Machine Learning is the study of methods for programming computers to learn. Computers are applied to a wide range of tasks, and for most of these it is relatively easy for programmers to design and implement the necessary software. However, there are many tasks for which this is difficult or impossible. These can be divided into four general categories. First, there are problems for which there exist no human experts. For example, in modern automated manufacturing facilities, there is a need to predict machine failures before they occur by analyzing sensor readings. Because the machines are new, there are no human experts who can be interviewed by a programmer to provide the knowledge necessary to build a computer system. A machine learning system can study recorded data and subsequent machine failures and learn prediction rules. Second, there are problems where human experts exist, but where they are unable to explain their expertise. This is the case in many perceptual tasks, such as speech recognition, hand-writing recognition, and natural language understanding. Virtually all humans exhibit expert-level abilities on these tasks, but none of them can describe the detailed steps that they follow as they perform them. Fortunately, humans can provide machines with examples of the inputs and correct outputs for these tasks, so machine learning algorithms can learn to map the inputs to the outputs. Third, there are problems where phenomena are changing rapidly. In finance, for example, people would like to predict the future behavior of the stock market, of consumer purchases, or of exchange rates. These behaviors change frequently, so that even if a programmer could construct a good predictive computer program, it would need to be rewritten frequently. A learning program can relieve the programmer of this burden by constantly modifying and tuning a set of learned prediction rules. Fourth, there are applications that need to be customized for each computer user separately. Consider, for example, a program to filter unwanted electronic mail messages. Different users will need different filters. It is unreasonable to expect each user to program his or her own rules, and it is infeasible to provide every user with a software engineer to keep the rules up-to-date. A machine learning system can learn which mail messages the user rejects and maintain the filtering rules automatically. Machine learning addresses many of the same research questions as the fields of statistics, data mining, and psychology, but with differences of emphasis. Statistics focuses on understanding the phenomena that have generated the data, often with the goal of testing different hypotheses about those phenomena. Data mining seeks to find patterns in the data that are understandable by people. Psychological studies of human learning aspire to understand the mechanisms underlying the various learning behaviors exhibited by people (concept learning, skill acquisition, strategy change, etc.).

Machine learning

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

In the Hamadryas baboon, males are substantially larger than females. A troop of baboons is subdivided into a number of ‘one-male groups’, consisting of one adult male and one or more females with their young. The male prevents any of ‘his’ females from moving too far from him. Kummer (1971) performed the following experiment. Two males, A and B, previously unknown to each other, were placed in a large enclosure. Male A was free to move about the enclosure, but male B was shut in a small cage, from which he could observe A but not interfere. A female, unknown to both males, was then placed in the enclosure. Within 20 minutes male A had persuaded the female to accept his ownership. Male B was then released into the open enclosure. Instead of challenging male A , B avoided any contact, accepting A’s ownership.

Evolution and the Theory of Games

Series Preface * Preface to the Third Edition * 1 Linear Systems * 2 Nonlinear Systems: Local Theory * 3 Nonlinear Systems: Global Theory * 4 Nonlinear Systems: Bifurcation Theory * References * Index

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Differential Equations and Dynamical Systems

AUTO-07p: Continuation and bifurcation software for ordinary differential equations

Quantitative approaches to evolutionary biology traditionally consider evolutionary change in isolation from an important pressure in natural selection: the demography of coevolving populations In Analysis of Evolutionary Processes, Fabio Dercole and Sergio Rinaldi have written the first comprehensive book on Adaptive Dynamics (AD), a quantitative modeling approach that explicitly links evolutionary changes to demographic ones The book shows how the so-called AD canonical equation can answer questions of paramount interest in biology, engineering, and the social sciences, especially economics
	
	After introducing the basics of evolutionary processes and classifying available modeling approaches, Dercole and Rinaldi give a detailed presentation of the derivation of the AD canonical equation, an ordinary differential equation that focuses on evolutionary processes driven by rare and small innovations The authors then look at important features of evolutionary dynamics as viewed through the lens of AD They present their discovery of the first chaotic evolutionary attractor, which calls into question the common view that coevolution produces exquisitely harmonious adaptations between species And, opening up potential new lines of research by providing the first application of AD to economics, they show how AD can explain the emergence of technological variety
	
	Analysis of Evolutionary Processes will interest anyone looking for a self-contained treatment of AD for self-study or teaching, including graduate students and researchers in mathematical and theoretical biology, applied mathematics, and theoretical economics

Analysis of Evolutionary Processes: The Adaptive Dynamics Approach and Its Applications

Disclosing the main features of the structure of a network is crucial to understand a number of static and dynamic properties, such as robustness to failures, spreading dynamics, or collective behaviours. Among the possible characterizations, the core-periphery paradigm models the network as the union of a dense core with a sparsely connected periphery, highlighting the role of each node on the basis of its topological position. Here we show that the core-periphery structure can effectively be profiled by elaborating the behaviour of a random walker. A curve—the core-periphery profile—and a numerical indicator are derived, providing a global topological portrait. Simultaneously, a coreness value is attributed to each node, qualifying its position and role. The application to social, technological, economical, and biological networks reveals the power of this technique in disclosing the overall network structure and the peculiar role of some specific nodes.

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Profiling core-periphery network structure by random walkers

Recurrent neurons (and in particular LSTM cells) demonstrated to be efficient when used as basic blocks to build sequence to sequence architectures, which represent the state-of-the-art approach in many sequential tasks related to natural language processing. In this work, these architectures are proposed as general purposes, multi-step predictors for nonlinear time series. We analyze artificial, noise-free data generated by chaotic oscillators and compare LSTM nets with the benchmarks set by feed-forward, one-step-recursive and multi-output predictors. We focus on two different training methods for LSTM nets. The traditional one makes use of the so-called teacher forcing, i.e. the ground truth data are used as input for each time step ahead, rather than the outputs predicted for the previous steps. Conversely, the second feeds the previous predictions back into the recurrent neurons, as it happens when the network is used in forecasting. LSTM predictors robustly show the strengths of the two benchmark competitors, i.e., the good short-term performance of one-step-recursive predictors and greatly improved mid-long-term predictions with respect to feed-forward, multi-output predictors. Training LSTM predictors without teacher forcing is recommended to improve accuracy and robustness, and ensures a more uniform distribution of the predictive power within the chaotic attractor. We also show that LSTM architectures maintain good performances when the number of time lags included in the input differs from the actual embedding dimension of the dataset, a feature that is very important when working on real data.

Robustness of LSTM neural networks for multi-step forecasting of chaotic time series

We study the interplay of ecological and evolutionary dynamics in communities composed of populations with contrasting time-scales. In such communities, genetic variation of individual traits can cause population transitions between stationary and cyclic ecological regimes, hence abrupt variations in fitness. Such abrupt variations raise ridges in the adaptive landscape, where the populations are poised between equilibrium and cyclic coexistence and along which evolutionary trajectories can remain sliding for long times or halt at special points called evolutionary pseudo-equilibria. These novel phenomena should be generic to all systems in which ecological interactions cause fitness to vary discontinuously. They are demonstrated by the analysis of a predator-prey community, with one adaptive trait for each population. The eco-evolutionary dynamics of the system show a number of other distinctive features, including evolutionary extinction and two forms of Red Queen dynamics. One of them is characterized by intermittent bouts of cyclic oscillations of the two populations.

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Fabio Dercole

Papers

AUTO-07p: Continuation and bifurcation software for ordinary differential equations

Analysis of Evolutionary Processes: The Adaptive Dynamics Approach and Its Applications

Profiling core-periphery network structure by random walkers

Robustness of LSTM neural networks for multi-step forecasting of chaotic time series

Coevolution of slow–fast populations: evolutionary sliding, evolutionary pseudo-equilibria and complex Red Queen dynamics