A Treatise on the Family. G. S. Becker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1981. Gary Becker is one of the most famous and influential economists of the second half of the 20th century, a fervent contributor to and expounder of the University of Chicago free-market philosophy, and winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics. Although any book with the word "treatise" in its title is clearly intended to have an impact, one coming from someone as brilliant and controversial as Becker certainly had such a lofty goal. It has received many article-length reviews in several disciplines (Ben-Porath, 1982; Bergmann, 1995; Foster, 1993; Hannan, 1982), which is one measure of its scholarly importance, and yet its impact is, I think, less than it may have initially appeared, especially for scholars with substantive interests in the family. This book is, its title notwithstanding, more about economics and the economic approach to behavior than about the family. In the first sentence of the preface, Becker writes "In this book, I develop an economic or rational choice approach to the family." Lest anyone accuse him of focusing on traditional (i.e., material) economics topics, such as family income, poverty, and labor supply, he immediately emphasizes that those topics are not his focus. "My intent is more ambitious: to analyze marriage, births, divorce, division of labor in households, prestige, and other non-material behavior with the tools and framework developed for material behavior." Indeed, the book includes chapters on many of these issues. One chapter examines the principles of the efficient division of labor in households, three analyze marriage and divorce, three analyze various child-related issues (fertility and intergenerational mobility), and others focus on broader family issues, such as intrafamily resource allocation. His analysis is not, he believes, constrained by time or place. His intention is "to present a comprehensive analysis that is applicable, at least in part, to families in the past as well as the present, in primitive as well as modern societies, and in Eastern as well as Western cultures." His tone is profoundly conservative and utterly skeptical of any constructive role for government programs. There is a clear sense of how much better things were in the old days of a genderbased division of labor and low market-work rates for married women. Indeed, Becker is ready and able to show in Chapter 2 that such a state of affairs was efficient and induced not by market or societal discrimination (although he allows that it might exist) but by small underlying household productivity differences that arise primarily from what he refers to as "complementarities" between caring for young children while carrying another to term. Most family scholars would probably find that an unconvincingly simple explanation for a profound and complex phenomenon. What, then, is the salient contribution of Treatise on the Family? It is not literally the idea that economics could be applied to the nonmarket sector and to family life because Becker had already established that with considerable success and influence. At its core, microeconomics is simple, characterized by a belief in the importance of prices and markets, the role of self-interested or rational behavior, and, somewhat less centrally, the stability of preferences. It was Becker's singular and invaluable contribution to appreciate that the behaviors potentially amenable to the economic approach were not limited to phenomenon with explicit monetary prices and formal markets. Indeed, during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, he did undeniably important and pioneering work extending the domain of economics to such topics as labor market discrimination, fertility, crime, human capital, household production, and the allocation of time. Nor is Becker's contribution the detailed analyses themselves. Many of them are, frankly, odd, idiosyncratic, and off-putting. …

A Treatise on the Family

Demographic trends in the 2000s showed the continuing separation of family and household due to factors such as childbearing among single parents, the dissolution of cohabiting unions, divorce, repartnering, and remarriage. The transnational families of many immigrants also displayed this separation, as families extended across borders. In addition, demographers demonstrated during the decade that trends such as marriage and divorce were diverging according to education. Moreover, demographic trends in the age structure of the population showed that a large increase in the elderly population will occur in the 2010s. Overall, demographic trends produced an increased complexity of family life and a more ambiguous and fluid set of categories than demographers are accustomed to measuring.

Demographic Trends in the United States: A Review of Research in the 2000s

Paid Work, Parenting, and Housework: Gender Strategies and Myths@@@The Second Shift: Working Parents and the Revolution at Home.

Two dominant theories within family research foresee a long-term decline in marriage, fertility, and partner stability. They also assume that this “less-family” scenario will be spearheaded by higher-educated strata. Trends in the latter half of the twentieth century seemed to provide ample support for both predictions. However, recent signs of change in family behavior raise doubts about their continued validity. In a number of countries we see a halt to, and even reversal of, fertility decline and of couple instability. In parallel, we observe a reversal of the social gradient on both dimensions. Applying a multiple equilibrium framework, we propose a theoretical framework that helps explain both the phase of marital and fertility decline and the subsequent recovery. We focus especially on the endogenous dynamics of the process, which, we argue, depend on the conditions that favor rapid diffusion. Our core argument is that the turnaround is driven by the diffusion of gender-egalitarian norms.

Re-theorizing Family Demographics

An International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).

The rise in educational enrolment is often cited as a possible cause of the trend to later childbearing in developed societies but direct evidence of its contribution to the aggregate change in fertility tempo is scarce. We show that rising enrolment, resulting in later ages at the end of education, accounts for a substantial part of the upward shift in the mean age at first birth in the 1980s and 1990s in Britain and in France. The postponement of first birth over that period has two components: a longer average period of enrolment and a post-enrolment component that is also related to educational level. The relationship between rising educational participation and the move to later fertility timing is almost certainly causal. Our findings therefore suggest that fertility tempo change is rooted in macro-economic and structural forces rather than in the cultural domain.

/pdf/fertility-postponement-is-largely-due-to-rising-educational-3n32plqpq7.pdf

Fertility postponement is largely due to rising educational enrolment

How persistent and universal has the two child family ideal been in Europe during the last three decades? We analyze responses of women of reproductive age from 168 surveys conducted in 37 countries in 1979–2012. A two-child ideal has become nearly universal among women in all parts of Europe. Countries that used to display higher ideal family size have converged over time toward a two-child model. Six out of ten women in Europe consider two children as ideal, and this proportion is very similar in different regions. The mean ideal family size has become closely clustered around 2.2 in most countries. Gradual shifts can be documented toward more women expressing an ideal of having one child (and, quite rarely, having no children) and a parallel decline in an ideal of three or more children. An increasing number of European countries saw their mean ideal family size falling to relatively low levels around 1.95–2.15. However, with the exception of one survey for eastern Germany and two of the surveys not included in our study owing to high nonresponse or low sample size, none of the analyzed surveys suggests a decline in mean ideal family size to levels considerably below replacement, i.e., below 1.9 children per woman.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2014.00691.x

Two Is Best? The Persistence of a Two‐Child Family Ideal in Europe

The article presents an overview of trends in cohabitation and marriage in Britain over several decades, using a consistent set of retrospective histories from the General Household Survey 1979–2007. Time-trends are presented, for men and women, of: the experience of different types of partnership by specified ages, the frequency of premarital cohabitation, the average time spent in different types of partnership, the timing of life course transitions, and the outcome of cohabitation and marriage at the fifth and tenth anniversaries.

/pdf/cohabitation-and-marriage-in-britain-since-the-1970s-3qetl97swz.pdf

Cohabitation and marriage in Britain since the 1970s

BACKGROUND: The long-term decline in cohort fertility in highly developed countries has been widely documented. However, no systematic analysis has investigated which parity contributed most to the fertility decline to low and very low levels. 
Objective: We examine how the contribution of changing parity progression ratios varied across cohorts, countries, and broader regions in Europe, North America, Australia, and East Asia. We pay special attention to countries that reached very low completed cohort fertility, below 1.75 children per woman.
Methods: Using population censuses and large-scale surveys for 32 low fertility countries, we decompose the change in completed cohort fertility among women born between 1940 and 1970. The decomposition method takes into account the sequential nature of childbearing as a chain of transitions from lower to higher parities.
Results: Among women born between 1940 and 1955, the fertility decline was mostly driven by reductions in the progression ratios to third and higher-order births. By contrast, among women born between 1955 and 1970, changes in fertility showed distinct regional patterns: In Central and Eastern Europe they were fuelled by falling second-birth rates, whereas in the German-speaking countries, Southern Europe, and East Asia decreases in first-birth rates played the major role.
Conclusions: Pathways to low and very low fertility show distinct geographical patterns, which reflect the diversity of the cultural, socioeconomic, and institutional settings of low fertility countries. 
Contribution: Our study highlights the importance of analysing parity-specific components of fertility in order to understand fertility change and variation. We demonstrate that similar low levels of completed cohort fertility can result from different combinations of parity-specific fertility rates.

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/175535/1/WP2017_03_HFDRR.pdf

Cohort fertility decline in low fertility countries: Decomposition using parity progression ratios

We study the aggregate gap between intended and actual fertility in 19 European countries and the US based on a cohort approach. This complements prior research that had mainly used a period approach. We compare the mean intended number of children among young women aged 20 to 24 (born in the early 1970s), measured during the 1990s in the Fertility and Family Surveys, with data on completed fertility in the same cohorts around age 40. In a similar manner, we compare the share who state that they do not want a child with actual cohort childlessness. Our exploration is informed by the cognitive–social model of fertility intentions developed by Bachrach and Morgan (Popul Dev Rev 39(3):459–485, 2013). In all countries, women eventually had, on average, fewer children than the earlier expectations in their birth cohort, and more often than intended, they remained childless. The results reveal distinct regional patterns, which are most apparent for childlessness. The gap between intended and actual childlessness is widest in the Southern European and the German-speaking countries and smallest in the Central and Eastern European countries. Additionally, we analyze the aggregate intentions-fertility gap among women with different levels of education. The gap is largest among highly educated women in most countries studied and the educational gradient varies by region, most distinctively for childlessness. Differences between countries suggest that contextual factors—norms about parenthood, work–family policies, unemployment—shape women’s fertility goals, total family size, and the gap between them.

/pdf/the-gap-between-lifetime-fertility-intentions-and-completed-3wz6u2qydo.pdf

Eva Beaujouan

Papers

Fertility postponement is largely due to rising educational enrolment

Two Is Best? The Persistence of a Two‐Child Family Ideal in Europe

Cohabitation and marriage in Britain since the 1970s

Cohort fertility decline in low fertility countries: Decomposition using parity progression ratios

The Gap Between Lifetime Fertility Intentions and Completed Fertility in Europe and the United States: A Cohort Approach