The 2008 crash has left all the established economic doctrines - equilibrium models, real business cycles, disequilibria models - in disarray. Part of the problem is due to Smith’s "veil of ignorance": individuals unknowingly pursue society’s interest and, as a result, have no clue as to the macroeconomic effects of their actions: witness the Keynes and Leontief multipliers, the concept of value added, fiat money, Engel’s law and technical progress, to name but a few of the macrofoundations of microeconomics. A good viewpoint to take bearings anew lies in comparing the post-Great Depression institutions with those emerging from Thatcher and Reagan’s economic policies: deregulation, exogenous vs. endoge- nous money, shadow banking vs. Volcker’s Rule. Very simply, the banks, whose lending determined deposits after Roosevelt, and were a public service became private enterprises whose deposits determine lending. These underlay the great moderation preceding 2006, and the subsequent crash.

The Economic Institutions of Capitalism

A question of trust

http://media.terry.uga.edu/documents/finance/decision_making.pdf

Multiple criteria decision making combined with finance: A categorized bibliographic study

BlockIoTIntelligence: A Blockchain-enabled Intelligent IoT Architecture with Artificial Intelligence

To obtain more funds from the institutional investors, private equity (PE) fund managers may report inflated valuations of private investee companies that are not yet sold. However, such overvaluations may result in a reputational cost when those investments are realized. Using evidence from 39 countries, we show that there are significant systematic biases in managers' reporting of fund performance. We find that these biases depend on the accounting and legal environment in a country, and on proxies for the degree of information asymmetry between institutional investors and PE fund managers.

/pdf/private-equity-returns-and-disclosure-around-the-world-nmho82u7u2.pdf

Private equity returns and disclosure around the world

In an age of constant, complex and disruptive technological innovation, knowing what, when, and how to structure regulatory interventions has become much more difficult. Regulators can find themselves in a situation where they believe they must opt for either reckless action (regulation without sufficient facts) or paralysis (doing nothing). Inevitably in such a case, caution tends to trump risk. But such caution merely functions to reinforce the status quo and the result is that new technologies struggle to reach the market in a timely or efficient manner. The solution: lawmaking and regulatory design needs to become more proactive, dynamic and responsive. So how can regulators actually achieve these goals? What can they do to promote innovation and offer better opportunities to people wanting to build a new business around a disruptive technology or simply enjoy the benefits of a disruptive new technology as a consumer?

/pdf/regulation-tomorrow-what-happens-when-technology-is-faster-3yu69lfsyb.pdf

Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens When Technology Is Faster than the Law?

In a technology-driven, digital world, many of the largest and most successful businesses now operate as ‘platforms’. Such firms leverage networked technologies to facilitate economic exchange, transfer information, connect people, and make predictions. Platform companies are already disrupting multiple industries, including retail, hotels, taxis, and others, and are aggressively moving into new sectors, such as financial services. This paper examines the distinctive features of this new business model and its implications for regulation, notably corporate governance. In particular, the paper suggests that a tension exists between the incentives created by modern corporate governance and the business needs of today’s platforms. The current regulatory framework promotes an unhealthy ‘corporate’ attitude that is failing platforms, and a new direction (what we term ‘platform governance’) is urgently required. In identifying this new regulatory direction, the paper considers how firms might develop as successful platforms. Although there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution, the paper describes three interconnected strategies: (1) leveraging current and near-future digital technologies to create more ‘community-driven’ forms of organization; (2) building an ‘open and accessible platform culture’; and (3) facilitating the creation, curation, and consumption of meaningful ‘content’. The paper concludes that jurisdictions that are the most successful in designing a new ‘platform governance’ based on the promotion of these strategies will be the primary beneficiaries of the digital transformation.

/pdf/the-end-of-corporate-governance-hello-platform-governance-19kxz3l5bm.pdf

The End of ‘Corporate’ Governance: Hello ‘Platform’ Governance

Preface 1. The Corporate Governance of Non-listed Companies 2. The First Pillar: Company Law-a One-size-fits-all Approach for Non-listed Companies 3. Company Law Developments in Europe 4. Company Law Developments in the United States and Asia 5. The Second Pillar: Contractual Arrangements 6. The Contractual Governance of Private Equity Funds and Hedge Funds- A Case Study 7. The Third Pillar: Optional Guidelines 8. Hybrid Business Forms and the Regulation of Illicit Transactions 9. Governance of Non-listed Companies: The Way Forward

/pdf/corporate-governance-of-non-listed-companies-3l4mo417tf.pdf

Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies

Female and male entrepreneurs differ in the way they finance their businesses. This can be attributed to the type of business and the type of management and experience (indirect effect). Female start-ups may also experience other barriers based upon discriminatory effects (direct effect). Whether gender has an impact on size and composition of start-up capital, is the subject of the present paper. To test for these direct and indirect effects data of 2000 Dutch starting entrepreneurs, of whom approximately 500 are women, are used. 5001-6182 Business 5546-5548.6 Office Organization and Management Library of Congress Classification (LCC) 1-6182 Commerce M Business Administration and Business Economics L 20 Firm Objectives, Organization and Behavior: general Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) M 13 G32 J16 Entrepreneurship Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure Economics of Gender 85 A Business General 270 A 100 G Strategic Management Organizational Growth European Business Schools Library Group (EBSLG) 85 B Small Business Management, Entrepreneurship Gemeenschappelijke Onderwerpsontsluiting (GOO) 85.00 Bedrijfskunde, Organisatiekunde: algemeen 85.10 Strategisch beleid Classification GOO 85.00 Bedrijfskunde, organisatiekunde: Algemeen Bedrijfskunde / Bedrijfseconomie Strategisch management, organisatievernieuwing

Start-Up Capital: Differences Between Male and Female Entrepreneurs 'Does Gender Matter?'

For the last decade economists have been preoccupied with the decline in bank financing to small businesses and entrepreneurs This effort has produced a better understanding of the obstacles to external financing We examine the market and policy instruments that in some sense encourage more bank lending to SMEs This leads us to explore the recent surge in Fintech lending that has affected the ability of SMEs and entrepreneurial firms to obtain loans We consider recent evidence that the growth of alternative online lending has supplied new competition to traditional banks and is beginning to disrupt the traditional of business of lending Finally, we examine the regulatory responses to Fintech in seventeen jurisdictions We examine the first time that venture capitalists invest in Fintech companies to determine whether there is a meaningful connection between levels of investment and regulatory choice Our findings have implications for how regulation is likely to play an important role in the development of Fintech

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2967891_code352890.pdf?abstractid=2967891&mirid=1&type=2

Erik P. M. Vermeulen

Papers

Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens When Technology Is Faster than the Law?

The End of ‘Corporate’ Governance: Hello ‘Platform’ Governance

Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies

Start-Up Capital: Differences Between Male and Female Entrepreneurs 'Does Gender Matter?'

FinTech and the financing of enterprises : From crowdfunding to marketplace lending