Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity

This article reviews the main insights from selected literature on risk perception, particularly in connection with natural hazards. It includes numerous case studies on perception and social behavior dealing with floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcano eruptions, wild fires, and landslides. The review reveals that personal experience of a natural hazard and trust--or lack of trust--in authorities and experts have the most substantial impact on risk perception. Cultural and individual factors such as media coverage, age, gender, education, income, social status, and others do not play such an important role but act as mediators or amplifiers of the main causal connections between experience, trust, perception, and preparedness to take protective actions. When analyzing the factors of experience and trust on risk perception and on the likeliness of individuals to take preparedness action, the review found that a risk perception paradox exists in that it is assumed that high risk perception will lead to personal preparedness and, in the next step, to risk mitigation behavior. However, this is not necessarily true. In fact, the opposite can occur if individuals with high risk perception still choose not to personally prepare themselves in the face of a natural hazard. Therefore, based on the results of the review, this article offers three explanations suggesting why this paradox might occur. These findings have implications for future risk governance and communication as well as for the willingness of individuals to invest in risk preparedness or risk mitigation actions.

The Risk Perception Paradox—Implications for Governance and Communication of Natural Hazards

Crime, smoking, drug use, alcoholism, reckless driving, and many other unhealthy patterns of behavior that play out over a lifetime often debut during adolescence. Avoiding risks or buying time can set a different lifetime pattern. Changing unhealthy behaviors in adolescence would have a broad impact on society, reducing the burdens of disease, injury, human suffering, and associated economic costs. Any program designed to prevent or change such risky behaviors should be founded on a clear idea of what is normative (what behaviors, ideally, should the program foster?), descriptive (how are adolescents making decisions in the absence of the program?), and prescriptive (which practices can realistically move adolescent decisions closer to the normative ideal?). Normatively, decision processes should be evaluated for coherence (is the thinking process nonsensical, illogical, or self-contradictory?) and correspondence (are the outcomes of the decisions positive?). Behaviors that promote positive physical and mental health outcomes in modern society can be at odds with those selected for by evolution (e.g., early procreation). Healthy behaviors may also conflict with a decision maker's goals. Adolescents' goals are more likely to maximize immediate pleasure, and strict decision analysis implies that many kinds of unhealthy behavior, such as drinking and drug use, could be deemed rational. However, based on data showing developmental changes in goals, it is important for policy to promote positive long-term outcomes rather than adolescents' short-term goals. Developmental data also suggest that greater risk aversion is generally adaptive, and that decision processes that support this aversion are more advanced than those that support risk taking. A key question is whether adolescents are developmentally competent to make decisions about risks. In principle, barring temptations with high rewards and individual differences that reduce self-control (i.e., under ideal conditions), adolescents are capable of rational decision making to achieve their goals. In practice, much depends on the particular situation in which a decision is made. In the heat of passion, in the presence of peers, on the spur of the moment, in unfamiliar situations, when trading off risks and benefits favors bad long-term outcomes, and when behavioral inhibition is required for good outcomes, adolescents are likely to reason more poorly than adults do. Brain maturation in adolescence is incomplete. Impulsivity, sensation seeking, thrill seeking, depression, and other individual differences also contribute to risk taking that resists standard risk-reduction interventions, although some conditions such as depression can be effectively treated with other approaches. Major explanatory models of risky decision making can be roughly divided into (a) those, including health-belief models and the theory of planned behavior, that adhere to a "rational" behavioral decision-making framework that stresses deliberate, quantitative trading off of risks and benefits; and (b) those that emphasize nondeliberative reaction to the perceived gists or prototypes in the immediate decision environment. (A gist is a fuzzy mental representation of the general meaning of information or experience; a prototype is a mental representation of a standard or typical example of a category.) Although perceived risks and especially benefits predict behavioral intentions and risk-taking behavior, behavioral willingness is an even better predictor of susceptibility to risk taking-and has unique explanatory power-because adolescents are willing to do riskier things than they either intend or expect to do. Dual-process models, such as the prototype/willingness model and fuzzy-trace theory, identify two divergent paths to risk taking: a reasoned and a reactive route. Such models explain apparent contradictions in the literature, including different causes of risk taking for different individuals. Interventions to reduce risk taking must take into account the different causes of such behavior if they are to be effective. Longitudinal and experimental research are needed to disentangle opposing causal processes-particularly, those that produce positive versus negative relations between risk perceptions and behaviors. Counterintuitive findings that must be accommodated by any adequate theory of risk taking include the following: (a) Despite conventional wisdom, adolescents do not perceive themselves to be invulnerable, and perceived vulnerability declines with increasing age; (b) although the object of many interventions is to enhance the accuracy of risk perceptions, adolescents typically overestimate important risks, such as HIV and lung cancer; (c) despite increasing competence in reasoning, some biases in judgment and decision making grow with age, producing more "irrational" violations of coherence among adults than among adolescents and younger children. The latter occurs because of a known developmental increase in gist processing with age. One implication of these findings is that traditional interventions stressing accurate risk perceptions are apt to be ineffective or backfire because young people already feel vulnerable and overestimate their risk. In addition, research shows that experience is not a good teacher for children and younger adolescents, because they tend to learn little from negative outcomes (favoring the use of effective deterrents, such as monitoring and supervision), although learning from experience improves considerably with age. Experience in the absence of negative consequences may increase feelings of invulnerability and thus explain the decrease in risk perceptions from early to late adolescence, as exploration increases. Finally, novel interventions that discourage deliberate weighing of risks and benefits by adolescents may ultimately prove more effective and enduring. Mature adults apparently resist taking risks not out of any conscious deliberation or choice, but because they intuitively grasp the gists of risky situations, retrieve appropriate risk-avoidant values, and never proceed down the slippery slope of actually contemplating tradeoffs between risks and benefits.

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Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy

Recent research indicates that social trust of those who manage a hazard is strongly correlated to judgments about the hazard's risk and benefits. The present study investigates the more specific question of “For which hazards is this?” It was postulated that when an individual lacks knowledge about a hazard, social trust of authorities managing the hazard determines perceived risks and benefits. On the other hand, when an individual has personal knowledge about a hazard and therefore does not need to rely on managing authorities, social trust is unrelated to judged risks and benefits. Participants (N = 91) assessed risks, benefits, and trust in managing authorities and personal knowledge associated with 25 hazardous technologies and activities. As expected, strong correlations between social trust and judged risks and benefits were observed for hazards about which people did not possess much knowledge. No significant correlations between social trust and judged risks and benefits were found for hazards about which people were knowledgeable. Results suggest that the lay public relies on social trust when making judgments of risks and benefits when personal knowledge about a hazard is lacking. Replicating findings of other studies, the present study also found negative correlations between perceived risks and perceived benefits. When social trust was controlled for, correlations between perceived risks and benefits diminished. Implications of the results for risk management are discussed.

Perception of hazards: the role of social trust and knowledge

Feel lonely? What about reading books? Book is one of the greatest friends to accompany while in your lonely time. When you have no friends and activities somewhere and sometimes, reading book can be a great choice. This is not only for spending the time, it will increase the knowledge. Of course the b=benefits to take will relate to what kind of book that you are reading. And now, we will concern you to try reading models of man as one of the reading material to finish quickly.

Models of man

It was postulated that shared values determine social trust in institutions and persons related to a technology: One has trust in people holding similar salient values. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that social trust has a positive influence on perceived benefits and a negative impact on perceived risks. Results of a survey of University of Zurich students indicated that the proposed causal model explained perception of pesticides, nuclear power, and artificial sweetener very well. When social trust was controlled, the relation between risks and benefits perceived diminished. Results indicate that social trust is a key predictive factor of the perceived risks and benefits of a technology, and provide support for the salient values similarity theory of social trust.

Salient value similarity, social trust, and risk/benefit perception

Preface Social Trust: Past Social Trust: An Introduction Social Trust: Traditional Interpretations Complexity and Social Trust Social Trust: Present Strategies for Simplicity, One: High Resource Demand, Individual Focus Strategies for Simplicity, Two: High Resource Demand, Community Focus Strategies for Simplicity, Three: Low Resource Demand, Individual Focus Strategies for Simplicity, Four: Low Resource Demand, Community Focus Social Trust: Future Social Trust Based on Cultural Values Narrative, Human Life, and Social Trust Social Trust: Moving from a Pluralistic to a Cosmopolitan Society References Index

Social Trust: Toward a Cosmopolitan Society

Social trust is a crucial issue to many aspects of modern society. Policy makers continually aspire to winning it and corporations frequently run the risk of losing it. The 'trust deficit' raises vital questions and problems to which until recently there have been few answers or solutions. Experts from both sides of the Atlantic explore the importance for trust of various influences, from individual perceptions to organizational systems, and consider the conditions involved in building or undermining trust. Several authors examine practical hazard management issues, including medical vaccination programmes and popular participation in pollution control and waste management as strategies for enhancing social trust. This book provides insightful analysis for researchers and students of environmental and social sciences and is essential reading for those engaged in risk management in both the public and private sectors.

Social Trust and the Management of Risk

Do the results of a scientific study influence confidence in the study's validity and the magnitude of change in the resulting perceived danger of the health risk investigated? Findings from the three investigations reported here indicate that scientific results that confirm a danger (negative results) do affect confidence in a study's validity and resulting risk assessments differently than results indicating low risk (positive results). Findings of Study 1 revealed that research results indicating a health risk were more trusted than results indicating little health risk. This effect was independent of the credibility of the information source. Study 2 demonstrated that confidence in research results increased with an increasing indication of health risk. Study 3 showed that people have more confidence in the results of animal tests on a food additive indicating negative human health effects than in animal tests indicating that a food additive is harmless. The findings have important practical implications. The observed asymmetry between positive and negative research results may be one reason that people are afraid of many of the hazards they are faced with in modern society.

George Cvetkovich

Papers

Perception of hazards: the role of social trust and knowledge

Salient value similarity, social trust, and risk/benefit perception

Social Trust: Toward a Cosmopolitan Society

Social Trust and the Management of Risk

Better negative than positive? Evidence of a bias for negative information about possible health dangers.