/pdf/convex-analysisnoer-san-nojin-zhan-nituite-5dl2rbmoyr.pdf

Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

This paper presents a new approach to estimation and inference in panel data models with a multifactor error structure where the unobserved common factors are (possibly) correlated with exogenously given individual-specific regressors, and the factor loadings differ over the cross section units. The basic idea behind the proposed estimation procedure is to filter the individual-specific regressors by means of (weighted) cross-section aggregates such that asymptotically as the cross-section dimension (N) tends to infinity the differential effects of unobserved common factors are eliminated. The estimation procedure has the advantage that it can be computed by OLS applied to an auxiliary regression where the observed regressors are augmented by (weighted) cross sectional averages of the dependent variable and the individual specific regressors. Two different but related problems are addressed: one that concerns the coefficients of the individual-specific regressors, and the other that focusses on the mean of the individual coefficients assumed random. In both cases appropriate estimators, referred to as common correlated effects (CCE) estimators, are proposed and their asymptotic distribution as N with T (the time-series dimension) fixed or as N and T (jointly) are derived under different regularity conditions. One important feature of the proposed CCE mean group (CCEMG) estimator is its invariance to the (unknown but fixed) number of unobserved common factors as N and T (jointly). The small sample properties of the various pooled estimators are investigated by Monte Carlo experiments that confirm the theoretical derivations and show that the pooled estimators have generally satisfactory small sample properties even for relatively small values of N and T.

Estimation and Inference in Large Heterogeneous Panels with a Multifactor Error Structure

/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthcoming.); We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk-aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi-unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, and other topics. Appendices contain technical details, some simple worked examples, and a bibliography for each section.

/pdf/auction-theory-a-guide-to-the-literature-3i2uohzm74.pdf

Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature

Many auctions involve the sale of a variety of distinct assets. Examples are airport time slots, delivery routes, network routing, and furniture. Because of complementarities or substitution effects between the different assets, bidders have preferences not just for particular items but for sets of items. For this reason, economic efficiency is enhanced if bidders are allowed to bid on bundles or combinations of different assets. This paper surveys the state of knowledge about the design of combinatorial auctions and presents some new insights. Periodic updates of portions of this survey will be posted to this journal's Online Supplements web page at http://joc.pubs.informs.org/OnlineSupplements.html.

/pdf/combinatorial-auctions-a-survey-4s6mf01wuq.pdf

Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey

. This is a detailed introduction to auction theory. It begins with a simple analysis of standard auctions and then uses a strikingly simple general solution of symmetric private values auctions to prove the payoff equivalence of many auction rules. The basic framework is then modified to admit risk aversion, multi-unit and repeated auctions as well as collusion. Then follows an introduction to optimal auctions, with and without stochastic entry, and to common value auctions and the winner's curse problem. The survey closes with a sample of applications, from the regulation of natural monopolies to price competition in oligopoly and the government securities market.

Auctions: an introduction

This text in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect competition, from monopoly and regulation to the strategic analysis of oligopolistic markets. Part II explains the analytics of risk, stochastic dominance, and risk aversion, supplemented with a variety of applications from different areas in economics. Part III focuses on markets and incentives under incomplete information, including a comprehensive introduction to the theory of auctions, which plays an important role in modern economics. Each chapter introduces the core issues in an accessible yet rigorous fashion, and then investigates specialized themes. Each also offers self-contained explanations and proofs. The only prerequisites are a basic knowledge of calculus and probability, and familiarity with intermediate undergraduate microeconomics. The text can be used as a textbook in different courses for senior undergraduate or first-year graduate students.

/pdf/topics-in-microeconomics-industrial-organization-auctions-kjw8yebpca.pdf

Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives

https://www.krannert.purdue.edu/centers/ijio/Accepted/2131.pdf

Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany

/pdf/topics-in-microeconomics-2r3cgfuep6.pdf

Topics In Microeconomics

We review different kinds of corruption that have been observed in procurement auctions and categorize them. We discuss means to avoid corruption, by choice of preferable auction formats, or with the help of technological tools, such as secure electronic bidding systems. Auctions that involve some soft elements, such as complex bids consisting of technical and financial proposals, are particularly prone to corruption. We do not believe that it is possible to eradicate corruption altogether in such situations, but we discuss means to make it less likely.

/pdf/corruption-in-procurement-auctions-223cyq1c08.pdf

Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Papers

Auctions: an introduction

Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives

Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany

Topics In Microeconomics

Corruption in Procurement Auctions