We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.

Random graphs

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

A unified view of metaheuristics This book provides a complete background on metaheuristics and shows readers how to design and implement efficient algorithms to solve complex optimization problems across a diverse range of applications, from networking and bioinformatics to engineering design, routing, and scheduling. It presents the main design questions for all families of metaheuristics and clearly illustrates how to implement the algorithms under a software framework to reuse both the design and code. Throughout the book, the key search components of metaheuristics are considered as a toolbox for: Designing efficient metaheuristics (e.g. local search, tabu search, simulated annealing, evolutionary algorithms, particle swarm optimization, scatter search, ant colonies, bee colonies, artificial immune systems) for optimization problems Designing efficient metaheuristics for multi-objective optimization problems Designing hybrid, parallel, and distributed metaheuristics Implementing metaheuristics on sequential and parallel machines Using many case studies and treating design and implementation independently, this book gives readers the skills necessary to solve large-scale optimization problems quickly and efficiently. It is a valuable reference for practicing engineers and researchers from diverse areas dealing with optimization or machine learning; and graduate students in computer science, operations research, control, engineering, business and management, and applied mathematics.

/pdf/metaheuristics-from-design-to-implementation-1vqdfv8nk9.pdf

Metaheuristics: From Design to Implementation

Background
The main problem in many model-building situations is to choose from a large set of covariates those that should be included in the "best" model. A decision to keep a variable in the model might be based on the clinical or statistical significance. There are several variable selection algorithms in existence. Those methods are mechanical and as such carry some limitations. Hosmer and Lemeshow describe a purposeful selection of covariates within which an analyst makes a variable selection decision at each step of the modeling process.

/pdf/purposeful-selection-of-variables-in-logistic-regression-5gll9wrfi8.pdf

Purposeful selection of variables in logistic regression

The theory of directed graphs has developed enormously over recent decades, yet this book (first published in 2000) remains the only book to cover more than a small fraction of the results. New research in the field has made a second edition a necessity. Substantially revised, reorganised and updated, the book now comprises eighteen chapters, carefully arranged in a straightforward and logical manner, with many new results and open problems. As well as covering the theoretical aspects of the subject, with detailed proofs of many important results, the authors present a number of algorithms, and whole chapters are devoted to topics such as branchings, feedback arc and vertex sets, connectivity augmentations, sparse subdigraphs with prescribed connectivity, and also packing, covering and decompositions of digraphs. Throughout the book, there is a strong focus on applications which include quantum mechanics, bioinformatics, embedded computing, and the travelling salesman problem. Detailed indices and topic-oriented chapters ease navigation, and more than 650 exercises, 170 figures and 150 open problems are included to help immerse the reader in all aspects of the subject. Digraphs is an essential, comprehensive reference for undergraduate and graduate students, and researchers in mathematics, operations research and computer science. It will also prove invaluable to specialists in related areas, such as meteorology, physics and computational biology.

Digraphs Theory Algorithms And Applications

Preface. Contributing Authors.- 1. The Traveling Salesman Problem: Applications, Formulations and Variations.- 2. Polyhedral Theory and Branch-and-Cut Algorithms for the Symmetric TSP.- 3. Polyhedral Theory for the Asymmetric Traveling Salesman Problem.- 4. Exact Methods for the Asymmetric Traveling Salesman Problem.- 5. Approximation Algorithms for Geometric TSP.- 6. Exponential Neighborhoods and Domination Analysis for the TSP.- 7. Probabilistic Analysis of the TSP.- 8. Local Search and Metaheuristics.- 9. Experimental Analysis of Heuristics for the STSP.- 10. Experimental Analysis of Heuristics for the ATSP.- 11. Polynomially Solvable Cases of the TSP.- 12. The Maximum TSP.- 13. The Generalized Traveling Salesman and Orienteering Problems.- 14. The Prize Collecting Traveling Salesman Problem and Its Applications.- 15. The Bottleneck TSP.- 16. TSP Software.- Appendix A: Sets, Graphs and Permutations. Appendix B: Computational Complexity. References. List of Figures. List of Tables. Index.

/pdf/the-traveling-salesman-problem-and-its-variations-4ya507d5u2.pdf

The traveling salesman problem and its variations

Editorial: The traveling salesman problem

Traveling salesman should not be greedy: domination analysis of greedy-type heuristics for the TSP

http://www.cs.rhul.ac.uk/~gutin/paperstsp/anti8.pdf

Gregory Gutin

Papers

Digraphs Theory Algorithms And Applications

The traveling salesman problem and its variations

Editorial: The traveling salesman problem

Traveling salesman should not be greedy: domination analysis of greedy-type heuristics for the TSP

When the greedy algorithm fails