Federico Fabbrini

TL;DR: In this paper, the role of national parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the reaction of national Parliaments as a case study is analyzed. And the authors argue that the review of national parliamentarians should focus exclusively on violations of the principle of subsidiarity and should not extend to the evaluation of the proportionality, legal basis or political merits of a draft EU legislative proposal.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the institutional implications of the "golden rule" on the role of the political and judicial branches, both in the states and in the EU, and argue that, while the domestic effects of such a rule are likely to vary from one state to another, the Fiscal Compact systematically enhances the powers of the EU institutions to direct and police the budgetary policies of the states.

TL;DR: The Euro-Crisis and the legal and institutional responses to it have had important constitutional implications on the architecture of the European Union (EU) as discussed by the authors, and Federico Fabbrini's book takes a broad look and examines how the crisis and its aftermath have changed relations of power in the EU, disaggregating three different dimensions: (1) the vertical relations between the member states and the EU institutions, (2) the relations of authority between the political branches and the courts, and (3) the horizontal relations of powers between the EU member states themselves.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a comprehensive analysis of decisions by high courts in Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and the EU with the aim to discuss the role of the judiciary in fiscal affairs.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the institutional implications of the Euro-zone Fiscal Compact on the role of the political and judicial branches, both in the states and in the EU as a whole.