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Eric A. Posner
Researcher at University of Chicago
Publications - 393
Citations - 17102
Eric A. Posner is an academic researcher from University of Chicago. The author has contributed to research in topics: International law & Human rights. The author has an hindex of 77, co-authored 377 publications receiving 16572 citations. Previous affiliations of Eric A. Posner include University of Michigan & Loyola Marymount University.
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Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Jonathan S. Masur,Eric A. Posner +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the record of U.S. regulatory agencies and criticize the methods they have used to calculate the social cost of carbon emissions and develop a larger theme about the relationship between cost-benefit analysis and politics.
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A Theory of Customary International Law
Jack L. Goldsmith,Eric A. Posner +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a theory of customary international law (CIL) is proposed to explain how CIL arises, why nations "comply" with CIL as commonly understood, and why CIL changes.
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Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: A Response to Criticisms
Eric A. Posner,E. Glen Weyl +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the valuations of financial markets are difficult to determine because of unique features of these markets that distinguish them from other types of markets where CBA is used.
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Climate Change Justice
Eric A. Posner,David A. Weisbach +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors make a powerful argument that the best and possibly only way to get an effective climate treaty is to exclude measures designed to redistribute wealth or address historical wrongs against underdeveloped countries.
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A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed a public enforcement policy of the Clayton Act against institutional investors in well-defined oligopolistic industries, where investors in firms in an industry must choose either to limit their holdings of an industry to a small stake (no more than 1% of the total size of the industry) or to hold the shares of only a single effective firm.