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Gabriel Jiménez

Researcher at Bank of Spain

Publications -  85
Citations -  4173

Gabriel Jiménez is an academic researcher from Bank of Spain. The author has contributed to research in topics: Loan & Credit risk. The author has an hindex of 24, co-authored 83 publications receiving 3924 citations. Previous affiliations of Gabriel Jiménez include Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education & University of Seville.

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Credit Cycles, Credit Risk, and Prudential Regulation

TL;DR: In this article, the authors found strong empirical support of a positive, although quite lagged, relationship between rapid credit growth and loan losses, and provided empirical evidence of more lenient credit terms during boom periods, both in terms of screening of borrowers and in collateral requirements.
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How Does Competition Impact Bank Risk-Taking?

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the empirical nature of the relationship between competition and bank risk-taking and found that standard measures of market concentration do not affect the ratio of non-performing commercial loans (NPL), their measure of bank risk.
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Determinants of collateral

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the factors that determine the use of collateral in time series and cross-section data on the population of banks and found that a higher risk free interest rate of the economy and a smaller size of the loan increase the likelihood that a loan will be totally secured with collateral instead of partially secured.
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How does competition affect bank risk-taking?

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that a nonlinear relationship theoretically exists between bank competition and risk-taking in the loan market and find support for this non-linear relationship using standard measures of market concentration in both the loan and deposit markets.
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Determinants of Collateral

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors draw upon the theory of contracting under asymmetric information to postulate and test several hypotheses concerning the relationship between the use and amount of collateral in financial loans to firms, the risk profile of the borrower, business cycle and monetary conditions of the economy, strength of the lending relation between borrower and lender, competition in the credit market and expertise and preferences of the lender.