George Danezis

TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate the two dominant classes of anonymity revocation systems, and identify fundamental flaws in their architecture, leading to a failure to ensure proper anonymity revocation, as well as introducing additional weaknesses for users not targeted for anonymity revocation.

TL;DR: In this article, Chaum's initial work on Mixes led to a vast number of proposals how to provide anonymous communication on the Internet, which all have in common, that a multiple of Mixes are used to establish a certain amount of anonymity.

TL;DR: In this article, the monetary amount a customer should add to their bill in order to provably hide their activities, within the differential privacy framework, is studied, and a cryptographic protocol for oblivious billing that ensures any additional expenditure, aimed at protecting privacy, can be tracked and reclaimed in the future, thus minimising its cost.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an adaptation of Rivest's chaffing and winnowing, which has the legal advantage of using authentication keys to provide privacy, and show how this system may have some resilience to the type of legal attack inherent in the UK's Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Art.

TL;DR: This work evaluates the two dominant classes of anonymity revocation systems, and identifies fundamental flaws in their architecture, leading to a failure to ensure proper anonymity revocation, as well as introducing additional weaknesses for users not targeted for anonymity revocation.