From the Publisher: 
A Question of Identity 
Life on the Screen is a fascinating and wide-ranging investigation of the impact of computers and networking on society, peoples' perceptions of themselves, and the individual's relationship to machines. Sherry Turkle, a Professor of the Sociology of Science at MIT and a licensed psychologist, uses Internet MUDs (multi-user domains, or in older gaming parlance multi-user dungeons) as a launching pad for explorations of software design, user interfaces, simulation, artificial intelligence, artificial life, agents, "bots," virtual reality, and "the on-line way of life." 
Turkle's discussion of postmodernism is particularly enlightening. She shows how postmodern concepts in art, architecture, and ethics are related to concrete topics much closer to home, for example AI research (Minsky's "Society of Mind") and even MUDs (exemplified by students with X-window terminals who are doing homework in one window and simultaneously playing out several different roles in the same MUD in other windows). Those of you who have (like me) been turned off by the shallow, pretentious, meaningless paintings and sculptures that litter our museums of modern art may have a different perspective after hearing what Turkle has to say. 
This is a psychoanalytical book, not a technical one. However, software developers and engineers will find it highly accessible because of the depth of the author's technical understanding and credibility. Unlike most other authors in this genre, Turkle does not constantly jar the technically-literate reader with blatant errors or bogus assertions about how things work. Although I personally don't have time or patience for MUDs,view most of AI as snake-oil, and abhor postmodern architecture, I thought the time spent reading this book was an extremely good investment.

스크린 위의 삶 = Life on the screen : identity in the age of the internet

https://iranakhlagh.nipc.ir/uploads/m099_12051.pdf

Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review:

The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion Jonathan Haidt Pantheon Books, 2012One has likely heard that, for the sake of decorum, religion and politics should never be topics of conversation with strangers. Even amongst friends or even when it is known that others hold opposing political or religious views, why is it that discussion of religion and politics leads to visceral-level acrimony and that one's views are right and the other's views are wrong? Professor Jonathan Haidt of the University of Virginia examines the psychological basis of our "righteous minds" without resorting to any of the pejorative labeling that is usually found in a book on politics and religion and eschews a purely comparative approach. Haidt proposes the intriguing hypothesis that our visceral reaction to competing ideologies is a subconscious, rather than leaned, reaction that evolved over human evolution to innate senses of suffering, fairness, cheating and disease, and that moral foundations facilitated intra-group cooperation which in turn conferred survival advantages over other groups. These psychological mechanisms are genetic in origin and not necessarily amenable to rational and voluntary control - this is in part the reason debating one's ideological opposite more often leads to frustration rather than understanding. Haidt also suggests that morality is based on six "psychological systems" or foundations (Moral Foundations Theory), similar to the hypothesized adaptive mental modules which evolved to solve specific problems of survival in the human ancestral environment.While decorum pleads for more civility, it would be better, as Haidt suggests, dragging the issue of partisan politics out into the open in order to understand it and work around our righteous minds. Haidt suggests a few methods by which the level of rhetoric in American politics can be reduced, such that the political parties can at least be cordial as they have been in the past and work together to solve truly pressing social problems.There are a number of fascinating points raised in the current book, but most intriguing is the one that morality, ideology and religion are products of group selection, as adaptations that increased individual cooperation and suppressed selfishness, thereby increasing individual loyalty to the group. That morality, political ideology and religion buttress group survival is probably highly intuitive. However, given the contemporary focus on the individual as the source of adaptations, to the exclusion of all else, to suggest that adaptations such as religion and political ideology arose to enhance survival of groups is heresy or, as Haidt recounts, "foolishness". While previous rejection of group selection itself was due in part to conceptual issues, one could also point out the prevailing individualist social sentiment, "selfish gene" mentality and unrelenting hostility against those who supported the view that group selection did indeed apply to humans and not just to insects. Haidt gives a lengthy and convincing defense of group selection, his main point being that humans can pursue self- interest at the same time they promote self-interest within a group setting - humans are "90 percent chimp, 10 percent bees". One can readily observe in the news and entertainment mediate that religion is a frequent target of derision, even within the scientific community - Haidt points to the strident contempt that the "New Atheists" hold for religion. They claim that religion is purely a by-product of an adaptive psychological trait and as a mere by-product religion serves no useful purpose. However, the religious "sense" has somehow managed to persist in the human psyche. One explanation by the New Atheists of how religion propagated itself is that it is a "parasite" or "virus" which latches onto a susceptible host and induces the host to "infect" others. As a "virus" or "parasite" that is merely interested in its own survival, religion causes people to perform behaviors that do not increase their own reproductive fitness and may even be detrimental to survival, but religion spreads nonetheless. …

The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion

LIST OF FIGURES PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 1 Philosophy of Education Before the Twentieth Century Socrates and Plato Aristotle Rousseau Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 2 The Philosophical and Educational Thought of John Dewey Dewey's Philosophical Orientation The Meaning and Aims of Education Dewey's Psychology Dewey's Theory of Knowledge Democracy and Education The Place of Subject Matter Dewey Today: An Assessment Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 3 Analytic Philosophy Philosophical Analysis in Education The Analysis of Teaching Current Analyses of Teaching Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 4 Continental Philosophy Existentialism Phenomenology Critical Theory Hermeneutics Postmodernism Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 5 Logic and Critical Thinking Formal Logic Informal Logic McPeck's View of Critical Thinking An Alternative Approach Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 6 Epistemology and Education Justified True Belief Foundationalism Truth Nonfoundational Theories of Knowledge Epistemology and Education Constructivism Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 7 Philosophy of Social Science and Educational Research How Does Science Grow? A Debate in Educational Research Some Examples Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 8 Ethics and Moral Education Pre-Enlightenment Ethics Enlightenment Ethics Utilitarianism Deweyan Ethics Moral Education Cognitive Developmentalism Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 9 Social and Political Philosophy The Current Debate Justice and Equality in Education Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 10 Problems of School Reform Equality Accountability Standards Testing Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 11 Multiculturalism and Cosmopolitanism Multiculturalism Cosmopolitanism The Educator's Dilemma Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature 12 Feminism, Philosophy, and Education Feminist Critiques of Philosophy Epistemology Philosophy of Social Science Ethics Care and Education Summary Questions Introduction to the Literature NOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

Philosophy of Education

In the life story, autobiographical remembering and self-understanding are combined to create a coherent account of one's past. A gap is demonstrated between developmental research on the story-organization of autobiographical remembering of events in childhood and of life narratives in adulthood. This gap is bridged by substantiating D. P. McAdams's (1985) claim that the life story develops in adolescence. Two manifestations of the life story, life narratives and autobiographical reasoning, are delineated in terms of 4 types of global coherence (temporal, biographical, causal, and thematic). A review of research shows that the cognitive tools necessary for constructing global coherence in a life story and the social-motivational demands to construct a life story develop during adolescence. The authors delineate the implications of the life story framework for other research areas such as coping, attachment, psychotherapeutic process, and the organization of autobiographical memory.

Getting a life: the emergence of the life story in adolescence.

4-8-year-old children's attributions of emotion to a story figure who violated a moral rule were studied in a series of experiments. Most 4-year-olds judged a wrongdoer to experience positive emotions, focusing their justifications on the successful outcome of his action, whereas almost all 8-year-olds attributed negative feelings, focusing on the moral value of the wrongdoer's action. A developmental trend from outcome-oriented toward morally oriented emotion attributions was also observed in children's judgments of the feelings of a story character who had resisted temptation. When morally evaluating a wrongdoer, only children above the age of 6 years took emotional reactions into account, judging a "happy" wrongdoer to be worse than a "sorry" one. 4- and 5-year-olds attributed positive emotions to a wrongdoer even if his transgression was severe and if he did not gain any material profit from it. However, they did not expect a person (even an ill-motivated one) to feel good if he or she unintentionally harmed another person or merely observed someone being hurt. These results are discussed in relation to recent research on children's developing conceptions of emotion and on the early development of moral understanding.

Children's understanding of moral emotions.

Luhmann, a prominent exponent of social systems theory, maintains that in modern, functionally differentiated societies morality is neither possible nor necessary. Against this claim it is argued that democracies want citizens with moral motivation. In contrast to Kohlberg, moral motivation is conceptualised as independent of stage of moral development, i.e. of the complexity of sociocognitive reasoning capacity. It is defined as willingness to do what one knows to be right even if that entails personal costs. This definition agrees with children's understanding. Moral motivation is assessed using emotion attributions. As empirically demonstrated, emotions indicate value commitments and action dispositions and this allows a motivational interpretation of the ‘happy victimiser phenomenon’, i.e. younger children's tendency to expect wrongdoers to feel good. Drawing on a longitudinal study, the development of moral motivation from childhood to early adulthood is described. There is a steady increase in sampl...

Development of moral motivation from childhood to early adulthood

Two moralities? A critical discussion of an ethic of care and responsibility versus an ethic of rights and justice

This study is concerned with the prediction of interindividual differences in children's immoral behavior in real moral conflicts by moral motive strength (appropriate attribution of moral emotions to story characters), temperamental inhibition, and ego control. Children were tempted to cheat at age 6 when they felt unobserved, or to contend for a scarce resource in peer triads at age 7. Moral motive strength and inhibition, but not ego control, predicted low cheating and low nonverbal rivalry to a similar extent. Extreme group analyses of children low or high in both traits showed that cheating/noncheating could be predicted with a hit rate above 90%. Nonverbal rivalry in a group increased exponentially with the number of low-moral uninhibited children in the group, a finding replicated within the same sample. Discussion focuses on the influence of moral motive strength, temperamental inhibition, ego control, and their interaction on the reduction of immoral behavior.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1131529.pdf

Gertrud Nunner-Winkler

Papers

Children's understanding of moral emotions.

Development of moral motivation from childhood to early adulthood

Two moralities? A critical discussion of an ethic of care and responsibility versus an ethic of rights and justice

Children's Moral Motive Strength and Temperamental Inhibition Reduce Their Immoral Behavior in Real Moral Conflicts

Entwicklung des Ichs