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The Theory of Industrial Organization

Does the period over which individuals evaluate outcomes influence their investment in risky assets? Results from this study show that the more frequently returns are evaluated, the more risk averse investors will be. The results are in line with the behavioral hypothesis of "myopic loss aversion," which assumes that people are myopic in evaluating outcomes over time, and are more sensitive to losses than to gains. The results have relevance for the equity premium puzzle, and also for the marketing strategies of fund managers. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of t (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

An experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods

The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have created societal and political pressure for pension funds to address sustainable investing. We run two field surveys (n=1,669 and n=3,186) with a pension fund that grants its members a real vote on its sustainable-investment policy. Two thirds of participants are willing to expand the fund’s engagement with companies based on selected SDGs, even when they expect engagement to hurt the financial performance. The support remains strong after the fund implemented the choice. A key reason is participants’ strong social preferences.

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Get Real! Individuals Prefer More Sustainable Investments

Risk attitude is known to be a key determinant of various economic and financial choices. Behavioral studies that aim to evaluate the role of risk attitudes in contexts of this type, therefore, require tools for measuring individual risk tolerance. Recent developments in decision theory provide such tools. However, the methods available can be time consuming. As a result, some practitioners might have an incentive to prefer "fast and frugal" methods to clean but more costly methods. In this article, we focus on a tractable procedure initially proposed by Holt and Laury (2002) to elicit risk attitude. We generalize this method to measure utility and risk aversion as follows. First, we allow measurement of probabilistic risk attitude through violations of expected utility due to probability weighting. Second, we use the outcome scale rather than the probability scale in the menu of choices. Third, we compare sure payoffs with lotteries instead of comparing non-degenerate lotteries. A within-subject experimental study illustrates the gains in tractability and bias minimization that can result from such an extension.

Risk aversion elicitation: reconciling tractability and bias minimization

markdown‘What makes an entrepreneur?’ is a fundamental question for economics, management, and psychology researchers. The present thesis addresses the definition of ‘the entrepreneur’ by investigating the roles of psychological (Part I: Chapters 2, 3, and 4) and biological (Part II: Chapters 5 and 6) traits in entrepreneurship. This interdisciplinary setting is a result of the limitations of the traditional ‘homo economicus’ perspective, where rational individuals are utility maximizing decision makers. 
The present thesis contributes to the field of entrepreneurship by focusing on the psychology of the entrepreneur, using concepts like overconfidence, optimism, positive affect, and negative affect, as well as the biology of the entrepreneur, using concepts like behavior and electrophysiology. It also contributes to the field of psychology by examining why some psychological concepts are problematic in one person (patient) but beneficial in another (entrepreneur) as well as to the field of biology, especially electrophysiology, with null findings despite of analyzing large samples and while small samples report significant findings. 
Of course, psychology and biology could play a role in many occupations. Thus, with the present thesis, entrepreneurship is not underlined, rather it is used as a proof of concept. Future research should not just further develop the understanding of the role of psychology and biology in entrepreneurship, but also investigate other manifestations of economic behavior and outcomes.

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Essays at the Intersection of Psychology, Biology, and Entrepreneurship : Verslagen op het snijvlak van psychologie, biologie en ondernemerschap

Collectively organized pension plans must increasingly demonstrate that the risk preferences of their members are adequately reflected in the plans’ asset allocations. However, whether funds should elicit individual members’ risk preferences to achieve this goal, or whether they can rely on other indicators, such as socio-demographics, remains unclear. To address this question, we apply a tailored augmented lottery choice method to elicit individual pension income risk preferences from 7894 members from five different pension plans. The results show that member risk preferences are strongly heterogeneous and can only partially be predicted from individual and plan characteristics. Differences in risk preference imply different optimal asset allocations. We find large welfare losses for heterogeneous members in pension plans with their current asset allocation because these allocations are safer than implied by members’ preferences. We provide a framework for pension plans to gauge the need to elicit risk preferences among their members.

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Individual pension risk preference elicitation and collective asset allocation with heterogeneity

Pension funds’ operating costs impair pension benefits, so it is crucial for pension funds to operate at the lowest cost possible. In practice, we observe substantial differences in costs per member for Dutch pension funds, both across and within pension fund size classes. This article presents new estimates of scale economies of pension funds and is the first that also measures pension fund X-inefficiency. We use a unique supervisory data set which distinguishes between administrative and investment costs and apply various approaches and models. Our estimates show large economies of scale for pension fund administrations, but modest diseconomies of scale for investment activities. We also found that many pension funds have substantial X-inefficiencies for both administrative and investment activities. The two kinds of inefficiency differ across types of pension funds. Therefore, most pension funds should be able to improve their cost performance, and hence increase pension benefits.

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X-efficiency and economies of scale in pension fund administration and investment

Pension risk preferences: a personalized elicitation method and its impact on asset allocation

markdownThe organization of pensions differs greatly across, and within, countries, and these differences affect the large number of stakeholders differently. The choices that underlie these differences tend to be very complicated, as they have to be balanced over the interests of different stakeholders over time. 
The first two studies of this doctoral thesis analyse heterogeneity in pension plan risk preferences. Using an augmented risk preferences elicitation method, we find strong heterogeneity in latent risk preferences. Together with institutional differences these affect the optimal asset allocation. Therefore, it is worthwhile to elicit risk preferences.
The third study focuses on pension fund administration and investment costs. We show that there are large economies of scale for pension fund administrations, and modest diseconomies of scale for investment activities. Many pension funds have substantial X-inefficiencies for both administrative and investment activities. The study suggests that consolidation of pension funds may be efficiency enhancing. 
The fourth study investigates pension fund discontinuity events. The occurrence and impact of these events is strongly dependent on the institutional setting of pensions. Stricter regulations increase the financial stability of the pension fund, but may reduce membership support through lower replacement rates. This trade-off influences the management of pension funds. 
Taken together, this dissertation scrutinizes the complexity of choices in pension organization. Choices in pensions depend on the particular institutional setting of pensions and on specific pension plan member characteristics. These choices affect a great many stakeholders of pensions through different channels, both directly and indirectly.

Choices in Pension Management

Pension funds’ operating costs come at the cost of benefits, so it is crucial for pension funds to operate at the lowest cost possible. In practice, we observe substantial differences in costs per member for Dutch pension funds, both across and within size classes. This paper discusses scale inefficiency and X-inefficiency using various approaches and models, based on a unique supervisory data set, which distinguishes between administrative and investment costs. Our estimates show large economies of scale for pension fund administrations, but modest diseconomies of scale for investment activities. We also found that many pension funds have substantial X-inefficiencies for both administrative and investment activities. The two kinds of inefficiency differ across types of pension funds. Therefore, most pension funds should be able to improve their cost performance, and hence increase pension benefits.

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Gosse Alserda

Papers

Individual pension risk preference elicitation and collective asset allocation with heterogeneity

X-efficiency and economies of scale in pension fund administration and investment

Pension risk preferences: a personalized elicitation method and its impact on asset allocation

Choices in Pension Management

X-efficiency and Economies of Scale in Pension Fund Administration and Investment