F
Françoise Forges
Researcher at Paris Dauphine University
Publications - 119
Citations - 2459
Françoise Forges is an academic researcher from Paris Dauphine University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Repeated game & Bayesian game. The author has an hindex of 26, co-authored 117 publications receiving 2294 citations. Previous affiliations of Françoise Forges include Center for Economic Studies & Institut Universitaire de France.
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An approach to communication equilibria
TL;DR: In this article, Aumann's correlated equilibrium and extensive form correlated equilibrium are proposed for multistage games, where players can observe private extraneous signals at every stage and the communication equilibrium, where the players are furthermore allowed to transmit inputs to an appropriate device at each stage.
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Afriat's Theorem for General Budget Sets
TL;DR: By increasing in a regular way the number of observed choices from the authors' class of budget sets one can fully identify the underlying preference relation and obtain testable implications of rational behavior for a wide class of economic environments and a constructive method to derive individual preferences from observed choices.
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Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
TL;DR: Aumann's (1987) theorem shows that correlated equilibrium is an expression of Bayesian rationality as discussed by the authors, and they extend this result to games with incomplete information, such as games with complete and incomplete information.
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Afriat's theorem for general budget sets
Françoise Forges,Enrico Minelli +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extend Afriat's theorem to a class of nonlinear, nonconvex budget sets and show that by increasing in a regular way the number of observed choices from their class of budget sets one can fully identify the underlying preference relation.
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Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study costless information transmission from a job applicant to an employer who must decide whether to hire him and, if so, which position to give him.