计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

We document differences in CEO pay and incentives in the United States and the United Kingdom for 1997. After controlling for size, sector and other firm and executive characteristics, CEOs in the US earn 45% higher cash compensation and 190% higher total compensation. The calculated effective ownership percentage in the US implies that the median CEO receives 1.48% of any increase in shareholder wealth compared to 0.25% in the UK The differences, can be largely attributed to greater share option awards in the US arising from institutional and cultural differences between the two countries. Corporate governance practices in the United Kingdom received increased attention in the 1990s, culminating in influential reports issued by the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) committees. Among other recommendations, the reports outlined a best-practice framework for setting executive pay, and significantly expanded disclosure rules for UK executive compensation. The Greenbury and Hampel reports were, in part, a response to a growing controversy over chief executive officer (CEO) pay levels triggered when executives in several recently privatised electric utilities exercised share options worth millions of pounds. However, in spite of these reports, CEO pay levels rose more than 18% in 1997 alone, even as publicsector workers were being asked to accept raises of less than 3% (Buckingham and Cowe, 1998 a,b). The continuing controversy, coupled with enhanced data availability through the new disclosure requirements, has sparked considerable academic interest in UK executive pay practices. Although CEO pay levels in the United Kingdom have grown in recent years, they remain far behind pay levels enjoyed by CEOs in the United States. The international pay gap is especially pronounced after including gains realised from exercising share options. Chief executives in the 500 largest UK companies in aggregate made ?330 million (or ?660,000 each) in 1997, including ?74 million from exercising options. In contrast, the top 500 US CEOs made in aggregate ?3.2 billion (or ?6.3 million each), including ?2.0 billion from option exercises.' Indeed, Disney's Michael Eisner, dubbed by pay-critic Graef Crystal

The prince and the pauper? ceo pay in the

We document differences in CEO pay and incentives in the United States and the United Kingdom for 1997. After controlling for size, sector and other firm and executive characteristics, CEOs in the US earn 45% higher cash compensation and 190% higher total compensation. The calculated effective ownership percentage in the US implies that the median CEO receives 1.48% of any increase in shareholder wealth compared to 0.25% in the UK. The differences, can be largely attributed to greater share option awards in the US arising from institutional and cultural differences between the two countries.

The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom

This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance.

Corporate tournaments and executive compensation: Evidence from the U.K.

This paper investigates shareholder voting in the UK. The Directors’ Remuneration Report (DRR) Regulations of 2002 gave shareholders a mandatory non-binding vote on boardroom pay. First, using data on about 50,000 resolutions over the period 2002 to 2007 we find that less than 10% of shareholders abstain or vote against the mandated Directors’ Remuneration Report (DRR) resolution. Second, investors are more likely to vote against DRR resolutions compared to non-pay resolutions. Third, shareholders are more likely to vote against general executive pay resolutions, such as stock options, long-term incentive plans and bonus resolutions compared to non-pay resolutions. Forth, firms with higher CEO pay attract greater voting dissent. Fifth, there is little evidence that CEO pay is lower in firms that previously experienced high levels of shareholder dissent. In addition, there is little evidence that the equity pay-mix, representing better owner-manager alignment, is greater in such firms. Currently, we find limited evidence that, on average, ‘say on pay’ materially alters the subsequent level and design of CEO compensation.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/corg_802.pdf?abstractid=1647230&mirid=1&type=2

Shareholder Voting and Directors’ Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK

Executive Overview Executive compensation consultants are investigated using data from the United States and the United Kingdom. The study yields a number of findings. First, CEO pay is generally greater in firms that use compensation consultants, consistent with a rent-extraction theory of executive pay. Second, the amount of equity used in the CEO compensation package, such as stock options, is greater in firms that use consultants. This is consistent with alignment of manager and shareholder interests. Third, there is little evidence that using consultants with potential conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business to client firms, leads to greater CEO pay or the adverse design of pay contracts. Copyright by the Academy of Management.

Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom

Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: The paper investigates the determinants of shareholder voting and its relation to CEO pay in the UK. The context of the study is the Directors' Remuneration Report (DRR) Regulations of 2002. This legislation gave shareholders a mandatory non-binding vote on boardroom pay in the UK. Research Findings/Insights: First, we find that less than 10 per cent of shareholders abstain or vote against the mandated Directors' Remuneration Report (DRR) resolution. This percentage is falling over time. Second, investors are more likely to vote against DRR resolutions compared to non-pay resolutions. Third, shareholders are more likely to vote against general executive pay resolutions, such as stock options, long-term incentive plans, and bonus resolutions compared to non-pay resolutions. Forth, firms with higher CEO pay attract greater voting dissent. Fifth, there is little evidence that CEO pay is lower in firms that previously experienced high levels of shareholder dissent. In addition, there is little evidence that the fraction of CEO equity pay, representing owner-manager alignment, is greater in such firms. Currently, we find limited evidence that, on average, “say on pay” materially alters the subsequent level and design of CEO compensation. Theoretical/Academic Implications: The study provides new insights on shareholder voting and CEO pay. Theoretically, shareholder voting is endogenously determined. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The study provides insights for practitioners and policy makers interested in shareholder rights, the effects on corporate governance, and say on pay in the UK. Shareholder voting appears to have limited effects on curbing excess CEO pay. Boards and compensation committees may want to communicate better policies on executive compensation to avert shareholder dissent.

Graham V. Sadler

Papers

Corporate tournaments and executive compensation: Evidence from the U.K.

Shareholder Voting and Directors’ Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK

Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom

Shareholder Voting and Directors' Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK

The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence