Este estudio presenta un modelo computacional para analizar el efecto de los jugadores con poder de veto en regimenes presidenciales. Exploramos la relacion entre los poderes legislativos del presidente y la configuracion de jugadores con veto, y analizamos deque manera el numero de partidos legislativos y su cohesion afectan la estabilidad de las politicas publicas. A partir de estas ideas desarrollamos una simulacion para evaluar el impacto conjunto de estos factores en un espacio bidimensional. Los resultados sugieren que la fragmentacion partidaria tiene efectos mixtos, mientras que el poder de decreto es un factor clave para explicar la estabilidad de las politicas. El impacto de las variables institucionales esta en general condicionado por la ubicacion de los actores politicos.

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Veto players in presidential regimes: institutional variables and policy change

Election campaigns attract great attention from voters, media and academics alike. The academics, however, tend to focus their research on the electoral result and on societal and long-term political factors influencing that result. The election campaign — the event of great interest, which has at least some role to play in affecting the result — is usually passed over or at most receives minimal attention. It is generally left to the journalists and pundits to give their insights into the campaign; scanning every television programme and newspaper for the latest news or gossip, scrutinising every campaign development — whether an initiative or gaffe — for its potential effect on the result. These are ‘the boys on the bus,’ the campaign journalists who, emulating Theodore White (1961), provide fascinating accounts of the nitty-gritty of election campaigning.1 But such studies emphasise the short-term and the ephemeral, rather than the underlying process to any campaign. They necessarily stress the unique rather than the general and as such promote the view of campaigns and campaigning as behaviour specific to each election, indeed to each party.

The Study of Election Campaigning

https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1182&context=si_pubs

Looking for two-sided coattail effects: Integrated parties and multilevel elections in the U.S.

The geography of Canadian parties’ electoral campaigns: leaders’ tours and constituency election results

Constitutional arrangements can be said to have a structural logic in the sense that, among other things, they reflect a pattern of assumptions about the nature of government and a polity's particular brand of constitutionalism. It is the argument of this article that there is a basic inconsistency in the constitutional design of parliamentary federations and particularly those which have incorporated British parliamentary traditions. This is illustrated by an analysis of the constitutional evolution of Australia and Canada. Both systems have responded to changing popular expectations of the scope and function of government not by gradual evolution within a consistent constitutional tradition, but by major alteration to the mode of constitutionalism as first one and then another element of the rival institutional logics becomes dominant. The tension between these competing elements is used to chart the interaction between federalism, parliamentary institutions and notions of limited government.

Eric Mintz

Papers

Banzhaf’s Power Index and Canada’s Constitutional Amending Formula: A Comment on Kilgour’s Analysis

Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America John H. Aldrich Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. xi, 349

Election campaign tours in Canada