Deep learning is a form of machine learning that enables computers to learn from experience and understand the world in terms of a hierarchy of concepts. Because the computer gathers knowledge from experience, there is no need for a human computer operator to formally specify all the knowledge that the computer needs. The hierarchy of concepts allows the computer to learn complicated concepts by building them out of simpler ones; a graph of these hierarchies would be many layers deep. This book introduces a broad range of topics in deep learning. The text offers mathematical and conceptual background, covering relevant concepts in linear algebra, probability theory and information theory, numerical computation, and machine learning. It describes deep learning techniques used by practitioners in industry, including deep feedforward networks, regularization, optimization algorithms, convolutional networks, sequence modeling, and practical methodology; and it surveys such applications as natural language processing, speech recognition, computer vision, online recommendation systems, bioinformatics, and videogames. Finally, the book offers research perspectives, covering such theoretical topics as linear factor models, autoencoders, representation learning, structured probabilistic models, Monte Carlo methods, the partition function, approximate inference, and deep generative models. Deep Learning can be used by undergraduate or graduate students planning careers in either industry or research, and by software engineers who want to begin using deep learning in their products or platforms. A website offers supplementary material for both readers and instructors.

Deep Learning

This paper proposes a paradigm for managing the dynamic aspects of organizational knowledge creating processes. Its central theme is that organizational knowledge is created through a continuous dialogue between tacit and explicit knowledge. The nature of this dialogue is examined and four patterns of interaction involving tacit and explicit knowledge are identified. It is argued that while new knowledge is developed by individuals, organizations play a critical role in articulating and amplifying that knowledge. A theoretical framework is developed which provides an analytical perspective on the constituent dimensions of knowledge creation. This framework is then applied in two operational models for facilitating the dynamic creation of appropriate organizational knowledge.

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A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation

The concept of a linguistic variable and its application to approximate reasoning—II☆

A circumplex model of affect

The teaching of qualitative analysis in the social sciences is rarely undertaken in a structured way. This handbook is designed to remedy that and to present students and researchers with a systematic method for interpreting qualitative data', whether derived from interviews, field notes, or documentary materials. The special emphasis of the book is on how to develop theory through qualitative analysis. The reader is provided with the tools for doing qualitative analysis, such as codes, memos, memo sequences, theoretical sampling and comparative analysis, and diagrams, all of which are abundantly illustrated by actual examples drawn from the author's own varied qualitative research and research consultations, as well as from his research seminars. Many of the procedural discussions are concluded with rules of thumb that can usefully guide the researchers' analytic operations. The difficulties that beginners encounter when doing qualitative analysis and the kinds of persistent questions they raise are also discussed, as is the problem of how to integrate analyses. In addition, there is a chapter on the teaching of qualitative analysis and the giving of useful advice during research consultations, and there is a discussion of the preparation of material for publication. The book has been written not only for sociologists but for all researchers in the social sciences and in such fields as education, public health, nursing, and administration who employ qualitative methods in their work.

Qualitative analysis for social scientists

Obama Reframes Syria: Metaphor and War Revisited by George Lakoff President Obama has reframed his position on Syria, adjusting the Red Line metaphor: It wasn't his Red Line, not his responsibility for drawing it. It was the Red Line drawn by the world, by the international community -- both legally by international treaty, and morally by universal revulsion against the use of poison gas by Assad. It was also America's Red Line, imposed by America's commitment to live up to such treaties. The reframing fit his previous rationale for the Red Line: to uphold international treaties on weapons of mass destruction, both gas and nuclear weapons. By this logic, the Red Line therefore applies not just to Assad's use of sarin, but potentially to Iran's development of nuclear weapons. The new version of the metaphorical policy has broad consequences, what I have called systemic causation (that goes beyond the immediate local situation) as opposed to direct causation (in this case applying just to the immediate case of Assad's use of sarin). Some will call the reframing cynical, a way to avoid responsibility for his first use of the Red Line metaphor. But President Obama's reframing makes excellent sense from the perspective of his consistent policy of treaties and international norms, which he has said was the basis for the Red Line metaphor in the first place. Metaphors can kill, as I wrote in my original Metaphor and War paper in 1991 on the eve of the Gulf War. Why can metaphors kill? Because metaphors in language are reflections of metaphorical thought that structures reasoning, and thus our actions, both in everyday life and in politics. In politics, they are rarely isolated. They usually come as part of a coherent system of concepts -- usually a moral system. The Red Line metaphor can stand a bit of linguistic analysis. The metaphor is based on a conceptual frame: Drawing a line in the sand means that the person who draws the line issues a threat to the person on the other side: you cross the line and I'll hurt you. This frame presupposes another common conceptual metaphor: Performing A Kind of Action Is Being In A Bounded Location, and Changing a Kind of Action is Moving to a New Location.

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Obama Reframes Syria: Metaphor and War Revisited

?ACZTE: § Esglg is S%a1§a§er* m§®E§& Zaaoff; bnivsrsity 35 Eishigan, §eve§%a:, :§?G In his “ﬁcieg 02 edva?§s in Eesgsnse is §§@ms Eebert Stainaker prs§cse3 faur sriteria fer eistiﬁgxisiigg greeiaaie maiifiers frsm segtance modifiers; C§Lf§&? can it give rise to m unive?sa1 or exisﬁentiai sentences (In the text Gf the pager he limits this criterian to subject position.) (2) Only if an adverﬁ is a senience moiifier can it give rise to opaque contexts in the subject pesitien. (1) and (2) are essentially the same criterion if one assumes (as do Thomason and Stalnaker in their “Modality aad Referenceq) that opacity is to be accounted for in terms of the eifference in the scape of an operator binding a variable. (3) Only advarbg which are sentence modifiers aan occur at the beginning of a cwmplex aentence whose constituent clauaeg have different gubjects. By qcomplex semtmmce“ ﬁtalnaker maans conjunctions, disjunctions, and if~ then constructiwms, but nmt relative claases, complements, etc. (4) If Q~1y owcurs as the moeifier of a claseﬁ sentence, then one can paraphraam ﬁne awntence by ﬁeleting the aeverb anﬁ prefacing the reaulting sentence by “ii is Q,1y true th&#39;tq or “it is true Quly thatq. Stalnaker claims that these tesis yield the fellowiﬁg results :41 Senﬂence maﬁ% 4: frecaentiy, fa) v 3 :ha mQ?§in2 aecessarilw Uossibl ... V4’ }» 5 -e, sicwly, relucﬁantlyg .... W ?§iaiE§ gxggartee ey gyani §S—2§§§ ffﬁﬁ the Eatienal Sciaaaa (aa §§:¥&rsii§ sf Eechigag.

Adverbs and Opacity

Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics
Society (1986), pp. 442-454

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Argument Forms in Lexical Semantics

Sores on what it would take to understand hw one adverb uorks* George Lakoff Department of Linguistics University of&#39;California, Berkeley September 1972 To appear in The Monist *This work was partially supported by grant GS-35119 from the National Science Foundation to to University of California at Berkeley. V&#39;\) 1. A natural language is a unified and integrated system, and the serious study of one part of the system inevitably involves one in the For this reason, the study of small, isolated fragments of a language--however study of many other parts, if not the system as a whole. necessary, valuable and difficult this may be -- will often make us The fact is that you can&#39;t really study one phenomenon adequately without studying a think that we understand more than we really do. great many other related phenomena, and the way they fit together in This is the sort of thing Experience in descriptive terms of the linguistic system as a whole. a linguist learns very early in his career. linguistics, even at an elementary level will force a linguist to come to grips with a wide range of complex data in some language, perhaps even English, and the truism soon emerges. But, due to the vagaries of our educational institutions, few philosophers or logicians receive training in linguistic description. Consequently much of the discussion of natural language in the Philosophical and logical literature is based on a very small sampling of data which is skewed in nontrivial ways. True, one has to start somewhere, and a great deal has been learned by ordinary language philosophers who have looked at only a handful of relatively simple examples and by logicians who have studied what by natural language standards are only miniscule fragments (e.g., first- order predicate calculus, the various modal logics, etc.). But now that philosophers and logicians are turning to more detailed studies of natural language phenomena, it is perhaps the right time to suggest that philosophical and logical training be expanded to include the study of natural languages as entire systems. I don&#39;t mean to suggest, for example, that logicians should stop their systematic study of small fragents, but rather that a knowledge of the kinds of phenomena out- side of those fragments can enrich the study of fragments and give one a more rezatistic picture of what one does and does not know about natural language. The study of adverbs is a good case in point. Reichenbsch,1 in his analysis of conversational language, made a brave attempt to study a number of natural language phenomena that had previously been ignored

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George Lakoff

Papers

Obama Reframes Syria: Metaphor and War Revisited

Adverbs and Opacity

Argument Forms in Lexical Semantics

Notes on what it would Take to Understand how One Adverb Works

The Cognitive Foundations of Mathematics