Showing papers by "Gregory DeAngelo published in 2007"

An analysis of economic cost minimization and biological invasion damage control using the AWQ criterion

Abstract: DeAngelo et al. (New approaches to the Economics of plant health. Springer, Heidelberg, 2006) have recently used the AWS criterion in a M/G/1 queuing model to show that there is no necessary tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency in non-native species management. In this paper, we use an alternate cost criterion (AWQ criterion) to investigate the generality of this central result in DeAngelo et al. (New approaches to the Economics of plant health. Springer, Heidelberg, 2006). Our theoretical analysis shows that there is no unambiguous answer to this question. Therefore, we use numerical methods and our numerical analysis leads to two findings. First, for many values of the model parameters that describe the strictness of inspections, there is a tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency. Second, for most values of the model parameter that depicts the volume of maritime trade handled by the seaport under consideration, there is no tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency.

On economic-cost minimization versus biological-invasion damage control

Abstract: Recently, Batabyal et al (2005) have used a queuing model to show that there is a tension between economic-cost minimization and inspection stringency in invasive-species management in the following sense: greater (lesser) inspection stringency with a larger (smaller) number of inspectors leads to higher (lower) economic costs We use a more general queuing model to investigate whether there is, in fact, a tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency Our theoretical analysis shows that there is no definite answer to this question Therefore, we use numerical methods, and our numerical analysis leads to two conclusions For many values of the model parameters that delineate the strictness of inspections, there is a tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency In contrast, for most values of the model parameter that describes the volume of maritime trade handled by the port under study, there is no tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency

Average Patent Pendency and Examination Errors: A Queuing Theoretic Analysis

Abstract: Researchers have raised two concerns about the current patent approval process by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). First, it takes too long to process applications. Second, examiners make too many errors in the approval process. The first concern suggests that examiners ought to be less stringent in their decision making and hence take less time in processing applications. The second concern suggests exactly the opposite. Given this state of affairs, we analyze the following question: Does a more stringent examination of applications always lengthen the pendency period? Our theoretical analysis shows that there is no definite answer to this question. Hence, we use numerical methods and our numerical analysis leads to two conclusions. For many values of the model parameters that describe the stringency of examinations, a more stringent examination process does lengthen the pendency period. In contrast, for most values of the model parameter that describes the volume of patent applications handled by the PTO under study, a more stringent examination process does not lengthen the pendency period.

To Match or Not to Match: Aspects of Marital Matchmaking Under Uncertainty

Abstract: In contemporary times, individuals wishing to get married are increasingly using matchmakers to assist them with the task of finding an apposite spouse. This notwithstanding, researchers have paid scant attention to the task of matchmaking from the perspective of a matchmaker. Therefore, the general purpose of this paper is to analyze the circumstances under which a matchmaker optimally accepts or rejects individual matching assignments. To this end, we concentrate on two specific cases. In the first case, our matchmaker's reservation profit is exogenous. In the second case, this reservation profit is endogenous.