For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge — proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses. Wisdom and intellectual integrity demanded that one must desist from unproven utterances and minimize, even in thought, the gap between speculation and established knowledge. The proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics. Einstein’s results again turned the tables and now very few philosophers or scientists still think that scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. But few realize that with this the whole classical structure of intellectual values falls in ruins and has to be replaced: one cannot simply water down the ideal of proven truth - as some logical empiricists do — to the ideal of’probable truth’1 or — as some sociologists of knowledge do — to ‘truth by [changing] consensus’.2

Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes

An attempt is made to interpret quantum mechanics as a statistical theory, or more exactly as a form of non-deterministic statistical dynamics. The paper falls into three parts. In the first, the distribution functions of the complete set of dynamical variables specifying a mechanical system (phase-space distributions), which are fundamental in any form of statistical dynamics, are expressed in terms of the wave vectors of quantum theory. This is shown to be equivalent to specifying a theory of functions of non-commuting operators, and may hence be considered as an interpretation of quantum kinematics. In the second part, the laws governing the transformation with time of these phase-space distributions are derived from the equations of motion of quantum dynamics and found to be of the required form for a dynamical stochastic process. It is shown that these phase-space transformation equations can be used as an alternative to the Schrodinger equation in the solution of quantum mechanical problems, such as the evolution with time of wave packets, collision problems and the calculation of transition probabilities in perturbed systems; an approximation method is derived for this purpose. The third part, quantum statistics, deals with the phase-space distribution of members of large assemblies, with a view to applications of quantum mechanics to kinetic theories of matter. Finally, the limitations of the theory, its uniqueness and the possibilities of experimental verification are discussed.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0305004100000487

Quantum mechanics as a statistical theory

This article reviews research on the use of situation models in language comprehension and memory retrieval over the past 15 years. Situation models are integrated mental representations of a described state of affairs. Significant progress has been made in the scientific understanding of how situation models are involved in language comprehension and memory retrieval. Much of this research focuses on establishing the existence of situation models, often by using tasks that assess one dimension of a situation model. However, the authors argue that the time has now come for researchers to begin to take the multidimensionality of situation models seriously. The authors offer a theoretical framework and some methodological observations that may help researchers to tackle this issue.

/pdf/situation-models-in-language-comprehension-and-memory-1geul7x1or.pdf

Situation Models in Language Comprehension and Memory

Many people have argued that the evolution of the human language faculty cannot be explained by Darwinian natural selection. Chomsky and Gould have suggested that language may have evolved as the by-product of selection for other abilities or as a consequence of as-yet unknown laws of growth and form. Others have argued that a biological specialization for grammar is incompatible with every tenet of Darwinian theory – that it shows no genetic variation, could not exist in any intermediate forms, confers no selective advantage, and would require more evolutionary time and genomic space than is available. We examine these arguments and show that they depend on inaccurate assumptions about biology or language or both. Evolutionary theory offers clear criteria for when a trait should be attributed to natural selection: complex design for some function, and the absence of alternative processes capable of explaining such complexity. Human language meets these criteria: Grammar is a complex mechanism tailored to the transmission of propositional structures through a serial interface. Autonomous and arbitrary grammatical phenomena have been offered as counterexamples to the position that language is an adaptation, but this reasoning is unsound: Communication protocols depend on arbitrary conventions that are adaptive as long as they are shared. Consequently, language acquisition in the child should systematically differ from language evolution in the species, and attempts to analogize them are misleading. Reviewing other arguments and data, we conclude that there is every reason to believe that a specialization for grammar evolved by a conventional neo-Darwinian process.

http://www.biolinguagem.com/ling_cog_cult/pinker_bloom_1990_naturallanguage_naturalselection.pdf

Natural language and natural selection

Introduction by Richard Rorty An Ambiguity in Sense-Datum Theories Another Language? The Logic of 'Looks' Explaining Looks Impressions and Ideas: a Logical Point Impressions and Ideas: A Historical Point The Logic of 'Means' Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation? Science and Ordinary Usage Private Episodes: The Problem Thoughts: The Classical View Our Rylean Ancestors Theories and Models Methodological versus Philosophical Behaviorism The Logic of Private Episodes: Thoughts The Logic of Private Episodes: Impressions Study Guide by Robert Brandom

Empiricism and the philosophy of mind

Elements of symbolic logic

Experience and prediction

Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) was a formidable figure in early-twentieth-century philosophy of science. Educated in Germany, he was influential in establishing the so-called Berlin Circle, a companion group to the Vienna Circle founded by his colleague Rudolph Carnap. The movement they founded-usually known as "logical positivism," although it is more precisely known as "scientific philosophy" or "logical empiricism"-was a form of epistemology that privileged scientific over metaphysical truths. Reichenbach, like other young philosophers of the exact sciences of his generation, was deeply impressed by the far-reaching changes in physics brought about by Einstein's special and general theories of relativity. Reichenbach responded to scientific advances by doing fundamental work in space-time theories, in quantum mechanics, in statistical mechanics, and in the development of probability theory-making him the most important philosopher of physics in the first generation of logical empiricism. Forced from his academic position by the Nazi race laws in 1933, Reichenbach wrote Experience and Prediction at the University of Istanbul, where had had fled, expressly to introduce logical positivism to English speakers. In the two decades following World War II, during the explosion of scientific advances in North America, logical positivism was the reigning theory of the philosophy of science and Reichenbach was at the peak of his career. But, inevitably, support for logical positivism began to wane as it became obvious that the justification of scientific theories could not be entirely resolved by relying on strictly formal, technical processes. The growth of the discipline of the history of philosophy of science, which has created an audience of scholars eager for seminal classics in scientific philosophy, and the evidence supporting a historicist paradigm within logical positivism are two important reasons to make Experience and Prediction available once again.

/pdf/experience-and-prediction-an-analysis-of-the-foundations-and-1cg83jzhhq.pdf

Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge

The Rise of Scientific Philosophy

This book represents a new approach to philosophy. It treats philosophy as not a collection of systems, but as a study of problems. It recognizes in traditional philosophical systems the historical function of having asked questions rather than having given solutions. Professor Reichenbach traces the failures of the systems to psychological causes. Speculative philosophers offered answers at a time when science had not yet provided the means to give true answers. Their search for certainty and for moral directives led them to accept pseudo-solutions. Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and many others are cited to illustrate the rationalist fallacy: reason, unaided by observation, was regarded as a source of knowledge, revealing the physical world and 'moral truth'. The empiricists could not disprove this thesis, for they could not give a valid account of mathematical knowledge. Mathematical discoveries in the early nineteenth century cleared the way for modern scientific philosophy. Its advance was furthered by discoveries in modern physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology. These findings have made possible a new conception of the universe and of the atom. The work of scientists thus altered philosophy completely and brought into being a philosopher with a new attitude and training. Instead of dictating so-called laws of reason to the scientist, this modern philosopher proceeds by analyzing scientific methods and results. He finds answers to the age-old questions of space, time, causality, and life; of the human observer and the external world. He tells us how to find our way through this world without resorting to unjustifiable beliefs or assuming a supernatural origin for moral standards. Philosophy thus is no longer a battleground of contradictory opinions, but a science discovering truth step by step. Professor Reichenbach, known for his many contributions to logic and the philosophy of science, addresses this book to a wider audience. He writes for those who do not have the leisure or preparation to read in the fields of mathematics, symbolic logic, or physics. Besides showing the principal foundations of the new philosophy, he has been careful to provide the necessary factual background. He has written a philosophical study, not a mere popularization. It contains within its chapters all the necessary scientific material in an understandable form - and, therefore, conveys all the information indispensable to a modern world-view. The late Hans Reichenbach was Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Hans Reichenbach

Papers

Elements of symbolic logic

Experience and prediction

Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge

The Rise of Scientific Philosophy

The rise of scientific philosophy