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Eric A. Posner
Researcher at University of Chicago
Publications - 393
Citations - 17102
Eric A. Posner is an academic researcher from University of Chicago. The author has contributed to research in topics: International law & Human rights. The author has an hindex of 77, co-authored 377 publications receiving 16572 citations. Previous affiliations of Eric A. Posner include University of Michigan & Loyola Marymount University.
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Law and Social Norms
TL;DR: The role of law in a society in which order is maintained mostly through social norms, trust, and non-legal sanctions has been discussed in this article, where the authors argue that social norms are sometimes desirable yet sometimes odious, and that the law is critical to enhancing good social norms and undermining bad ones.
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The limits of international law
Jack L. Goldsmith,Eric A. Posner +1 more
TL;DR: A Theory of Customary International Law is a generalization of the theory of International Agreements, which is used in many of the works of the present paper, e.g.,.
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Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis when Preferences are Distorted
Matthew D. Adler,Eric A. Posner +1 more
TL;DR: It is argued that cost-benefit analysis is best understood as a welfarist decision procedure, and its most plausible defense is that use of cost- benefit analysis is more likely to maximize overall well-being than is use of alternative decision-procedures.
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Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice
Eric A. Posner,Adrian Vermeule +1 more
TL;DR: This article argued that transitional justice is continuous with ordinary justice, and there is no reason to treat transitional-justice measures as presumptively suspect, on either moral or institutional grounds, since transitional justice has developed a range of pragmatic tools for managing transitions.
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A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error
TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce an informal model of contracting where courts are assumed to be radically incompetent, that is, they are unable to determine whether a party in a contract dispute has engaged in opportunistic behavior (breach), although they can determine whether parties intended to enter a legally enforceable contract.