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Ellen Engel

Researcher at University of Illinois at Chicago

Publications -  25
Citations -  4712

Ellen Engel is an academic researcher from University of Illinois at Chicago. The author has contributed to research in topics: Executive compensation & Earnings. The author has an hindex of 18, co-authored 24 publications receiving 4428 citations. Previous affiliations of Ellen Engel include University of Chicago & Stanford University.

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Financial Accounting Information, Organizational Complexity and Corporate Governance Systems

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate how corporate governance systems of large public U.S. corporations vary with information properties of numbers produced by their financial accounting systems and find that in firms whose current accounting numbers do a relatively poor job of capturing the effects of the firm's current activities and outcomes on shareholder value, the accounting numbers are less effective in the governance setting.
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Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate how ownership concentration, directors' and executive's incentives, and board structure vary with earnings timeliness, and organizational complexity measured as geographic and/or product line diversification.
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Discretionary behavior with respect to allowances for loan losses and the behavior of security prices

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the capital market pricing of discretionary and non-discretionary components of a major accrual in the banking industry, the allowance for loan losses, and found that the market perceives the allowance to be comprised of two components, a nondiscretionary component which is negatively priced and a discretionary component whose incremental pricing coefficient is positive.
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms' Going-Private Decisions

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate firms' going-private decisions in response to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and find that firms go private only if the SOX-imposed costs to the firm exceed the soX-induced benefits to shareholders.
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The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and firms’ going-private decisions

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate firms' going-private decisions in response to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and find that the quarterly frequency of going private transactions has increased after the enactment of SOX.