Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

https://findresearcher.sdu.dk:8443/ws/files/116118561/reverse_logistics.pdf

Reverse logistics and closed-loop supply chain: A comprehensive review to explore the future

The management of food distribution networks is receiving more and more attention, both in practice and in the scientific literature. In this paper, we review quantitative operations management approaches to food distribution management, and relate this to challenges faced by the industry. Here, our main focus is on three aspects: food quality, food safety, and sustainability. We discuss the literature on three decision levels: strategic network design, tactical network planning, and operational transportation planning. For each of these, we survey the research contributions, discuss the state of the art, and identify challenges for future research.

https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/doc/1165266/file.pdf

Quality, safety and sustainability in food distribution : A review of quantitative operations management approaches and challenges

Today, around 54% of the world’s population lives in urban areas. By 2050, this share is expected to go up significantly. As a result, city logistics, which focuses on the efficient and effective transportation of goods in urban areas while taking into account the negative effects on congestion, safety, and environment, is critical to ensuring continued quality of life in cities. We review and discuss a variety of current and anticipated challenges and opportunities of city logistics. We hope this helps shaping an appropriate research agenda and stimulates more researchers to enter this exciting field.

/pdf/50th-anniversary-invited-article-city-logistics-challenges-640lyqmsq8.pdf

50th Anniversary Invited Article—City Logistics: Challenges and Opportunities

A memetic algorithm for bi-objective integrated forward/reverse logistics network design

This paper presents the results of a large-scale survey on the potential benefits of and impediments for horizontal cooperation in Flanders. The main findings are that in general Logistics Service Providers strongly believe in the potential benefits of horizontal cooperation to increase their profitability or to improve the quality of their services. The impediments for cooperation that are perceived or expected by the non-cooperating Logistics Service Providers prove to be experienced by the cooperating Logistics Service Providers. Finding a reliable party to lead the cooperation and constructing a fair allocation mechanism for the benefits are the impediments that respondents agree with most.

Horizontal cooperation in logistics : Opportunities and impediments

This article presents a broad review of horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics. This topic is fast gaining momentum in the logistics sector and is thus highly relevant from a practical point of view. Moreover, horizontal cooperation is also interesting from a theoretical perspective because it can be approached by various disciplines, offering a forum for economists, operations researchers, and psychologists, among others. The purpose of this article is to provide a starting point for intensified future research on the topic of horizontal cooperation. In addition to a discussion of various types of horizontal cooperation and closely related literature, the drivers, impediments, and facilitators are reviewed and supported by an extensive bibliography.

Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics: A Literature Review

Purpose - To provide empirical evidence on the level of savings that can be attained by joint route planning and how these savings depend on specific market characteristics.Design/methodology/approach - Joint route planning is a measure that companies can take to decrease the costs of their distribution activities. Essentially, this can either be achieved through horizontal cooperation or through outsourcing distribution to a Logistics Service Provider. The synergy value is defined as the difference between distribution costs in the original situation where all entities perform their orders individually, and the costs of a system where all orders are collected and route schemes are set up simultaneously to exploit economies of scale. This paper provides estimates of synergy values, both in a constructed benchmark case and in a number of real-world cases. Findings - It turns out that synergy values of 30% are achievable. Furthermore, intuition is developed on how the synergy values depend on characteristics of the distribution problem under consideration. Practical implications - the developed intuition on the nature of synergy values can help practitioners to find suitable combinations of distribution systems, since synergy values can quickly be assessed based on the characteristics of the distribution problem, without solving large and difficult Vehicle Routing Problems. Originality/value - this paper addresses a major impediment to horizontal cooperation: estimating operational savings upfront.

/pdf/joint-route-planning-under-varying-market-conditions-33m2130ylu.pdf

Joint Route Planning under Varying Market Conditions

Purpose – To provide empirical evidence on the level of savings that can be attained by joint route planning and how these savings depend on specific market characteristics.Design/methodology/approach – Joint route planning is a measure that companies can take to decrease the costs of their distribution activities. Essentially, this can either be achieved through horizontal cooperation or through outsourcing distribution to a logistics service provider. The synergy value is defined as the difference between distribution costs in the original situation where all entities perform their orders individually, and the costs of a system where all orders are collected and route schemes are set up simultaneously to exploit economies of scale. This paper provides estimates of synergy values, both in a constructed benchmark case and in a number of real‐world cases.Findings – It turns out that synergy values of 30 per cent are achievable. Furthermore, intuition is developed on how the synergy values depend on charact...

/pdf/joint-route-planning-under-varying-market-conditions-3dak73u8fs.pdf

This thesis deals with horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics. It contains a comprehensive discussion of the available academic literature on this topic, many practical examples, and an empirical investigation of opportunities and impediments. Furthermore, three enabling concepts for horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics are developed. The analysis is practice oriented in the sense that most of the results are based on real-life datasets. In case studies conducted, the most important goal is to learn lessons that are also applicable to other cases or industries. By contrast, in chapters that have a more theoretical point of departure, efforts are made to draw conclusions that are directly applicable in practice. Many different research techniques are used in this thesis. They include case study analysis, surveys, exploratory factor analysis, regression, game theory, vehicle routing heuristics, and facility location heuristics.

F.C.A.M. Cruijssen

Papers

Horizontal cooperation in logistics : Opportunities and impediments

Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics: A Literature Review

Joint Route Planning under Varying Market Conditions

Joint Route Planning under Varying Market Conditions

Horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics