/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

Algorithmic trading has sharply increased over the past decade Does it improve market quality, and should it be encouraged? We provide the first analysis of this question The NYSE automated quote dissemination in 2003, and we use this change in market structure that increases algorithmic trading as an exogenous instrument to measure the causal effect of algorithmic trading on liquidity For large stocks in particular, algorithmic trading narrows spreads, reduces adverse selection, and reduces trade-related price discovery The findings indicate that algorithmic trading improves liquidity and enhances the informativeness of quotes

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1668523_code49904.pdf?abstractid=1100635&rulid=5239579&mirid=2

Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity

This paper solves explicitly a simple equilibrium model with liquidity risk. In our liquidityadjusted capital asset pricing model, a security s required return depends on its expected liquidity as well as on the covariances of its own return and liquidity with the market return and liquidity. In addition, a persistent negative shock to a security s liquidity results in low contemporaneous returns and high predicted future returns. The model provides a unified framework for understanding the various channels through which liquidity risk may affect asset prices. Our empirical results shed light on the total and relative economic significance of these channels and provide evidence of flight to liquidity. r 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Market Liquidity: Asset Pricing with Liquidity Risk

Society's demands for individual and corporate social responsibility as alternative responses to market and distributive failures are becoming increasingly prominent. We draw on recent developments in the psychology and economics of prosocial behaviour to shed light on this trend and the underlying mix of motivations. We then link individual concerns to corporate social responsibility, contrasting three possible understandings of the term: firms' adoption of a more long-term perspective, the delegated exercise of prosocial behaviour on behalf of stakeholders, and insider-initiated corporate philanthropy. We discuss the benefits, costs and limits of socially responsible behaviour as a means to further societal goals.

/pdf/individual-and-corporate-social-responsibility-1v44bdupxr.pdf

Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility

Society’s demands for individual and corporate social responsibility as an alternative response to market and distributive failures are becoming increasingly prominent. We first draw on recent developments in the “psychology and economics” of prosocial behavior to shed light on this trend, which reflects a complex interplay of genuine altruism, social or self image concerns, and material incentives. We then link individual concerns to corporate social responsibility, contrasting three possible understandings of the term: the adoption of a more long-term perspective by firms, the delegated exercise of prosocial behavior on behalf of stakeholders, and insider-initiated corporate philanthropy. For both individuals and firms we discuss the benefits, costs and limits of socially responsible behavior as a means to further societal goals.

/pdf/individual-and-corporate-social-responsibility-3vj4z7bfgq.pdf

When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, relations with social activists may become an effective entrenchment strategy for inefficient CEOs. We thus argue that managerial turnover and firm value are increased when explicit stakeholder protection is introduced so as to deprive incumbent CEOs of activists' support. This finding provides a rationale for the emergence of specialized institutions (social auditors and ethic indexes) that help firms commit to stakeholder protection even in case of managerial replacement. Our theory also explains a recent trend whereby social activist organizations and institutional shareholders are showing a growing support for each others' agenda.

/pdf/corporate-social-responsibility-and-managerial-entrenchment-4xxv52z9jt.pdf

Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment

When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, relations with social activists may become an eective entrenchment strategy for inecient CEOs. We thus argue that managerial turnover and firm value are increased by the institutionalization of stakeholder protection depriving incumbent CEOs of activists’ support. This finding provides a rationale for the emergence of specialized institutions (social auditors and ethic indexes) that help firms commit to stakeholder protection even in case of managerial replacement. Our theory also explains a recent trend whereby social activist organizations and institutional shareholders are showing a growing support for each others’ agenda.

Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment.

Liquidity providers often learn information about an asset from prices of other assets. We show that this generates a self-reinforcing positive relationship between price informativeness and liquidity. This relationship causes liquidity spillovers and is a source of fragility: a small drop in the liquidity of one asset can, through a feedback loop, result in a very large drop in market liquidity and price informativeness (a liquidity crash). This feedback loop provides a new explanation for comovements in liquidity and liquidity dry-ups. It also generates multiple equilibria.

Illiquidity Contagion and Liquidity Crashes

Short-termism need not breed informational price ineciency even when generating Beauty Contests. We demonstrate this claim in a two-period market with persistent liquidity trading and risk-averse, privately informed, short-term investors and nd that prices reect average expectations about fundamentals and liquidity trading. Informed investors engage in \retrospective" learning to reassess inferences (about fundamentals) made during the trading game’s early stages. This behavior introduces strategic complementarities in the use of information and can yield two stable equilibria that can be ranked in terms of liquidity, volatility, and informational eciency.

/pdf/the-beauty-contest-and-short-term-trading-3keg8w1ier.pdf

Giovanni Cespa

Papers

Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment

Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment.

Illiquidity Contagion and Liquidity Crashes

Illiquidity Contagion and Liquidity Crashes

The Beauty Contest and Short-Term Trading