We map the pattern and extent of the European integration of core state powers (coercive force, public finance and public administration) and analyse causes and consequences. We highlight two findings: First, in contrast to historical examples of federal state-building, where the nationalization of core state powers precipitated the institutional, territorial and political consolidation of the emerging state, the European integration of core state powers is associated with the institutional, territorial and political fragmentation of the European Union. Second, in contrast to European market integration, state elites and mass publics, not organized business interests, are the prime drivers of integration.

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More integration, less federation: the European integration of core state powers

This article analyses how the European Union's response to the euro-crisis has altered the constitutional balance upon which its stability is based. It argues that the stability and legitimacy of any political system requires the structural incorporation of individual and political self-determination. In the context of the EU, this requirement is met through the idea of constitutional balance, with ‘substantive’, ‘institutional’ and ‘spatial’ dimensions. Analysing reforms to EU law and institutional structure in the wake of the crisis – such as the establishment of the ESM, the growing influence of the European Council and the creation of a stand-alone Fiscal Compact – it is argued that recent reforms are likely to have a lasting impact on the ability of the EU to mediate conflicting interests in all three areas. By undermining its constitutional balance, the response to the crisis is likely to dampen the long-term stability and legitimacy of the EU project.

Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro‐Crisis

Executive dominance in the contemporary EU is part of a wider migration of executive power towards types of decision making that eschew electoral accountability and popular democratic control. This democratic gap is fed by far-going secrecy arrangements and practices exercised in a concerted fashion by the various executive actors at different levels of governance and resulting in the blacking out of crucial information and documents - even for parliaments. Beyond a deconstruction exercise on the nature and location of EU executive power and secretive working practices, this article focuses on the challenges facing parliaments in particular. It seeks to reconstruct a more pro-active and networked role of parliaments - both national and European - as countervailing power. In this vision parliaments must assert themselves in a manner that is true to their role in the political system and that is not dictated by government at any level.

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Challenging Executive Dominance in European Democracy

Preface: how many Unions? Part I. Institutionalisation of Multiple Unions: 1. From Rome to the Lisbon Treaty 2. The Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis 3. Institutionalisation and constitutional divisions Part II. Main Perspectives on the European Union: 4. The perspective of the economic community 5. The perspective of intergovernmental union 6. The perspective of parliamentary union Part III. Towards the Compound Union Perspective: 7. Comparing democratic models 8. Compound unions and the EU 9. A new political order in Europe.

Which European Union?: Europe after the Euro Crisis

How should decision-making under EU economic governance be understood following the euro-crisis? This article argues, contra existing depictions, that the post-crisis EU has increasingly adopted methods of decision-making in the economic field which marry the decision-making structure of inter-governmentalism with the supervisory and implementation framework of the Community Method. While this ‘post-crisis’ method has arisen for clear reasons – to achieve economic convergence between eurozone states in an environment where previous models of decision-making were unsuitable or unwanted – it also carries important normative implications. Post-crisis governance departs from the mechanisms of legal and political accountability present in previous forms of EU decision-making without substituting new models of accountability in their place. Providing appropriate channels of political and legal control in the EU's ‘new’ economic governance should be seen as a crucial task for the coming decade.

The Legal and Political Accountability Structure of ‘Post-Crisis’ EU Economic Governance

As the crisis (and the Union's response to it) further develops, one thing appears clear: the European Union post-crisis will be a very different animal from the pre-crisis EU. This article offers an alternative model for the EU's constitutional future. Its objective is to invert the Union's current path-dependency: changes to the way in which the Union works should serve to question, rather than entrench, its future objectives and trajectory. The paper argues that the post-crisis EU requires a quite different normative, institutional and juridical framework. Such a framework must focus on reproducing the social and political cleavages that underlie authority on the national level and that allow divisive political choices to be legitimised. This reform project implies reshaping the prerogatives of the European institutions. Rather than seeking to prevent or bracket political conflict, the division of institutional competences and tasks should be rethought in order to allow the EU institutions to internalise within their decision-making process the conflicts reproduced by social and political cleavages. Finally, a reformed legal order must play an active role as a facilitator and container of conflict over the ends of the integration project.

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From Balance to Conflict: A New Constitution for the EU

This contribution analyses the conflicts of justice that are becoming increasingly visible in Europe. It argues that while European Union (EU) law can be understood as an instrument for the incorporation of the demands of justice and the articulation of ‘the good’ beyond the nation state, it also potentially skews the distributive criteria and assumptions of justice that underlie the national welfare state. In light of the absence of a transnational political system that can bound such conflicts of justice, this article suggests that the capacity of the EU to contribute to, rather than detract from, the attainment of justice depends on the careful articulation and institutionalisation of the different types of transnational solidarity that exist in Europe.

Transnational Solidarity and the Mediation of Conflicts of Justice in Europe

This forum debate discusses the link between Union citizenship and free movement. These concepts were long understood as progressive and fundamental mechanisms in drawing the citizen closer to the European integration project. Both concepts now appear in crisis. This is, of course, reflected in the run-up to, and outcome of the Brexit vote. But criticism on the link between Union citizenship and free movement must be understood in a wider context. It is the context within which welfare systems are perceived to struggle with the incorporation of migrant citizens; and within which the benefits linked to free movement are perceived to fall to specific groups or classes of citizens in society. This EUDO forum debate takes on this discussion in two different ways. One the one hand, it discusses whether free movement contributes to, or detracts from, the capacity of the EU to create a more just or legitimate relationship between its citizens. On the other hand, it discusses whether Union citizenship – a status that is fundamental to all nationals of the Member States, whether they move across borders or not – should be centred on free movement, or whether we need to rethink the premise of what it means to be a European citizen.

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Freedom of movement under attack: is it worth defending as the core of EU citizenship?

This article analyses three prominent proposals for the functional and political transformation of the EU from a constitutional perspective. It argues that existing EU reform proposals, to varying degrees, entrench rather than reverse the challenges to individual and political self-determination brought about by the EU's response to its Euro crisis. As the article will conclude, challenging ‘authoritarian liberalism' in an EU context may require the development of a constitutional structure for the Union able to contest, rather than set in stone, the EU's existing economic and political goals.

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Floris de Witte

Papers

Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro‐Crisis

From Balance to Conflict: A New Constitution for the EU

Transnational Solidarity and the Mediation of Conflicts of Justice in Europe

Freedom of movement under attack: is it worth defending as the core of EU citizenship?

Self-determination in the Constitutional future of the EU