Pascal Courty

TL;DR: In this article, a particular kind of gaming response to explicit incentives in a large government organization is studied, where agents strategically report their performance outcomes to maximize their awards, and evaluate the efficiency impact of the behaviour and find that it has a negative impact on the true goal of the organization.

TL;DR: In this article, a particular kind of gaming responses to explicit incentives in a large government organization is studied. And the authors evaluate the efficiency impact of the behavior they identify and find that it has a negative impact on the true goal of the organization.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a simple explanation that borrows from the literature on airline ticket pricing and draw parallels with that literature, showing that a large number of brokers and scalpers resell a significant fraction of event tickets at substantial markups, despite the fact that promoters and ticketing agencies do not support resell for profits and often attempt to block secondary market.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study the provision of incentives in the large federal bureaucracy created under the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 and find that bureaucrats respond to these incentives by maximizing their private rewards, possibly at the expense of social welfare.

TL;DR: In this article, a monopolist selling tickets to consumers who learn new information about their demands over time is studied, and it is shown that rationing and intertemporal sales are never optimal.