are price decreases. (3) The frequency of price increases covaries strongly with inflation, whereas the frequency of price decreases and the size of price increases and price decreases do not. (4) The frequency of price change is highly seasonal: it is highest in the first quarter and then declines. (5) We find no evidence of upwardsloping hazard functions of price changes for individual products. We show that the first, second, and third facts are consistent with a benchmark menu-cost model, whereas the fourth and fifth facts are not.

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Five Facts about Prices: A Reevaluation of Menu Cost Models

In this paper we present a simple New Keynesian-style model of debt-driven slumps – that is, situations in which an overhang of debt on the part of some agents, who are forced into rapid deleveraging, is depressing aggregate demand. Making some agents debt-constrained is a surprisingly powerful assumption: Fisherian debt deflation, the possibility of a liquidity trap, the paradox of thrift, a Keynesiantype multiplier, and a rationale for expansionary fiscal policy all emerge naturally from the model. We argue that this approach sheds considerable light both on current economic difficulties and on historical episodes, including Japan’s lost decade (now in its 18th year) and the Great Depression itself.

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Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A Fisher-Minsky-Koo Approach*

We investigate the nature of selection and productivity growth in industries where we observe producer-level quantities and prices separately. We show there are important differences between revenue and physical productivity. Because physical productivity is inversely correlated with price while revenue productivity is positively correlated with price, previous work linking (rev- enue-based) productivity to survival confounded the separate and opposing effects of technical efficiency and demand on survival, understating the true impacts of both. Further, we find that young producers charge lower prices than incumbents. Thus the literature understates new producers' productivity advantages and entry's contribution to aggregate productivity growth. (JEL D24, L11, L25)

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Reallocation, Firm Turnover, and Efficiency : Selection on Productivity or Profitability?

We provide evidence on the transmission of monetary policy shocks in a setting with both economic and financial variables. We first show that shocks identified using high frequency surprises around policy announcements as external instruments produce responses in output and inflation that are typical in monetary VAR analysis. We also find, however, that the resulting "modest" movements in short rates lead to "large" movements in credit costs, which are due mainly to the reaction of both term premia and credit spreads. Finally, we show that forward guidance is important to the overall strength of policy transmission. (JEL E31, E32, E43, E44, E52, G01)

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Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and Economic Activity †

Although researchers have documented that many financial crises are associated with severe recessions (Graciela Kaminsky and Carmen Reinhart 1999), very little attention has been paid to whether countries recover from such large negative shocks in the sense that output losses are reversed. A few recent papers show persistent output loss from financial crises in a small set of countries. For instance, Cerra and Saxena (2005a) demonstrate that six Asian countries suffered permanent output loss from the Asian crisis, and Cerra and Saxena (2005b) show that only a tiny fraction of the output loss from Sweden's banking crisis in the early 1990s was recuperated. The graphs in Figure 1 illustrate persistent output loss for selected countries following the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis and the debt crisis of the early 1980s. In addition to financial crises, many countries experience large negative political shocks, which could include violent conflicts such as civil wars, as well as a deterioration in the country's governance. Such political shocks have the potential for significant disruption to economic activ? ity, as illustrated for a few episodes of civil war (Figure 2). This paper systematically documents the behavior of output following financial and political crises in a large set of 190 countries. While the graphs in Figures 1 and 2 are suggestive, our aim is to formally analyze the impact of financial and political shocks on output in a broad set of countries, particularly whether output losses are recovered. Financial shocks comprise currency, banking, and twin financial crises. For political shocks, we examine civil wars, a deterioration in the quality of political governance, and twin political crises comprising both shocks. We choose civil wars rather than interstate conflicts to ensure that the war occurs on the country's own soil. The military theater for some interstate conflicts may not directly encompass all parties to the conflict. In addition, the increase in wartime spending for an international conflict may boost economic activity in some countries. We also examine the economic impact of a deterioration in a country's political governance or institutional quality. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2003) use constraints on the power of the political executive as a measure of institutional quality, and find that it is linked to growth and volatility. Thus, we use this measure to study the shock to political governance. Potential endogeneity of the financial or political crisis is an important issue in estimating the output impact of the crisis. That is, the crisis itself may be a function of a slowdown of economic growth or changes in expectations of future growth. We attempt to address this issue using a few methods that are far from definite, but nonetheless uncover some interesting facts. In particular, we find that the forecasts of growth from an autoregressive model and from consensus surveys are optimistic relative to actual growth occurring during and after a crisis.

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Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic Recovery

We use rich historical data on military procurement to estimate the effects of government spending. We exploit regional variation in military buildups to estimate an “open economy relative multiplier” of approximately 1.5. We develop a framework for interpreting this estimate and relating it to estimates of the standard closed economy aggregate multiplier. The latter is highly sensitive to how strongly aggregate monetary and tax policy “leans against the wind.” Our open economy relative multiplier “differences out” these effects because monetary and tax policies are uniform across the nation. Our evidence indicates that demand shocks can have large effects on output. (JEL E12, E32, E62, F33, H56, H57, R12)

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Fiscal Stimulus in a Monetary Union: Evidence from U.S. Regions

We present estimates of monetary non-neutrality based on evidence from high-frequency responses of real interest rates, expected inflation, and expected output growth Our identifying assumption is that unexpected changes in interest rates in a 30-minute window surrounding scheduled Federal Reserve announcements arise from news about monetary policy In response to an interest rate hike, nominal and real interest rates increase roughly one-for-one, several years out into the term structure, while the response of expected inflation is small At the same time, forecasts about output growth also increase|the opposite of what standard models imply about a monetary tightening To explain these facts, we build a model in which Fed announcements affect beliefs not only about monetary policy but also about other economic fundamentals Our model implies that these information effects play an important role in the overall causal effect of monetary policy shocks on output

High Frequency Identification of Monetary Non-Neutrality: The Information Effect

In recent years, central banks have increasingly turned to “forward guidance” as a central tool of monetary policy, especially as interest rates around the world have hit the zero lower bound. Standard monetary models imply that far future forward guidance is extremely powerful: promises about far future interest rates have huge effects on current economic outcomes, and these effects grow with the horizon of the forward guidance. We show that the power of forward guidance is highly sensitive to the assumption of complete markets. If agents face uninsurable income risk and borrowing constraints, a precautionary savings effect tempers their responses to changes in future interest rates. As a consequence, forward guidance has substantially less power to stimulate the economy. In addition, we show that the business cycle dynamics of our incomplete markets model differ substantially from its complete market counterpart. This contrasts with the well-known results of Krusell and Smith (1998). We present approximate representations that can easily be incorporated into standard business cycle models.

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The Power of Forward Guidance Revisited

Empirical evidence suggests that as much as one-third of the U.S. business cycle is due to nominal shocks. We calibrate a multisector menu cost model using new evidence on the cross-sectional distribution of the frequency and size of price changes in the U.S. economy. We augment the model to incorporate intermediate inputs. We show that the introduction of heterogeneity in the frequency of price change triples the degree of monetary non-neutrality generated by the model. We furthermore show that the introduction of intermediate inputs raises the degree of monetary non-neutrality by another factor of three, without adversely affecting the model's ability to match the large average size of price changes. A single-sector model with a frequency of price change equal to the median, rather than the mean, generates monetary non-neutrality similar to that in our multisector model. Our multisector model with intermediate inputs generates variation in real output in response to calibrated aggregate nominal shocks that can account for roughly 23% of the U.S. business cycle.

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Emi Nakamura

Papers

Five Facts about Prices: A Reevaluation of Menu Cost Models

Fiscal Stimulus in a Monetary Union: Evidence from U.S. Regions

High Frequency Identification of Monetary Non-Neutrality: The Information Effect

The Power of Forward Guidance Revisited

Monetary Non-neutrality in a Multisector Menu Cost Model