-Person Envy-Free Chore Division

Using a Wiki to Enhance Cooperative Learning in a Real Analysis Course.

Cooperation in Social Networks: Communication, Trust, and Selflessness

N-person envy-free chore division