Francesco Sangiorgi

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the influence of the correlation on the extent of ratings shopping and bias and highlight the interaction between the decision about whether to rely on unsolicited ratings and the potential for ratings shopping.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study financial markets in which both rational and overconfident agents coexist and make endogenous information acquisition decisions, and demonstrate the following irrelevance result when a positive fraction of rational agents (endogenously) decides to become informed in equilibrium, prices are set as if all investors were rational.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study financial markets in which both rational and overconfident agents coexist and make endogenous information acquisition decisions, and demonstrate the following irrelevance result: when a positive fraction of rational agents (endogeneously) decides to become informed in equilibrium, prices are set as if all investors were rational, and as a consequence the overconfidence bias does not a ect informational efficiency, price volatility, rational traders' expected profits or their welfare.

TL;DR: The authors analyzes costly information acquisition in asset markets with Knightian uncertainty about the asset fundamentals and shows that when uncertainty is high enough, information acquisition decisions become strategic complements and lead to multiple equilibria.

TL;DR: This article studied asset markets in which ambiguity averse investors face Knightian uncertainty about the fundamentals, and coexist with agents who have resolved their uncertainty, although not risk, as a result of a rational information acquisition process.