In arguing a "role for history," Kuhn was proposing a naturalized philosophy of science. That, I argue, is the only viable approach to the philosophy of science. I begin by exhibiting the main general objections to a naturalistic approach. These objections, I suggest, are equally powerful against nonnaturalistic accounts. I review the failure of two nonnaturalistic approaches, methodological foundationism (Carnap, Reichenbach, and Popper) and metamethodology (Lakatos and Laudan). The correct response, I suggest, is to adopt an "evolutionary perspective." This perspective is defended against one recent critic (Putnam). To argue the plausibility of a naturalistic approach, I next sketch a naturalistic account of theories and of theory choice. This account is then illustrated by the recent revolution in geology. In conclusion I return to Kuhn's question about the role of history in developing a naturalistic theory of science.

Philosophy of Science Naturalized

The purpose of this paper is not to be new or original, but to provide a concise exposition of a certain approach in philosophy of science, at the hands of a loosely associated group of contemporary philosophers.* I do not want anyone to suffer from guilt by asociation, so I should emphasize that any two authors mentioned here may agree on only a few aspects of the discussed approach, and disagree on others.

The Semantic Approach to Scientific Theories

A precise formulation of the structure of modern evolutionary theory has proved elusive. In this paper, I introduce and develop a formal approach to the structure of population genetics, evolutionary theory's most developed sub-theory. Under the semantic approach, used as a framework in this paper, presenting a theory consists in presenting a related family of models. I offer general guidelines and examples for the classification of population genetics models; the defining features of the models are taken to be their state spaces, parameters, and laws. The suggestions regarding the various aspects of the characterization of population genetics models provide an outline for further detailed research.

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A Semantic Approach to the Structure of Population Genetics

The myth of operationism.

Jacqueline Fawcett's nursing metaparadigm-the domains of person, health, environment, and nursing-remains popular in nursing curricula, despite having been repeatedly challenged as a logical philosophy of nursing. Fawcett appropriated the word "metaparadigm" (indirectly) from Margaret Masterman and Thomas Kuhn as a devise that allowed her to organize then-current areas of nursing interest into a philosophical "hierarchy of knowledge," and thereby claim nursing inquiry and practice as rigorously "scientific." Scholars have consistently rejected the logic of Fawcett's metaparadigm, but have not yet proposed a substantially agreed-upon alternative. Through an analysis of articles introducing and critiquing Fawcett's metaparadigm, I argue for a re-conceptualized metaparadigm that articulates nursing's ontology. What exists for the nursing discipline are not already-demarcated metaparadigm domains, but rather interdependent, dynamic relations that constitute people, including nurses, in their health/environment circumstance. The nursing discipline aims to skillfully access this dynamic relationality as the basis for action and reflection to produce both positive health trajectories and knowledge that facilitates future action and reflection. Further inquiry into the onto-epistemology of nursing will produce a more robust understanding of nursing practice, science, and philosophy, and clarify its unique contribution to health and healthcare.

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Re-conceptualizing the nursing metaparadigm: Articulating the philosophical ontology of the nursing discipline that orients inquiry and practice.

We have seen that the operational imperative is a prescriptive thesis about formulations of theories which imposes restrictions on the sorts of theories science may employ. We assessed the operational imperative by investigating a number of relationships holding between theory formulations, theories, physical systems, and phenomena, and then applying our findings to the operational imperative. These applications showed that the operational definitions required by the operational imperative were not definitions at all, being rather statements of putative empirical regularities holding between particulars which in effect are formulations of empirically true or false theories. From this fact it followed that the supposed epistemic pay-offs of following the operational imperative fail to accrue: Operational definitions do not enable one to go deductively from knowledge of observables to knowledge of unobservables, and operational definitions do not provide a means for testing theories about unobservable phenomena. As such the operational imperative should be rejected in both its weak and strong versions. However, we did discover a grain of truth in the observational imperative — namely that theories with non-observable parameters are testable only if these parameters have observable manifestations. But that grain of truth does not lead to the operational imperative as typically advanced unless one embraces certain epistemological theories about observation which recent work on observation makes highly doubtful.

Frederick Suppe

Papers

Theories, their formulations, and the operational imperative

Misidentification, truth, and knowing that