Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The task of quantizing general relativity raises serious questions about the meaning of the present formulation and interpretation of quantum mechanics when applied to so fundamental a structure as the space-time geometry itself. This paper seeks to clarify the foundations of quantum mechanics. It presents a reformulation of quantum theory in a form believed suitable for application to general relativity. The aim is not to deny or contradict the conventional formulation of quantum theory, which has demonstrated its usefulness in an overwhelming variety of problems, but rather to supply a new, more general and complete formulation, from which the conventional interpretation can be deduced. The relationship of this new formulation to the older formulation is therefore that of a metatheory to a theory, that is, it is an underlying theory in which the nature and consistency, as well as the realm of applicability, of the older theory can be investigated and clarified.

"relative State" Formulation of Quantum Mechanics

This monograph on classical logic presents fundamental concepts and results in a rigorous mathematical style. Applications to automated theorem proving are considered and usable programs in Prolog are provided. This material can be used both as a first text in formal logic and as an introduction to automation issues, and is intended for those interested in computer science and mathematics at the beginning graduate level. The book begins with propositional logic, then treats first-order logic, and finally, first-order logic with equality. In each case the initial presentation is semantic: Boolean valuations for propositional logic, models for first-order logic, and normal models when equality is added. This defines the intended subjects independently of a particular choice of proof mechanism. Then many kinds of proof procedures are introduced: tableau, resolution, natural deduction, Gentzen sequent and axiom systems. Completeness issues are centered in a model existence theorem, which permits the coverage of a variety of proof procedures without repetition of detail. In addition, results such as compactness, interpolation, and the Beth definability theorem are easily established. Implementations of tableau theorem provers are given in Prolog, and resolution is left as a project for the student.

First-Order Logic and Automated Theorem Proving

From the Publisher:
Provides a simple and clear presentation, covering propositional and predicate logic and some specialized logics used for reasoning about the correctness of computer systems.

/pdf/logic-in-computer-science-modelling-and-reasoning-about-1xmdohrju1.pdf

Logic in Computer Science: Modelling and Reasoning about Systems

Wittgenstein's work remains, undeniably, now, that off one of those few philosophers who will be read by all future generations.

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. By L. Wittgenstein. Edited by G. H. Von Wright, R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Pp. 400. 37s. 6d. 1956. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford)

Part I. Computability Theory: 1. Enumerability 2. Diagonalization 3. Turing computability 4. Uncomputability 5. Abacus computability 6. Recursive functions 7. Recursive sets and relations 8. Equivalent definitions of computability Part II. Basic Metalogic: 9. A precis of first-order logic: syntax 10. A precis of first-order logic: semantics 11. The undecidability of first-order logic 12. Models 13. The existence of models 14. Proofs and completeness 15. Arithmetization 16. Representability of recursive functions 17. Indefinability, undecidability, incompleteness 18. The unprovability of consistency Part III. Further Topics: 19. Normal forms 20. The Craig interpolation theorem 21. Monadic and dyadic logic 22. Second-order logic 23. Arithmetical definability 24. Decidability of arithmetic without multiplication 25. Non-standard models 26. Ramsey's theorem 27. Modal logic and provability.

http://www.gbv.de/dms/goettingen/333567617.pdf

Computability and Logic

1. GL and other systems of propositional modal logic 2. Peano arithmetic 3. The box as Bew(x) 4. Semantics for GL and other modal logics 5. Completeness and decidability of GL and K, K4, T, B, S4, and S5 6. Canonical models 7. On GL 8. The fixed point theorem 9. The arithmetical completeness theorems for GL and GLS 10. Trees for GL 11. An incomplete system of modal logic 12. An S4 -preserving proof-theoretical treatment of modality 13. Modal logic within set theory 14. Modal logic within analysis 15. The joint provability logic of consistency and w-consistency 16. On GLB: the fixed point theorem, letterless sentences, and analysis 18. Quantified provability logic with one one-place predicate letter Notes Bibliography Index.

The logic of provability

To Be Is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some Variables)

* Studies on Set Theory and the Nature of Logic * Introduction to Part I * The Iterative Conception of Set * Reply to Charles Parsons's "Sets and Classes" * On Second-Order Logic * To Be Is to Be a Value of a Variable (Or to Be Some Values of Some Variables) * Nominalist Platonism * Iteration Again * Introductory Notes to Godel *1951 * Must We Believe in Set Theory? * Frege Studies * Introduction to Part II * Gottlob Frege and the Foundations of Arithmetic * Reading the Begriffsschrift * Saving Frege from Contradiction * The Consistency of Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic * The Standard of Equality of Numbers * Whence the Contradiction? *1879? * The Advantages of Honest Toil over Theft * On the Proof of Frege's Theorem * Frege's Theorem and the Peano Postulates * Is Hume's Principle Analytic? * Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 82-83 (with Richard Heck) * Constructing Cantorian Counterexamples * Various Logical Studies and Lighter Papers * Introduction to Part III * Zooming Down the Slippery Slope * Don't Eliminate Cut * The Justification of Mathematical Induction * A Curious Inference * A New Proof of the Godel Incompleteness Theorem * On "Seeing" the Truth of the Godel Sentence * Quotational Ambiguity * The Hardest Logical Puzzle Ever * Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem Explained in Words of One Syllable

George Boolos

Papers

Computability and Logic

The logic of provability

To Be Is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some Variables)

Logic, Logic, and Logic

The Iterative Conception of Set