H
Hal R. Varian
Researcher at Google
Publications - 258
Citations - 42185
Hal R. Varian is an academic researcher from Google. The author has contributed to research in topics: The Internet & Public good. The author has an hindex of 74, co-authored 257 publications receiving 40181 citations. Previous affiliations of Hal R. Varian include National Bureau of Economic Research & Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Papers
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Patent
Determining Advertising Effectiveness
TL;DR: In this article, a plurality of user events is identified, where each user event is a tracked online activity or action and identifying information associated with each identified user event, the information including at least one of a time and a location of each event.
Aggregation and Disaggregation of Information Goods: Implications for Bundling, Site Licensing, and Micropayment Systems
Brian Kahin,Hal R. Varian +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a model for aggregation and disaggregation is presented, based on the Aggregation Changes Demand (ACD) model, with a focus on site licensing and subscriptions.
Journal ArticleDOI
Measuring the deadweight costs of dup and rent seeking activities
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined a simple model of rent seeking behavior in order to determine the correct way to measure welfare loss due to rent seeking, using a general equilibrium version of the standard partial equilibrium consumers' surplus cost-benefit setup.
Journal ArticleDOI
The demographics of the do-not-call list [security of data]
TL;DR: Data from do-not-call registries and other sources show discernible patterns in the demographics of consumers who signed up for do- not-call lists, which might be useful in analyzing the prospects for a do-Not-spam registry.
Book
Sequential provision of public goods
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the problem of private provision of public goods when agents are able to make sequential contributions rather than simultaneous contributions and show that this tends to exacerbate the free-rider problem in the sense that the amount of public good provided under sequential contribution is always less than under simultaneous contribution.