Social partners (trade unions and employers' associations) shape labour institutions and economic and social outcomes in many countries. In this paper, we argue that, when examining social partners' representativeness, it is important to consider both affiliation and dissimilarity measures. The latter concerns the extent to which affiliated and non- affiliated firms or workers are distributed similarly across relevant dimensions, including firm size. In our analysis of European Company Survey data, we find that affiliation and dissimilarity measures correlate positively across countries, particularly in the case of employers' associations. This result also holds across employers' associations when we use firm population data for Portugal. Overall, we conclude that higher affiliation rates do not necessarily equate to more representative social partners as they can involve greater dissimilarity between affiliated and non-affiliated firms. 

/pdf/how-representative-are-social-partners-in-europe-the-role-of-2f9them6.pdf

How Representative are Social Partners in Europe? The Role of Dissimilarity

Social partners (trade unions and employers' associations [EA]) and their representativeness can shape labour institutions and economic and social outcomes in many countries. In this paper, we argue that, when examining social partners' representativeness, it is important to consider both affiliation rates and dissimilarity measures. The latter concerns the extent to which affiliated and non-affiliated firms or workers are distributed similarly across relevant dimensions, including firm size. In our analysis of the European Company Survey, we find that affiliation density and dissimilarity measures correlate positively across countries, particularly in the case of EA in which we focus. This result also holds across EA when we use more detailed, firm population data for Portugal. We conclude that higher affiliation densities do not necessarily correspond to more representative social partners as they can involve greater dissimilarity between affiliated and non-affiliated firms. 

/pdf/how-representative-are-social-partners-in-europe-the-role-of-29k8oxqa.pdf

How representative are social partners in Europe? The role of dissimilarity

Labor Market Concentration and Wages: Incumbents versus New Hires

IZA DP No. 16021 MARCH 2023 Non-compete Agreements in a Rigid Labour Market: The Case of Italy* Non-compete clauses (NCCs) limiting the mobility of workers have been found to be rather widespread in the US, a flexible labour market with large turnover rates and a limited coverage of collective bargaining. This paper explores the presence of such arrangements in a rigid labour market, with strict employment protection regulations by OECD standards and where all employees are, at least on paper, subject to collective bargaining. Based on a representative survey of employees in the private sector, an exam of collective agreements and case law, we find that in Italy i) collective agreements play no role in regulating the use of NCCs while the law specifies only the formal requirements, ii) about 16% of private sector employees are currently bound by a NCC, iii) NCCs are relatively frequent among low educated employees in manual and elementary low paid occupations having no access to any type of confidential information, and iv) in addition to NCCs, a number of other arrangements limit the post-employment activity of workers. Many of the NCCs do not comply with the minimum requirements established by law and yet workers do not consider them as unenforceable and appear to behave as they were effective. Even when NCCs are unenforceable they appear to negatively affect wages when they are introduced without changing the tasks of the workers involved. Normative implications are discussed in the last section of the paper. JEL Classification: J31, J41, J42, L40

Non-Compete Agreements in a Rigid Labour Market: The Case of Italy

We investigate the impact of labour market concentration on two dimensions of job quality, namely wages and job security. We leverage rich administrative linked employer-employee data from Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain in the 2010s to provide the first comparable cross-country evidence in the literature. Controlling for productivity and local product market concentration, we show that the elasticities of wages with respect to labour market concentration are strikingly similar across countries: increasing labour market concentration by 10% reduces wages by 0.19% in Germany, 0.22% in France, 0.25% in Portugal and 0.29% in Denmark. Regarding job security, we find that an increase in labour market concentration by 10% reduces the probability of being hired on a permanent contract by 0.46% in France, 0.51% in Germany and 2.34% in Portugal. While not affecting this probability in Italy and Spain, labour market concentration significantly reduces the probability of being converted to a permanent contract once hired on a temporary one. Our results suggest that considering only the effect of labour market concentration on wages underestimates its overall impact on job quality and hence the resulting welfare loss for workers.

https://run.unl.pt/bitstream/10362/147201/1/WP654.pdf

Florentino José Felgueroso Fernández

Papers

Labour Market Concentration, Wages and Job Security in Europe