G
Gerald Marschke
Researcher at State University of New York System
Publications - 55
Citations - 1788
Gerald Marschke is an academic researcher from State University of New York System. The author has contributed to research in topics: Incentive & Performance measurement. The author has an hindex of 21, co-authored 53 publications receiving 1694 citations. Previous affiliations of Gerald Marschke include Harvard University & University at Albany, SUNY.
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Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems
TL;DR: In this paper, the principal-agent model is used as a focal theoretical frame for synthesizing what we know, both theoretically and empirically, about the design and dynamics of the implementation of performance management systems in the public sector.
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An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives
TL;DR: In this article, a particular kind of gaming response to explicit incentives in a large government organization is studied, where agents strategically report their performance outcomes to maximize their awards, and evaluate the efficiency impact of the behaviour and find that it has a negative impact on the true goal of the organization.
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Labor mobility of scientists, technological diffusion, and the firm's patenting decision
Jinyoung Kim,Gerald Marschke +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed and tested a model of the patenting and R&D decisions of an innovating firm whose scientist-employees sometimes quit to join or start a rival.
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An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives
Pascal Courty,Gerald Marschke +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a particular kind of gaming responses to explicit incentives in a large government organization is studied. And the authors evaluate the efficiency impact of the behavior they identify and find that it has a negative impact on the true goal of the organization.
Posted Content
Measuring Government Performance: Lessons from a Federal Job Training Program
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study the provision of incentives in the large federal bureaucracy created under the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 and find that bureaucrats respond to these incentives by maximizing their private rewards, possibly at the expense of social welfare.