China's economic reforms have resulted in spectacular growth and poverty reduction. However, China's institutions look ill-suited to achieve such a result, and they indeed suffer from serious shortcomings. To solve the "China puzzle," this paper analyzes China's institution—a regionally decentralized authoritarian system. The central government has control over personnel, whereas subnational governments run the bulk of the economy; and they initiate, negotiate, implement, divert, and resist reforms, policies, rules, and laws. China's reform trajectories have been shaped by regional decentralization. Spectacular performance on the one hand and grave problems on the other hand are all determined by this governance structure. ( JEL O17, O18, O43, P21, P25, P26)

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The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development

Land policies are of fundamental importance to sustainable growth, good governance, and the well-being of, and the economic opportunities open to, both rural and urban dwellers - particularly the poor. To this end, research on land policy, and analysis of interventions related to the subject, have long been of interest to the Bank's Research Department, and other academic, and civil society institutions. The report aims to strengthen the effectiveness of land policy in support of development, and poverty reduction, by setting out the results of recent research in a way that is accessible to a wide audience of policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, academics in the Bank's client countries, donor agency officials, and the broader development community. Its main message rests on three principles: 1) provision of secure tenure to land improves the welfare of the poor, particularly by enhancing the asset base of those whose land rights are often neglected, and, creates incentives needed for investment, paramount to sustainable economic growth; 2) facilitation of land exchange, and distribution, whether as an asset or for current services, at low cost, through markets, and non-market channels, will expedite land access by productive, but land-poor producers, so that once economic growth improves, financial markets would rely on the use of land as collateral; and, 3) governments' contribution to the promotion of socially desirable land allocation, and utilization. The report discusses mechanisms to promote tenure security, demonstrates the importance of rental market transactions, arguing the removal of impediments to these can generate equity advantages, and positive investments. It also illustrates mechanisms, ranging from taxation, to regulation and land use planning to address these issues.

Land policies for growth and poverty reduction

We examine the impact of ambiguous and contested land rights on investment and productivity in agriculture in Akwapim, Ghana. We show that individuals who hold powerful positions in a local political hierarchy have more secure tenure rights and that as a consequence they invest more in land fertility and have substantially higher output. The intensity of investments on different plots cultivated by a given individual corresponds to that individual’s security of tenure over those specific plots and, in turn, to the individual’s position in the political hierarchy relevant to those specific plots.

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The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana

Institutions, ownership, and finance: the determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms☆

The current global land grab is causing radical changes in the use and ownership of land. The main process driving the land grab, or ‘foreignisation of space’, as highlighted in the media and the emerging literature is the production of food and biofuel for export in the aftermath of recent food and energy crises. However, there are several other processes driving the land rush. In this article I argue that an analytical framework that focuses on only one or two processes that drive the global land grab offers a narrow perspective on this complex process. It will be unable to take into account the full range and extent of agrarian and social changes that occur in light of the land grab and their strategic implications for poor people's livelihoods. An important starting point is to identify the broad processes driving the current land rush, and trace their structural and institutional origins. To do so, I identify and examine seven factors that are giving rise to radical changes in landownership and land ...

Globalisation and the foreignisation of space: seven processes driving the current global land grab

This paper uses household data from Northeast China to examine the link between investment and land tenure insecurity induced by China’s system of village-level land reallocation. We quantify expropriation risk using a hazard analysis of individual plot tenures and incorporate the predicted “hazards of expropriation” into an empirical analysis of plot-level investment. Our focus is on organic fertilizer use, which has long lasting benefits for soil quality. Although we find that higher expropriation risk significantly reduces application of organic fertilizer, a welfare analysis shows that guaranteeing land tenure in this part of China would yield only minimal efficiency gains.

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Hazards of Expropriation: Tenure Insecurity and Investment in Rural China

China's rural economic reforms radically altered land tenure in rural China. With the granting of land use rights and residual income rights to farming households between 1979 and 1983, agriculture shifted from a collective-based to a familybased system. Land was not privatized, however. Ownership remained "collective", with local officials, typically at the village level, exercising a major influence over the allocation of land and the way households could use land. The initial land allocations to families were typically based on household size, household labour supply, or both. The central government's policy was that these allocations were supposed to be for 15 years. In some villages, land use contracts have been respected; in other villages, however, local leaders have periodically redistributed land among households and have intervened throughout the reform period to determine how farmers are able to use the land. The initial reforms triggered an unprecedented acceleration of agricultural growth in China. From 1979 to 1984, the gross value of agricultural output increased in real terms at an annual rate of 7.6 per cent, and grain production rose by 4.9 per cent annually.' Empirical studies attribute a significant part of this increase to enhanced incentives, as farmers were able to keep the output and

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3182074.pdf

Land Rights in Rural China: Facts, Fictions and Issues

Tenure, land rights, and farmer investment incentives in China

Village Leaders and Land-Rights Formation in China

Beginning in the 1980s, almost all of the socialist countries replaced their planned economies with economic systems that relied heavily on market forces to determine the production and allocation of goods and services. This transformation has affected the lives of nearly two billion people. Historically, the two main arguments in favour of planned economies were that they are more productive in the long run (because they avoided the inherent instability of market forces, and were able to mobilize more resources for investment than a decentralized system), and that they provide a more equitable distribution of income. The experience of both socialist and market economies in the twentieth century decisively rejects the first argument; it would be hard to find observers of almost any persuasion who claim that planned economies are more productive or more efficient than market economies. Yet the second argument may well be valid; planned economies may indeed be more equitable than market economies. This raises the possibility that some societies may wish to retain at least some of the policies of planned economies, despite their inefficiencies, to maintain a more equitable distribution of income. Consequently, for countries that abandoned planning in favour of the market an important policy issue is the extent to which this policy shift has increased inequality.

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Guo Li

Papers

Hazards of Expropriation: Tenure Insecurity and Investment in Rural China

Land Rights in Rural China: Facts, Fictions and Issues

Tenure, land rights, and farmer investment incentives in China

Village Leaders and Land-Rights Formation in China

Markets, Human Capital and Inequality: Evidence from Rural China