Econometric policy evaluation: A critique

Today's financial regulatory systems assume that regulations which make individual banks safe also make the financial system safe. The eleventh Geneva Report on the World Economy shows that this thinking is flawed. Actions that banks take to make themselves safer can - in times of crisis - undermine the system's stability. The Report argues for a different approach. What is needed is micro-prudential (i.e. bank-level) regulation, macro-prudential (i.e. system-wide) regulation, and careful coordination of the two. Macro-prudential regulation in particular needs reform to ensure it countervails the natural decline in measured risk during booms and its rise in subsequent collapses. "Counter-cyclical capital charges" are the way forward; regulators should adjust capital adequacy requirements over the cycle by two multiples - the first related to above-average growth of credit expansion and leverage, the second related to the mismatch in the maturity of assets and liabilities. Changes to mark-to-market procedures are also needed. Macro- and micro-prudential regulation should be carried out by separate institutions since they differ in focus and expertise required. Central Banks should be tasked with macro-prudential regulation, Financial Services Authorities with micro-prudential regulation. Improved international coordination is also important. Since financial and asset-price cycles differ from country to country, counter-cyclical regulatory policy needs to be implemented mainly by the "host" rather than the "home" country.

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The fundamental principles of financial regulation

This paper uses data on house transactions in the state of Massachusetts over the last 20 years to show that houses sold after foreclosure, or close in time to the death or bankruptcy of at least one seller, are sold at lower prices than other houses. Foreclosure discounts are particularly large on average at 28% of the value of a house. The pattern of death-related discounts suggests that they may result from poor home maintenance by older sellers, while foreclosure discounts appear to be related to the threat of vandalism in low-priced neighborhoods. After aggregating to the zipcode level and controlling for regional price trends, the prices of forced sales are mean-reverting, while the prices of unforced sales are close to a random walk. At the zipcode level, this suggests that unforced sales take place at approximately efficient prices, while forced-sales prices reflect time-varying illiquidity in neighborhood housing markets. At a more local level, however, we find that foreclosures that take place within a quarter of a mile, and particularly within a tenth of a mile, of a house lower the price at which it is sold. Our preferred estimate of this effect is that a foreclosure at a distance of 0.05 miles lowers the price of a house by about 1%.

Forced Sales and House Prices

The social and private micro-level consequences of homeownership

The market for housing differs in several important ways from the textbook model of a liquid asset market with exogenous fundamentals. This implies that the price at which a house is sold can be influenced not only by general supply and demand conditions, but also by idiosyncratic factors, including the urgency of the sale and the effects of the ownership transfer on the physical quality of the house. First, houses are productive only when people are living in them. Owning an empty house is equivalent to throwing away the dividend on a financial asset. Second, houses are fragile assets that need maintenance, and are vulnerable to van dalism. Unoccupied houses are particularly vulnerable and expensive to protect. Third, short-term rental contracts involve high transactions costs, resulting from the moving costs of renters and the need of homeowners to protect their property against damage. Fourth, houses are expensive, indivisible, and heterogeneous assets. Each house has certain unique characteristics which are likely to appeal to certain poten tial buyers and not to others, so selling a house requires matching it with an appro priate buyer. Because of the high costs of intermediation in housing, this task is normally undertaken by a real estate broker rather than a dealer. Fifth, most home owners must finance their purchases using mortgages, collateralized debt contracts that transfer home ownership to the mortgage lender through a foreclosure process if the homeowner defaults. The expansion of mortgage credit in the early 2000s and the recent decline in house prices have led to an unprecedented increase in foreclosures since 2006. Foreclosures transfer houses to financial institutions which must maintain and pro tect them until they can be sold. Foreclosed houses are likely to sell at low prices, both because they may have been physically damaged during the foreclosure pro cess, and because financial institutions have an incentive to sell them quickly. In a liquid market, an asset can be sold rapidly with a minimal impact on its price, but

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Although previous research shows that prices of homes in neighborhoods with foreclosures are lower than those in neighborhoods without foreclosures, it remains unclear whether the lower prices are the result of a general decline in neighborhood values or whether foreclosures reduce the prices of nearby non-distressed sales through a contagion effect. We provide robust evidence of a contagion discount by simultaneously estimating the local price trend and the incremental price impact of nearby foreclosures. At its peak, the discount is roughly one percent per nearby foreclosed property. The discount diminishes rapidly as the distance to the distressed property increases. The contagion discount grows from the onset of distress through the foreclosure sale and then stabilizes. This pattern is consistent with the contagion effect being the visual externality associated with deferred maintenance and neglect.

The Contagion Effect of Foreclosed Properties

The contagion effect of foreclosed properties

Previous studies have shown that foreclosure often results in vandalism, disinvestment and other negative spillover effects in the neighborhood. This paper extends these views into a formal theoretical model through pricing based on comparables. We project that the spillover effect of a foreclosure on neighborhood property values depends on two factors: the discount of foreclosure sale and the weight placed on the foreclosed property as a comparable in the valuation. The former is related to housing cycle and the latter varies by time of foreclosure and its distance from the subject property. Empirical results based on a 2006 sample show that this effect is significant within a radius of 0.9 km (roughly 10 blocks) and within 5 years from its liquidation. The most severe impact is an 8.7% discount on neighborhood property values, which gradually drops to anywhere between −1.2 to −1.7% for foreclosures liquidated within the past 5 years. These spillover effects vary slightly when the sample selection bias is taken into account. Based on an alternative sample of purchase transactions in 2003, the estimated spillover effects in booming years are reduced by half, confirming on the important role played by housing cycles.

Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values

https://academics.hamilton.edu/documents/grwy_1.34.kg.pdf

Eric Rosenblatt

Papers

The Contagion Effect of Foreclosed Properties

The contagion effect of foreclosed properties

Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values

Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values

Foreclosure externalities: New evidence