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George Danezis
Researcher at University College London
Publications - 213
Citations - 12903
George Danezis is an academic researcher from University College London. The author has contributed to research in topics: Anonymity & Traffic analysis. The author has an hindex of 59, co-authored 209 publications receiving 11516 citations. Previous affiliations of George Danezis include University of Cambridge & Microsoft.
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Chainspace: A Sharded Smart Contracts Platform
TL;DR: Chainspace as mentioned in this paper is a distributed ledger that supports user defined smart contracts and executes user-supplied transactions on their objects, and the correct execution of smart contract transactions is verifiable by all.
Book ChapterDOI
Designing Privacy-Preserving Smart Meters with Low-Cost Microcontrollers
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the feasibility of designing privacy-preserving smart meters using low-cost microcontrollers and provide a general methodology for estimating design costs, and show that it is feasible to produce certified meter readings for use in billing protocols relying on zero-knowledge proofs with micro-controllers such as those inside currently deployed smart meters.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
A pact with the devil
Mike Bond,George Danezis +1 more
TL;DR: It is argued that in terms of propagation, there exists a continuum between legitimate applications and pure malware, rather than a quantised scale.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Towards ensuring client-side computational integrity
George Danezis,Benjamin Livshits +1 more
TL;DR: This paper proposes one such architecture that provides privacy, integrity and leverages the Cloud for availability while only using cryptographic building blocks available today.
Posted Content
Replay Attacks and Defenses Against Cross-shard Consensus in Sharded Distributed Ledgers
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a family of replay attacks against sharded distributed ledgers, that target cross-shard consensus protocols, such as Chainspace and Omniledger, allowing an attacker with network access only, to double-spend or lock resources with minimal efforts.