THE DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS. By Oscar Kempthorne. New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1952. 631 pp. $8.50. This book by a teacher of statistics (as well as a consultant for \"experimenters\") is a comprehensive study of the philosophical background for the statistical design of experiment. It is necessary to have some facility with algebraic notation and manipulation to be able to use the volume intelligently. The problems are presented from the theoretical point of view, without such practical examples as would be helpful for those not acquainted with mathematics. The mathematical justification for the techniques is given. As a somewhat advanced treatment of the design and analysis of experiments, this volume will be interesting and helpful for many who approach statistics theoretically as well as practically. With emphasis on the \"why,\" and with description given broadly, the author relates the subject matter to the general theory of statistics and to the general problem of experimental inference. MARGARET J. ROBERTSON

The Design and Analysis of Experiments

Experience and Educationis the best concise statement on education ever published by John Dewey, the man acknowledged to be the pre-eminent educational theorist of the twentieth century. Written more than two decades after Democracy and Education(Dewey's most comprehensive statement of his position in educational philosophy), this book demonstrates how Dewey reformulated his ideas as a result of his intervening experience with the progressive schools and in the light of the criticisms his theories had received. Analysing both "traditional" and "progressive" education, Dr. Dewey here insists that neither the old nor the new education is adequate and that each is miseducative because neither of them applies the principles of a carefully developed philosophy of experience. Many pages of this volume illustrate Dr. Dewey's ideas for a philosophy of experience and its relation to education. He particularly urges that all teachers and educators looking for a new movement in education should think in terms of the deeped and larger issues of education rather than in terms of some divisive "ism" about education, even such an "ism" as "progressivism." His philosophy, here expressed in its most essential, most readable form, predicates an American educational system that respects all sources of experience, on that offers a true learning situation that is both historical and social, both orderly and dynamic.

经验与教育 = Experience and education

Statistics for Spatial Data.

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting from Technology

Response surface methods have been used for a variety of applications in aerospace engineering, particularly in multidisciplinary design optimization. We investigate the use of kriging models as alternatives to traditional second-order polynomial response surfaces for constructing global approximations for use in a real aerospace engineering application, namely, the design of an aerospike nozzle. Our objective is to examine the difeculties in building and using kriging models to create accurate global approximations to facilitate multidisciplinary design optimization. Error analysis of the response surface and kriging models is performed, along with a graphical comparison of the approximations. Four optimization problems are also formulated and solved using both sets of approximation models to gain insight into their use for multidisciplinary design optimization. We end that the kriging models, which use only a constant “global” model and a Gaussian correlation function, yield global approximations that are slightly more accurate than the response surface models.

Kriging Models for Global Approximation in Simulation-Based Multidisciplinary Design Optimization

In this paper, we introduce a small variation to current approaches broadly called Taguchi Robust Design Methods. In these methods, there are two broad categories of problems associated with simultaneously minimizing performance variations and bringing the mean on target, namely, Type 1-minimizing variations in performance caused by variations in noise factors (uncontrollable parameters). Type II-minimizing variations in performance caused by variations in control factors (design variables). In this paper, we introduce a variation to the existing approaches to solve both types of problems. This variation embodies the integration of the Response Surface Methodology (RSM) with the compromise Decision Support Problem (DSP). Our approach is especially useful for design problems where there are no closed-form solutions and system performance is computationally expensive to evaluate. The design of a solar powered irrigation system is used as an example.

A procedure for robust design: Minimizing variations caused by noise factors and control factors

In this paper we focus on scale-based product families derived from scalable product platforms that can be exploited from both a functional and a manufacturing standpoint to increase the potential benefits of having a common platform. While many companies have been successful with scalable product platforms, few, if any, have instituted a systematic approach to design (i) the product platform and (ii) the corresponding family of products which are scaled around the product platform. Accordingly, in this paper we address the following question: How can a scalable product platform and its resulting product family be efficiently and effectively modeled, analyzed, and designed?

Product platform design: method and application

In this paper, we compare and contrast the use of second-order response surface models and kriging models for approximating non-random, deterministic computer analyses. After reviewing the response surface method for constructing polynomial approximations, kriging is presented as an alternative approximation method for the design and analysis of computer experiments. Both methods are applied to the multidisciplinary design of an aerospike nozzle which consists of a computational fluid dynamics model and a finite-element model. Error analysis of the response surface and kriging models is performed along with a graphical comparison of the approximations, and four optimization problems m formulated and solved using both sets of approximation models. The second-order response surface models and kriging models-using a constant underlying global model and a Gaussian correlation function-yield comparable results.

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Comparison of response surface and kriging models for multidisciplinary design optimization

1. Our Frame of Reference A COMPREHENSIVE approach called the decision support problem technique" is being developed and implemented at the University of Houston to provide support for human judgment in designing an artifact that can be manufactured and maintained. Decision support problems (DSPs) provide a means for modeling decisions encountered in design, manufacture, and maintenance. Multiple objectives that are quantified using analysis-based "hard" and insight-based "soft" information can be modeled in the DSPs. For real-world, practical systems, not all of the information will be available for modeling systems comprehensively and correctly in the early stages of the project. Therefore, the solution to the problem, even if it is obtained using optimization techniques, cannot be the optimum with respect to the real world. However, this solution can be used to support a designer's quest for a superior solution. In a computerassisted environment, this support is provided in the form of optimal solutions for decision support problems. Formulation and solution of DSPs provide a means for making the following types of decisions:

Farrokh Mistree

Papers

Kriging Models for Global Approximation in Simulation-Based Multidisciplinary Design Optimization

A procedure for robust design: Minimizing variations caused by noise factors and control factors

Product platform design: method and application

Comparison of response surface and kriging models for multidisciplinary design optimization

The compromise decision support problem and the adaptive linear programming algorithm