Showing papers by "Gregory DeAngelo published in 2014"
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on a mass layoff of Oregon State Police in February of 2003 and find that the subsequent decrease in enforcement is associated with a significant increase in injuries and fatalities.
Abstract: Simultaneity complicates the estimation of the causal effect of police on crime. We overcome this obstacle by focusing on a mass layoff of Oregon State Police in February of 2003. Due solely to budget cuts, 35 percent of the roadway troopers were laid off, which dramatically reduced citations. The subsequent decrease in enforcement is associated with a significant increase in injuries and fatalities. The effects are similar using control groups chosen either geographically or through data-driven methods. Our estimates suggest that a highway fatality can be prevented with $309,000 of expenditures on state police. (JEL H76, K42, R41)
92 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors measure the relative efficiency of 50 municipal police departments in New York State using an output-oriented data envelopment analysis programming model and find that 30 departments are efficient, while 20 could improve their efficiency.
Abstract: This paper measures the relative efficiency of 50 municipal police departments in New York State using an output-oriented data envelopment analysis programming model and finds that 30 departments are efficient, while 20 could improve their efficiency. Adoption of best practice methods in the 20 laggard agencies could reduce violent crime by an average 173 percent and property crime by 64 percent. We find that four factors show statistically significant effects on violent and property crime “output:” the number of community policing officers, the number of employment screening techniques, the number of mobile computer devices deployed, and the number officers employed in special drug units.
2 citations
TL;DR: The authors show that the standard ultimatum/dictator exchange games implicitly assume perfectly inelastic demand, an assumption that is far too restrictive to support broad conclusions about profit maximization in general and about the restraint of fairness on profit maximisation in particular.
Abstract: In seminal contributions, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986a, 1986b) introduce dictator games and questionnaires to investigate whether fairness constrains profit maximization. They find that fairness does matter in dividing monetary gains. This is important because standard microeconomic models do not take fairness into account and therefore are deficient and, as Kahneman et al. (1986, p. S286) put it, embarrassingly so. The question that this paper takes up is whether the standard dictator exchange game is too simple to adequately address the question Kahneman et al. pose. We show that the standard ultimatum/dictator exchange games implicitly assume perfectly inelastic demand, an assumption, we argue, that is far too restrictive to support broad conclusions about profit maximization in general and about the restraint of fairness on profit maximization in particular. We argue that the question at least must be investigated in the context of the simple models of profit maximization that are criticized. This paper introduces a new experimental design based on a more general demand specification defining a dictator monopoly. Results from initial rounds are similar to those of standard dictator games with significant sharing in evidence. As rounds progress, however, dictator monopolists take more, until finally they take it all. This strongly suggests that agents making decisions within a more complex microeconomic setting, even as simple as the one in this paper, respond quite differently than they do when deciding on the simple division of a windfall gain.
2 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that monetary damages and specific performance remedies are unnecessary in a zero transaction costs world, and show how the presence of transaction costs impact the decisions of contracting parties as between the inclusion of liquidated damages clauses in contracts and resorting to litigation that could result in the application of either monetary damages or specific performance remedy.
Abstract: The Coase theorem tells us that monetary damages and specific performance remedies for breach of contract have identical effects when transaction costs are zero. This has become a standard part of the literature on the economics of contract law. This note argues that the traditional view is somewhat misguided, as monetary damages and specific performance remedies are unnecessary in a zero transaction costs world. We go on to show how the presence of transaction costs impact the decisions of contracting parties as between the inclusion of liquidated damages clauses in contracts and resorting to litigation that could result in the application of either monetary damages or specific performance remedies.
1 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a theoretical environment to assess determinants of policing decisions, including not only the chance of observing the violation, but also the decisions of the police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, jurors, parole boards, etc.
Abstract: The economic analysis of deterrence emphasizes the role of expected sanctions in creating costs to illegal behavior. Typically, the enforcement of the law is compressed into a single probability. This variable is intended to summarize all relevant information regarding not only the chance of observing the violation, but also includes the decisions of the police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, jurors, parole boards, etc. While a substantial literature has developed for assessing the objectives of and influences on judges and prosecutors, the incentives facing police officers has been relatively neglected. Our objective is to develop a theoretical environment to assess determinants of policing decisions.