E
Ernest F. Brickell
Researcher at Telcordia Technologies
Publications - 9
Citations - 692
Ernest F. Brickell is an academic researcher from Telcordia Technologies. The author has contributed to research in topics: Encryption & Known-plaintext attack. The author has an hindex of 8, co-authored 9 publications receiving 636 citations.
Papers
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Book ChapterDOI
An observation on the security of McEliece's public-key cryptosystem
P. J. Lee,Ernest F. Brickell +1 more
TL;DR: A systematic method of checking is suggested, and a generalized version of the cryptanalytic attack which reduces the work factor sigdicantly is described, which can be viewed as generalized probabilistic decoding algorithms for any linear error correcting codes.
Book ChapterDOI
GRADUAL AND VERIFIABLE RELEASE OF A SECRET (Extended Abstract)
TL;DR: This work presents protocols allowing someone with a secret discrete logarithm to release it, bit by bit, such that anyone can verify each bit’s correctness as they receive it.
Proceedings Article
On privacy homomorphisms
Ernest F. Brickell,Yacov Yacobi +1 more
TL;DR: This paper shows that two additive privacy homomorphisms proposed are insecure under a ciphertext only attack and the other two can be broken by a known plaintext attack and introduces the notion of an R-additive privacy homomorphicism, which is essentially an additive privacy Homomorphism in which only at most R messages need to be added together.
Book ChapterDOI
On Privacy Homomorphisms (Extended Abstract)
Ernest F. Brickell,Yacov Yacobi +1 more
TL;DR: This paper shows that two of the four additive privacy homomorphisms proposed are insecure under a ciphertext only attack and the other two can be broken by a known plaintext attack and introduces the notion of an R -additive privacy homomorphicism, which is essentially an additive privacy Homomorphism in which only at most R messages need to be added together.
Book ChapterDOI
An attack on a signature scheme proposed by Okamoto and Shiraishi
TL;DR: If the system is used as it is presented, an opponent could sign messages without factoring the modulus and a modification is suggested which may not have the same flaw as the proposed scheme.