China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. By Peter Hays Gries. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. 224p. $24.95.Arguments in the West over the existence of a “China threat” frequently atomize and even demonize China, as the author of the book points out at the beginning. Is Chinese nationalism benign or malign? The rise of Chinese nationalism in recent times has become an issue of great interest and importance to the world because of concerns over China's intentions as economic growth propels the country's ascendance onto the world stage. This timely account analyzes the sources and dimensions of the new nationalism, from what Peter Hays Gries calls the “rarely told Chinese side of the story” (p. 4). It is premised on a refreshing perspective that “to understand Chinese nationalism, we must listen to the Chinese” (p. 4). Gries's attempt to introduce Western scholars to the views of these new nationalists is an important contribution in itself, as so often mainstream views of Chinese nationalism in the West construe it as a tool to legitimize Communist Party rule. This book gets it right by taking Chinese nationalism seriously and treats it as a matter of genuine popular base and emotional content.

China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy

China: The Pessoptimist Nation, by William A. Callahan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. xxvii + 262 pages. £25.00 (hardcover). William Callahan's study addresses the perplexing ambiguity at the heart of China's self image, and the image it projects to the rest of the world, in the modern era. For this highly divided identity, Callahan coins the phrase "pessoptimist". While it doesn't exactly trip off the tongue, it captures at least some of the highly conflicted nature of what China, and Chinese, thinks about itself, and what outsiders think about it. Callahan asserts that much internal discourse on China's image is based on a "structure of feeling". This is based on a narrative of recent history which is primarily of hurt - humiliation since the Opium wars in the mid- 19th century, and then the breakdown of national unity in the Republican Period, leading to the devastating war with Japan. The Communists were the cure at least for the unity issues, largely pulling China together as one after their victory in 1949. The historical stain of suffering and grief remains, however, even to this day, and can be resurrected at will when countries are accused of "hurting the feelings" of China through diplomatic slights. This happened most recently when President Obama "hurt the feelings of the 1 .3 billion Chinese people" by meeting with the Dalai Lama in Washington in late February 2010. Callahan has chosen rich albeit controversial territory. It is odd diplomatic behavior for what is now one of the world's largest economies, and most powerful countries, to constantly speak in this wounded way as though it were the underdog. During 2008, as Callahan documents carefully, there were multiple sources of misunderstanding between China and the outside world in the build up to the Beijing Olympics in August that year which arose from this image that China projects. The torch ceremony through various foreign capitals became a cause celebre of mixed messages and clashing values, with demonstrators battling with nationalist young overseas Chinese students. The nadir was the snatching of the torch flame from a disabled Chinese athlete in Paris, something which in part inspired the temporary boycotting of Carrefour stores in China itself. Callahan is wise in not denying the deep historic wounds left by the Second World War. The handling of this by the right wing in Japan, in particular, with a refusal to deal with the historic record robustly, especially in governmentsanctioned school textbooks, has been a constant source of anger in China. Tellingly, even the very well-meant joint committee between Japan and China in its report on the war issued late in 2009 did not commit itself to specific figures for fatalities in the 1937-45 conflict. It remains a source of deep anger and controversy. There is a distinction, however, between this and the political uses of the Second World War almost 50 years after the event. In Maoist China, particularly during the Cultural Revolution from 1967, the preoccupation was with class straggle, purging enemies within and fighting foreign revisionists. The real fire of anger at that time was reserved for the USSR, with the US and Europe a close second. The anger against Japan slept. In the 1980s, these feelings were resuscitated, with various formulations of national humiliation movements, culminating in the early 2000s in a National Humiliation Day, and finally the National Defense Day which is still observed. In his tour around this newly articulated sense of hurt, Callahan describes visits to the museums of humiliation in China, including the very powerful Nanjing Massacre Memorial. Here he sees the dominant portrayal of China as being like a violated female, invaded, raped and then mutilated by Japanese male troops. This self image reappears in language about the "century of humiliation" from 1 840 onwards, in which the virtue of China had been sullied by the new technologies of the west. …

China: The Pessoptimist Nation

The trade war between the USA and China has shocked many across the world. A disruption to the interdependence of the two largest economies seemed unfathomable. However, in an effort to thwart China’s economic practices and boost the US economy, President Trump’s administration levied tariffs on Chinese imports shortly after taking office, moving US foreign economic policy from liberalism, practiced for decades, to protectionism. China has retaliated, and the trade war continues today. With conceptual insights from the nationalism literature, we explore the nationalist roots of the trade war from both the US and Chinese perspectives. In the USA, the Trump administration’s plan to achieve energy autonomy, decrease reliance on foreign resources, and reinvigorate the manufacturing sector has led to protectionist policies, the othering of China, and hence the trade war. Although reluctant to enter the conflict, China has rebuffed the USA, resisting and counterattacking US actions, owing to a long-felt sense of persecution in the global space and an eagerness to participate fully, and lead in some issue areas, in international affairs. The conflict continues into the COVID-19 era, marked by US scapegoating of China and hits to economic performance. Until both sides are convinced they have achieved their goals, or the USA undergoes an administration change, the conflict will likely continue.

/pdf/us-china-relations-nationalism-the-trade-war-and-covid-19-3z5uhpwa6a.pdf

US–China Relations: Nationalism, the Trade War, and COVID-19

China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry, by Brantly Womack. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. xiv + 281 pp. £40.00/US$70.00 (hardcover), £15.99/US$27.99 (paperback). This well-written, thoughtful and often witty book contributes to both international relations theory and comparative politics. To the study of international relations, the book makes a convincing argument that asymmetry significantly affects how countries, particularly their governments, interact with and regard each other. Thus, the relationship between a stronger country and a weaker one is not singular but dual. The interests and perceptions of the stronger country toward the weaker one are different from the interests and perceptions of the weaker toward the stronger. Despite contributing to constant sources of tension, these differences do not necessarily lead to conflict nor to the stronger country trying to dominate or eliminate the weaker one, a point that Brantly Womack stresses because it goes against the grain of many prominent theories of international relations. Instead, the two countries can have generally peaceful interactions within the context of both accepting their asymmetry. To elaborate this argument, Womack compares China and Vietnam's interactions, drawing on both his own research and experience in both countries and on an impressive range of secondary sources. Although foreign relations between the two countries are prominent in the analysis, Womack also includes interactions involving trade, ideology, development policy and culture. Two early chapters sketch basic features of each country that affect how China and Vietnam view themselves and their relations with other nations. These features, which Womack calls "parameters", are size, degree of integration within the country and of the central government's power or influence over all its territory, extent of self-sufficiency in natural resources, domestic distribution of resources (particularly food and other essentials) and history. One prominent finding through this analysis is the significance for China of "centricity", the situation "in which the awareness, capacity, and control of the center fades as distances become larger, but not as a result of open opposition or confrontation" (p. 40). In dealing with this prominent feature of domestic politics, Chinese authorities over the centuries have tended strongly to see the world as a series of circles. The inner most one is central China; the next one is China's boundaries within which the central authorities will deal forcefully with any potential rival centers of power but otherwise rule in ways that minimize resorting to force. Beyond China's boundaries are more distant and larger circles, which China's government does not expect to control but toward which it tries to project influence and leadership. This feature, Womack says, means that China's government is keen to influence international affairs, but is neither prone to exercising military power nor to seeking additional territory unless threatened by counter-centers near its borders. …

China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry

In recent years, maritime sovereignty disputes have become highly visible microcosms of broader contests in the Asia-Pacific region. While material factors have provided potential flashpoints for conflict in the maritime domain, these conflicts are also motivated by ideational factors as sovereignty claims link national identity, status and prestige to the defence of maritime possessions. This article examines the way that maritime spaces have become increasingly linked to, and conflated with, state sovereignty in public discourses, a process articulated as "maritime territorialization". As a case study, this article uses the Timor Sea dispute between the small Southeast Asian state of Timor-Leste and its much larger neighbour Australia over maritime boundaries, territory and oil and gas reserves. It examines the specific maritime territorialization discourses employed by Timor-Leste's leaders and supporters, and considers some of the broader implications for maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific region.

Maritime Territorialization, UNCLOS and the Timor Sea Dispute

In autocracies, nationalism appears to have merged with geopolitical thinking. In light of this geopoliticisation of nationalism, it is surprising that the literature has paid virtually no attention to the role of territorial disputes as a conditioning factor. The present study seeks to further enhance the field by factoring in the role of territorial disputes in triggering different expressions of nationalism. It develops an analytical framework for typologies of nationalism according to four territorial disputes: China’s dispute with Vietnam over maritime territory in the South China Sea, China’s dispute with Japan over maritime territory in the East China Sea, Vietnam’s dispute with Cambodia over territorial border demarcations, and Vietnam’s dispute with China over maritime territory in the South China Sea. The respective disputes of China and Vietnam are analysed and tested against criteria of expressions of nationalism in autocracies. We find that territorial disputes and therefore external context are important conditioning factors of nationalism in autocracies.

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/186810341703600103

Hannah Cotillon

Papers

Territorial Disputes and Nationalism: A Comparative Case Study of China and Vietnam