Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts Daniel Dennett in this first full-scale presentation of a theory of intentionality that he has been developing for almost twenty years. We adopt a stance, he argues, a predictive strategy of interpretation that presupposes the rationality of the people - or other entities - we are hoping to understand and predict.These principles of radical interpretation have far-reaching implications for the metaphysical and scientific status of the processes referred to by the everday terms of folk psychology and their corresponding terms in cognitive science.While Dennett's philosophical stance has been steadfast over the years, his views have undergone successive enrichments, refinements, and extensions. "The Intentional Stance" brings together both previously published and original material: four of the book's ten chapters - its first and the final three - appear here for the first time and push the theory into surprising new territory. The remaining six were published earlier in the 1980s but were not easily accessible; each is followed by a reflection - an essay reconsidering and extending the claims of the earlier work. These reflections and the new chapters represent the vanguard of Dennett's thought. They reveal fresh lines of inquiry into fundamental issues in psychology, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory as well as traditional issues in the philosophy of mind.Daniel C. Dennett is Distinguished Arts and Sciences Professor at Tufts University and the author of "Brainstorms" and "Elbow Room." "The Intentional Stance," along with these works, is a Bradford Book.

The Intentional Stance

Two people, 1 and 2, are said to have common knowledge of an event E if both know it, 1 knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that 1 knows it, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows it, and so on.

Agreeing to Disagree

Exchangeability and related topics

Bayesian Reasoning. Introduction to Bayesian Networks. Inference in Bayesian Networks. Bayesian Network Applications. Bayesian Planning and Decision-Making. Bayesian Network Applications II. Learning Bayesian Networks I. Learning Bayesian Networks II. Causality vs. Probability. Knowledge Engineering with Bayesian Networks I. Knowledge Engineering with Bayesian Networks II. Application Software.

Bayesian artificial intelligence

"[This book] proposes new foundations for the Bayesian principle of rational action, and goes on to develop a new logic of desirability and probabtility."-Frederic Schick, "Journal of Philosophy"

The Logic of Decision

Part I. Computability Theory: 1. Enumerability 2. Diagonalization 3. Turing computability 4. Uncomputability 5. Abacus computability 6. Recursive functions 7. Recursive sets and relations 8. Equivalent definitions of computability Part II. Basic Metalogic: 9. A precis of first-order logic: syntax 10. A precis of first-order logic: semantics 11. The undecidability of first-order logic 12. Models 13. The existence of models 14. Proofs and completeness 15. Arithmetization 16. Representability of recursive functions 17. Indefinability, undecidability, incompleteness 18. The unprovability of consistency Part III. Further Topics: 19. Normal forms 20. The Craig interpolation theorem 21. Monadic and dyadic logic 22. Second-order logic 23. Arithmetical definability 24. Decidability of arithmetic without multiplication 25. Non-standard models 26. Ramsey's theorem 27. Modal logic and provability.

http://www.gbv.de/dms/goettingen/333567617.pdf

Computability and Logic

Part of a series of studies of contemporary philosophers, this volume focuses on Rudolf Carnap.

Richard C. Jeffrey

Papers

The Logic of Decision

Computability and Logic

The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap

The Logic of Decision.

Studies in inductive logic and probability