It comes as something ofa surprise to reflect that the New York Review ofBooks is now over twenty years old. Even people of my generation (that is, old enough to remember the revolutionary 196os but not young enough to have taken a very exciting part in them) think of the paper as eternally youthful. In fact, it has gone through years of relatively quiet life, yet, as always in a competitive journalistic market, it is the controversies that attract the interest of the reader and to which the history (especially an admittedly impressionistic survey that tries to include something of the intellectual context in which a journal has operated) must give some attention. Not all the attacks which the New York Review has attracted, both early in its career and more recently, are worth more than a brief summary. What do we now make, for example, of Richard Kostelanetz's forthright accusation that 'The New York Review was from its origins destined to publicize Random House's (and especially [Jason] Epstein's) books and writers'?1 Well, simply that, even if the statistics bear out the charge (and Kostelanetz provides some suggestive evidence to support it, at least with respect to some early issues), there is nothing surprising in a market economy about a publisher trying to push his books through the pages of a journal edited by his friends. True, the New York Review has not had room to review more than around fifteen books in each issue and there could be a bias in the selection of

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3507774.pdf

The New York Review of Books

Culture and Imperialism

Even when political rule is territorial, territoriality does not necessarily entail the practices of total mutual exclusion which dominant understandings of the modern territorial state attribute to it. However, when the territoriality of the state is debated by international relations theorists the discussion is overwhelmingly in terms of the persistence or obsolescence of the territorial state as an unchanging entity rather than in terms of its significance and meaning in different historical‐geographical circumstances. Contemporary events call this approach into question. The end of the Cold War, the increased velocity and volatility of the world economy, and the emergence of political movements outside the framework of territorial states, suggest the need to consider the territoriality of states in historical context. Conventional thinking relies on three geographical assumptions ‐ states as fixed units of sovereign space, the domestic/foreign polarity, and states as ‘containers’ of societies...

The territorial trap: The geographical assumptions of international relations theory

Part I. Introduction: Developing a Regional Approach to Global Security: 1. Theories and histories about the structure of contemporary international security 2. Levels: distinguishing the regional from the global 3. Security complexes: a theory of regional security Part II. Asia: 4. South Asia: inching towards internal and external transformation 5. Northeast and southeast Asian security complexes during the Cold War 6. The 1990s and beyond: an emergent east Asian complex Conclusion Part III. The Middle East and Africa: Introduction 7. The Middle East: a perennial conflict formation 8. Sub-saharan Africa: security dynamics in a setting of weak and failed states Conclusions Part IV. The Americas: 9. North America: the sole superpower and its surroundings 10. South America: an under-conflictual anomaly? Conclusion: scenarios for the RSCs of the Americas Part V. The Europes: Introduction: 11. EU-Europe: the European Union and its 'near abroad' 12. The Balkans and Turkey 13. The post-Soviet space: a regional security complex around Russia Conclusion: scenarios for the European supercomplex Part VI. Conclusions: 14. Regions and powers: summing up and looking ahead 15. Reflections on conceptualising international security.

http://ndl.ethernet.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/3437/1/75.pdf

Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security

© 2005 Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd 10.1191/0309132505ph531pr I Parameters, definitions and themes This is the first of three reports I will write covering an emergent area of research in cultural geography and its cognate fields. During recent years, ‘non-representational theory’ has become as an umbrella term for diverse work that seeks better to cope with our self-evidently more-than-human, more-than-textual, multisensual worlds. In as much as nonrepresentational work allows it, these reports will sketch out common themes of interest, and assess impacts, critics and potentials, variously conceptual, methodological and empirical. Of late, non-representational theorists have asked difficult and provocative questions of cultural geographers, and many others in the discipline, about what is intended by the conduct of research (Thrift and Dewsbury, 2000). What has been identified as deadening effect – the tendency for cultural analyses to cleave towards a conservative, categorical politics of identity and textual meaning – can, it is contended, be overcome by allowing in much more of the excessive and transient aspects of living. Given the scope and force of the original non-representational arguments, it is unsurprising that this theory has been subject to fulsome response. In fact, non-representational theory has become a particularly effective lightning-rod for disciplinary self-critique. Commentaries have emerged from within cultural, feminist and Marxian traditions and the more recent coalition of critical geography. Notably, and anecdotally, some of the most colourful observations have been saved for bi-partisan conversation in the conference or common room. It is important (not to say appropriate) that the nature of the dialogue – variously confrontational, tribal, dogmatic, peevish and full-bodied – goes on record early. Published versions have been concerned predominantly with the theoretical conditions for disciplinary succession or progression that the term ‘non-representational’ would seem to imply and how, in relation, the concept of performance should be understood by geographers. These articles are variously structured as manifesto, critical review, restated challenge, revanchist programme and proposed reconciliation (Thrift, 1996; 1997; 2000; Nelson, 1999; Thrift and Dewsbury, 2000; Nash, 2000; Harrison, 2000; Gregson and Rose, 2000; Crouch, 2001; Dewsbury et al., 2002; Whatmore, 2002; Cresswell, 2002; Smith, 2003; Jacobs and Nash, 2003; Latham, 2003a; Castree and MacMillan, 2004).1 In this report, I would like to treat the flourishing theoretical debate as a significant Cultural geography: the busyness of being ‘more-than-representational’

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Cultural geography: the busyness of being 'more-than-representational'

(1999). Borderless worlds? Problematising discourses of deterritorialisation. Geopolitics: Vol. 4, Geopolitics at the end of the Twentieth Century, pp. 139-154.

Borderless worlds? Problematising discourses of deterritorialisation

/pdf/the-postmodern-geopolitical-condition-states-statecraft-and-rf4tmvrmu1.pdf

The Postmodern Geopolitical Condition: States, Statecraft, and Security at the Millennium

The legacy of ethnic cleansing: The international community and the returns process in post-Dayton Bosnia–Herzegovina

In this paper, we build on the work of Graham Smith, who was developing a critical geopolitics of Russia in his posthumous paper of 1999, published in this journal. Like Smith, we link the evolving geopolitical orientations of Russia to the search for a post-Soviet identity amongst its citizens and its political leadership. While Smith saw a core concept in Russian geopolitics having Protean masks, it is the leadership of the Russian state, specifically President Putin, who has successfully adopted a Protean strategy to appeal to the disparate elements of the Russian geopolitical spectrum. Based on a nationwide survey in spring 2002, we identify six clusters in Russian public opinion by socio-demographic characteristics and we connect each cluster to the main geopolitical orientations competing in contemporary Russia, including democratic statism and the increasingly marginalized Eurasianism that formed the core subject of Smith's paper.

Russian geopolitical culture and public opinion: the masks of Proteus revisited

SINCE THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF 11 September 2001 Russia has played a key part in the efforts of the Bush administration to build an international coalition to conduct the war on terrorism. In the hours immediately after the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre President Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to speak with President Bush and to personally offer his condolences.' Putin also dispatched a telegram to Washington DC conveying 'anger and indignation' against the 'series of barbaric terrorist acts directed against innocent people'.2 In a national television address later that day he described the 9-11 attacks as 'an unprecedented act of aggression on the part of international terrorism'. The attacks, he claimed, were not a localised American drama but an event that 'goes beyond national borders'. Terrorism, Putin declared, was the 'plague of the twenty first century' and 'Russia knows first hand what terrorism is. So, we understand as well as anyone the feelings of the American people'. Broadening the common identification with America into a transcendent community, he described 9-11 as 'a brazen challenge to the whole of humanity, at least to civilised humanity'. This common identity formation and divide-terrorist barbarism versus 'civilised humanity'-led Putin to declare that 'we entirely and fully share and experience your pain. We support you'.3 Putin later declared a national minute of silence in commemoration of the victims of the attacks. Less than two weeks after this first reaction Putin went on national television again and articulated what some have described as Russia defining its 'strategic choice'.4 The Russian Federation, he stated, 'has been fighting international terrorism for a long time' and 'has repeatedly urged the international community to join efforts'. The forums for those efforts were 'international agencies and institutions', most especially 'the UN and the UN Security Council'. Putin outlined a series of specific measures that Russia would adopt to aid the emergent American-led coalition against the Taliban government of Afghanistan. The Russian government would supply intelligence about 'the infrastructure and locations of international terrorists' and would 'make the Russian Federation's air space available for the through-flights of planes carrying humanitarian cargo to the area of that anti-terrorist operation'. In a noteworthy break from traditional Russian geopolitical thinking about controlling the Eurasian Heartland, he accepted the establishment of bases by America and its allies in Central Asia for operations against 'international terrorism'.5

Gearóid Ó Tuathail

Papers

Borderless worlds? Problematising discourses of deterritorialisation

The Postmodern Geopolitical Condition: States, Statecraft, and Security at the Millennium

The legacy of ethnic cleansing: The international community and the returns process in post-Dayton Bosnia–Herzegovina

Russian geopolitical culture and public opinion: the masks of Proteus revisited

A ‘Risky Westward Turn’? Putin's 9–11 Script and Ordinary Russians